View source for Paradox of voting

{{Short description|Paradox of the expected benefit of voting}}
[[File:Voting queue in Caracas.jpg|thumb|right|A crowd of voters queuing at a polling station in [[Caracas]]]]
{{About|the expected benefit of an individual's vote|the intransitivity of majority rule among three or more alternatives|Condorcet paradox}}
{{voting}}
The '''paradox of voting''', also called '''Downs' paradox''', is that for a [[rational egoism|rational and egoistic]] voter ([[Homo economicus]]), the costs of voting will normally exceed the expected benefits. Because the chance of exercising the pivotal vote is minuscule compared to any realistic estimate of the private individual benefits of the different possible outcomes, the expected benefits of voting are less than the costs. Responses to the paradox have included the view that voters vote to express their preference for a candidate rather than affect the outcome of the election, that [[Altruism theory of voting|voters exercise some degree of altruism]], or that the paradox ignores the collateral benefits associated with voting besides the resulting electoral outcome.

==History of scholarship==
The issue was noted by [[Nicolas de Condorcet]] in 1793 when he stated, "In single-stage elections, where there are a great many voters, each voter's influence is very small. It is therefore possible that the citizens will not be sufficiently interested [to vote]" and "... we know that this interest [which voters have in an election] must decrease with each individual's [i.e. voter's] influence on the election and as the number of voters increases."<ref>Mclean, I. & Hewitt, F. (1994), ''Condorcet'', Edward Elgar Publishing, Brookfield, VT, pp. 245–246. {{ISBN?}}</ref> In 1821, [[Hegel]] made a similar observation in his ''[[Elements of the Philosophy of Right]]'': "As for popular suffrage, it may be further remarked that especially in large states it leads inevitably to electoral indifference, since the casting of a single vote is of no significance where there is a multitude of electors."<ref>{{citation |work=Idioms of Inquiry |author=Terence Ball |publisher=SUNY |year=1987 |isbn=978-0887064586 |page=[https://archive.org/details/idiomsofinquiryc0000unse/page/30 30] |title=Is There Progress in Political Science? |url=https://archive.org/details/idiomsofinquiryc0000unse/page/30 }}</ref><ref>{{citation |title=Hegel on the calculus of voting |first=James |last= Buchanan |doi=10.1007/BF01719001 |journal=Public Choice |year=1974 |volume=17 |pages=99–101 |number=1|s2cid=154136235 }}</ref> The mathematician Charles L. Dodgson, better known as [[Lewis Carroll]], published the paper "A Method of Taking Votes on More than Two Issues" in 1876.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Black|first1=D.|title=The Theory of Committees and Elections|date=1987|publisher=Springer|location=Dordrecht|isbn=978-9400942257|pages=46–51|doi=10.1007/978-94-009-4225-7_7}}</ref>

This problem in modern [[public choice]] theory was analysed by [[Anthony Downs]] in 1957.<ref>Downs, A. (1957), ''An Economic Theory of Democracy'', Harper and Row, N.Y., 1957.{{page?|date=December 2022}} {{ISBN?}}</ref> In a [[Strategic voting#Rational voter model|rational voter model]] the [[Utility#Expected utility|expected utility]] of voting U can be described as:  
: <math> U = B \cdot p - C </math>,
where <math>B</math> is the benefit of a pivotal vote, <math>p</math> is the probability of a pivotal vote and <math>C</math> is the cost of voting.<ref name="z634"/>

==Support of the rational voter model==
Predictions of the [[Strategic voting#Rational voter model|rational voter model]] on voter turnout dependency on total number of voters, [[Electoral competition|competitiveness of elections]], [[underdog]] status and cost of voting have been confirmed in a 2007 laboratory study.<ref name="j842">{{cite journal | last1=LEVINE | first1=DAVID K. | last2=PALFREY | first2=THOMAS R. | title=The Paradox of Voter Participation? A Laboratory Study | journal=American Political Science Review | publisher=Cambridge University Press (CUP) | volume=101 | issue=1 | year=2007 | issn=0003-0554 | doi=10.1017/s0003055407070013 | doi-access=free | pages=143–158}}</ref> A [[stochastic]] element of voter turnout dependency on expected utility was found in the laboratory study.<ref name="j842"/> 

==Effect of polls==
{{Further|Opinion poll#Effect on voters}}
A 2020 study found the [[Ex-ante|anticipated]] [[Electoral competition|competitiveness of elections]] based on [[Opinion poll|polls]] resulted in an causal increase of [[voter turnout]].<ref name=Closeness>{{Cite journal|last1=Bursztyn|first1=Leonardo|last2=Cantoni|first2=Davide|last3=Funk|first3=Patricia|last4=Yuchtman|first4=Noam|date=June 2017|title=Identifying the Effect of Election Closeness on Voter Turnout: Evidence from Swiss Referenda|journal=NBER Working Paper No. 23490 |doi=10.3386/w23490|doi-access=free}}</ref> 

