Anonymous veto network

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Template:Short description In cryptography, the anonymous veto network (or AV-net) is a multi-party secure computation protocol to compute the boolean-OR function. It was first proposed by Feng Hao and Piotr Zieliński in 2006.[1] This protocol presents an efficient solution to the Dining cryptographers problem.

A related protocol that securely computes a boolean-count function is open vote network (or OV-net).

Description

All participants agree on a group G with a generator g of prime order q in which the discrete logarithm problem is hard. For example, a Schnorr group can be used. For a group of n participants, the protocol executes in two rounds.

Round 1: each participant i selects a random value xiRq and publishes the ephemeral public key gxi together with a zero-knowledge proof for the proof of the exponent xi. A detailed description of a method for such proofs is found in Template:IETF RFC.

After this round, each participant computes:

gyi=j<igxj/j>igxj

Round 2: each participant i publishes gciyi and a zero-knowledge proof for the proof of the exponent ci. Here, the participants chose ci=xi if they want to send a "0" bit (no veto), or a random value if they want to send a "1" bit (veto).

After round 2, each participant computes gciyi. If no one vetoed, each will obtain gciyi=1. On the other hand, if one or more participants vetoed, each will have gciyi1.

The protocol design

The protocol is designed by combining random public keys in such a structured way to achieve a vanishing effect. In this case, xiyi=0. For example, if there are three participants, then x1y1+x1y2+x3y3=x1(x2x3)+x2(x1x3)+x3(x1+x2)=0. A similar idea, though in a non-public-key context, can be traced back to David Chaum's original solution to the Dining cryptographers problem.[2]

References

  1. F. Hao, P. Zieliński. A 2-round anonymous veto protocol. Proceedings of the 14th International Workshop on Security Protocols, 2006.
  2. David Chaum. The Dining Cryptographers Problem: Unconditional Sender and Recipient Untraceability Journal of Cryptology, vol. 1, No, 1, pp. 65-75, 1988