View source for Existence of God

{{Short description|Philosophical question}}
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{{Philosophy of religion sidebar|God}}

The '''existence of God''' is a subject of debate in the [[philosophy of religion]] and [[theology]].<ref>''The Rationality of Theism'' quoting [[Quentin Smith]] "God is not 'dead' in academia; it returned to life in the late 1960s". They cite "the shift from hostility towards theism in Paul Edwards's ''Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' (1967) to sympathy towards theism in the more recent ''[[Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy]]''.</ref> A wide variety of arguments for and against the existence of [[God]] (with the same or similar arguments also generally being used when talking about the existence of multiple [[deities]]) can be categorized as [[logic]]al, [[Empirical research|empirical]], [[Metaphysics|metaphysical]], [[Subjectivity|subjective]], or [[Science|scientific]]. In [[Philosophy|philosophical]] terms, the question of the existence of God involves the disciplines of [[epistemology]] (the nature and scope of [[knowledge]]) and [[ontology]] (study of the nature of [[being]] or [[existence]]) and the [[Value theory|theory of value]] (since some definitions of God include "perfection").

The [[Western philosophy|Western tradition of philosophical discussion]] of the existence of God began with [[Plato]] and [[Aristotle]], who made arguments for the existence of a being responsible for fashioning the [[universe]], referred to as the [[demiurge]] or the [[unmoved mover]], that today would be categorized as [[cosmological argument]]s. Other arguments for the existence of God have been proposed by [[Anselm of Canterbury|St. Anselm]], who formulated the first [[ontological argument]]; [[Thomas Aquinas]], who presented his own version of the cosmological argument (the [[Five Ways (Aquinas)|first way]]); [[René Descartes]], who said that the existence of a benevolent God is [[logically necessary]] for the evidence of the senses to be meaningful. [[John Calvin]] argued for a ''[[sensus divinitatis]]'', which gives each human a knowledge of God's existence. [[Islamic philosopher]]s who developed arguments for the existence of God comprise [[Averroes]], who made arguments influenced by Aristotle's concept of the unmoved mover; [[Al-Ghazali]] and [[Al-Kindi]], who presented the [[Kalam cosmological argument]]; [[Avicenna]], who presented the [[Proof of the Truthful]]; and [[Al-Farabi]], who made [[Platonism in Islamic philosophy|Neoplatonic arguments]].

In philosophy, and more specifically in the philosophy of religion, [[atheism]] refers to the [[proposition]] that God does not exist.<ref name ="Draper">{{cite web |last1=Draper |first1=Paul |title=Atheism and Agnosticism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/atheism-agnosticism/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |date=2022}}</ref> Some religions, such as [[Jainism]], reject the possibility of a [[creator deity]]. Philosophers who have provided arguments against the existence of God include [[David Hume]], [[Ludwig Feuerbach]], and [[Bertrand Russell]].

[[Theism]], the proposition that God exists, is the dominant view among [[philosophy of religion|philosophers of religion]].<ref>{{cite book |last1=Cruz De |first1=Helen |last2=Nichols |first2=Ryan |title=Advances in Religion, Cognitive Science, and Experimental Philosophy|date=28 January 2016 |publisher=Bloomsbury Academic |pages=135 |isbn=978-1-4742-2382-9 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=iKfnCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA135}}</ref> In a 2020 [[PhilPapers]] survey, 69.50% of philosophers of religion stated that they accept or lean towards theism, while 19.86% stated they accept or lean towards atheism.<ref>{{cite web |title=PhilPapers Survey 2020 |url=https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/4842?aos=22 |website=PhilPapers}}</ref> Prominent contemporary philosophers of religion who defended theism include [[Alvin Plantinga]], [[Yujin Nagasawa]], [[John Hick]], [[Richard Swinburne]], and [[William Lane Craig]], while those who defended atheism include [[Graham Oppy]], [[Paul Draper (philosopher)|Paul Draper]], [[Quentin Smith]], 
[[J. L. Mackie]], and [[J. L. Schellenberg]].

== Positions ==

Positions on the existence of God can be divided along numerous axes, producing a variety of [[Orthogonality|orthogonal]] classifications. Theism and atheism are positions of belief or lack of it, while [[gnosticism]] and [[agnosticism]] are positions of knowledge or the lack of it. [[Ignosticism]] concerns belief about God's conceptual coherence. [[Apatheism]] concerns belief about the practical importance of whether God exists.