==Modifications of the rational voter model==
===Bounded rationality===
[[Bounded rationality]] with [[Quantal response equilibrium]] was found to be a better fit of observations in a 2007 laboratory study compared to a [[Nash equilibrium]].<ref name="j842"/> The Logit Quantal response equilibrium predicted a 17% voter turnout for elections with a large number of voters without additional altruistic or civic duty terms.<ref name="j842"/>

===Altruism theory of voting===
The [[altruism theory of voting]] assumes that voters are rational but not fully egoistic. In this view voters have some degree of [[altruism]] to voters of the same party.<ref>Chiang, Tun-Jen. [https://ssrn.com/abstract=2035566 "Unequal Altruism and the Voting Paradox."] George Mason University Law and Economics Research Paper Series. 12–36 (2012): n. page. Web. 22 Oct. 2012.</ref> The altruistic utility increases with the large number of voters of the same party, which can explain the rationality of voting despite only a small chance of individually affecting the outcome.<ref>Edlin, Aaron, Andrew Gelman, and Noah Kaplan. [http://escholarship.org/uc/item/0x3780rb "Voting as a Rational Choice: Why and How People Vote To Improve the Well-Being of Others."] ''Rationality and Society''. 19.3 (2008): 293–314. Web. 22 Oct. 2012.</ref>

===Civic duty===
[[Voter turnout]] was found to increase with [[Obligation#Obligation and morality|civic duty]].<ref name="z634">{{cite journal | last1=François | first1=Abel | last2=Gergaud | first2=Olivier | title=Is civic duty the solution to the paradox of voting? | journal=Public Choice | publisher=Springer Science and Business Media LLC | volume=180 | issue=3–4 | date=21 January 2019 | issn=0048-5829 | doi=10.1007/s11127-018-00635-7 | pages=257–283}}</ref> Civic duty can be represented in the rational voter model as an additional benefit to voting independent of casting a pivotal vote.<ref name="z634"/> Voting and engaging in political discourse may increase the voter's political knowledge and community awareness, both of which may contribute to a general sense of civic duty. [["I Voted" sticker]]s and slogans such as "If you don’t vote, you can’t complain!" are connected to civic duty and citizenship models.<ref name="a428">{{cite journal | last=Butkowski | first=Chelsea P | title="If you didn't take a selfie, did you even vote?": Embodied mass communication and citizenship models in "I voted" selfies | journal=New Media & Society | publisher=SAGE Publications | volume=25 | issue=9 | date=12 January 2022 | issn=1461-4448 | doi=10.1177/14614448211068937 | pages=2399–2418}}</ref>

===Other benefits===
[[Geoffrey Brennan]] and [[Loren Lomasky]] suggest that voters derive "expressive" benefits from supporting particular candidates – analogous to cheering on a sports team – rather than voting in hopes of achieving the political outcomes they prefer. This implies that the rational behavior of voters includes the ''instrumental'' as opposed to only the ''intrinsic'' value they derive from their vote.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Brennan |first1=Geoffrey |last2=Lomasky |first2=Loren |title=Democracy and Decision: The Pure Theory of Electoral Preference |date=1997 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=0521350433}}{{page?|date=December 2022}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Brennan |first1=Geoffrey |last2=Hamlin |first2=Alan |title=Expressive Voting and Electoral Equilibrium |journal=Public Choice |date=1998 |volume=95 |pages=149–175 |doi=10.1023/A:1004936203144 |s2cid=152382368 |url=https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:1004936203144 |access-date=2 June 2021}}</ref>

The magnitudes of electoral wins and losses are very closely watched by politicians, their aides, pundits and voters, because they indicate the strength of support for candidates, and tend to be viewed as an inherently more accurate measure of such than mere opinion polls (which have to rely on imperfect sampling).{{Citation needed|date=November 2024}}

==See also==
{{Columns-list|colwidth=20em|
* [[Availability heuristic]]
* [[Compulsory voting]]
* [[Cost of Voting Index]]
* [[Free-rider problem]]
* [[Get out the vote]]
* [[Homo reciprocans]]
* [[List of close election results]]
* [[Median voter theorem]]
* [[Rational ignorance]]
* [[Strategic voting]]
* [[Superrationality]]
* [[Political apathy]]
* [[Political efficacy]]
* [[Tit for tat]]
* [[Voter suppression]]
}}

==References==
{{Reflist}}

{{Decision theory paradoxes}}

[[Category:Public choice theory]]
[[Category:Elections]]
[[Category:1957 introductions]]
[[Category:Decision-making paradoxes]]
[[Category:Voting theory]]