Bimatrix game

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A payoff matrix converted from A and B where player 1 has two possible actions V and W and player 2 has actions X, Y and Z

In game theory, a bimatrix game is a simultaneous game for two players in which each player has a finite number of possible actions. The name comes from the fact that the normal form of such a game can be described by two matrices - matrix A describing the payoffs of player 1 and matrix B describing the payoffs of player 2.[1]

Player 1 is often called the "row player" and player 2 the "column player". If player 1 has m possible actions and player 2 has n possible actions, then each of the two matrices has m rows by n columns. When the row player selects the i-th action and the column player selects the j-th action, the payoff to the row player is A[i,j] and the payoff to the column player is B[i,j].

The players can also play mixed strategies. A mixed strategy for the row player is a non-negative vector x of length m such that: i=1mxi=1. Similarly, a mixed strategy for the column player is a non-negative vector y of length n such that: j=1nyj=1. When the players play mixed strategies with vectors x and y, the expected payoff of the row player is: x𝖳Ay and of the column player: x𝖳By.

Nash equilibrium in bimatrix games

Every bimatrix game has a Nash equilibrium in (possibly) mixed strategies. Finding such a Nash equilibrium is a special case of the Linear complementarity problem and can be done in finite time by the Lemke–Howson algorithm.[1]

There is a reduction from the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium in a bimatrix game to the problem of finding a competitive equilibrium in an economy with Leontief utilities.[2]

A zero-sum game is a special case of a bimatrix game in which A+B=0.

References

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