For the purposes of discussion, [[Richard Dawkins]] described seven "milestones" on his [[spectrum of theistic probability]]:<ref>{{Cite book |last=Dawkins |first=Richard |title=The God Delusion |title-link=The God Delusion |publisher=Bantam Books |year=2006 |isbn=978-0-618-68000-9 |page=[https://archive.org/details/isbn_0593058259/page/n54 50] |author-link=Richard Dawkins}}</ref>

# Strong theist. 100% [[probability]] that God exists. In the words of [[Carl Jung|Carl G. Jung]]: "I do not believe, I know."
# ''De facto'' [[theist]]. Very high probability but short of 100%. "I don't know for certain, but I strongly believe in God and live my life on the assumption that he is there."
# Leaning towards theism. Higher than 50% but not very high. "I am very uncertain, but I am inclined to believe in God."
# Completely impartial. Exactly 50%. "God's existence and nonexistence are exactly equiprobable."
# Leaning towards [[atheism]]. Lower than 50% but not very low. "I do not know whether God exists but I'm inclined to be skeptical."
# ''De facto'' atheist. Very low probability, but short of zero. "I don't know for certain but I think God is very improbable, and I live my life on the assumption that he is not there."
# Strong atheist. "I know there is no God, with the same conviction as Jung knows there is one."

=== Theism ===

{{Main|Theism}}

The Catholic Church, following the teachings of [[Paul the Apostle]] (e.g., {{Bibleverse|Romans|1:20|ESV}}), [[Thomas Aquinas]], and the [[First Vatican Council]], affirms that God's existence "can be known with certainty from the created world by the natural light of human reason".<ref>Vatican Council I, ''Dei Filius'' 2; quoted in ''[[Catechism of the Catholic Church]]'', 2nd edition (New York: Doubleday, 1995) n. 36, p. 20.</ref>

==== Traditional religious definition of God ====

In [[classical theism]], God is characterized as the metaphysically ultimate being (the first, timeless, absolutely simple and sovereign being, who is devoid of any [[Anthropomorphism|anthropomorphic]] qualities), in distinction to other conceptions such as [[Theistic Personalism|theistic personalism]], [[open theism]], and [[process theism]]. Classical theists do not believe that God can be completely defined. They believe it would contradict the [[Transcendence (religion)|transcendent]] nature of God for mere humans to define him. [[Robert Barron]] explains by analogy that it seems impossible for a two-dimensional object to conceive of three-dimensional humans.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Barron |first=Robert |title=Catholicism: A Journey to the Heart of the Faith |publisher=The Doubleday Religious Publishing Group |year=2011 |isbn=9780307720511}}</ref>

In modern Western societies, the [[Conceptions of God|concepts of God]] typically entail a [[Monotheism|monotheistic]], supreme, ultimate, and [[Personal god|personal being]], as found in the [[Christianity|Christian]], [[Islam]]ic and [[Judaism|Jewish]] traditions. In monotheistic religions outside the [[Abrahamic religion|Abrahamic traditions]], the existence of God is discussed in similar terms. In these traditions, God is also identified as the author (either directly or by inspiration) of certain texts, or that certain texts describe specific historical events caused by the God in question or communications from God (whether in direct speech or via dreams or omens). Some traditions also believe that God is the entity which is currently answering prayers for intervention or information or opinions.[[File:Ibn rushd.jpg|thumb|Ibn Rushd, a 12th-century Islamic scholar]]

Many Islamic scholars have used philosophical and rational arguments to prove the existence of God. For example, [[Averroes|Ibn Rushd]], a 12th-century Islamic scholar, philosopher, and physician, states there are only two arguments worthy of adherence, both of which are found in what he calls the "Precious Book" (The Qur'an). Rushd cites "providence" and "invention" in using the Qur'an's parables to claim the existence of God. Rushd argues that the Earth's weather patterns are conditioned to support human life; thus, if the planet is so finely-tuned to maintain life, then it suggests a fine tuner—God. The Sun and the Moon are not just random objects floating in the [[Milky Way]], rather they serve us day and night, and the way nature works and how life is formed, humankind benefits from it. Rushd essentially comes to a conclusion that there has to be a higher being who has made everything perfectly to serve the needs of human beings.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Ibn Rushd (Averroes) |url=https://www.iep.utm.edu/ibnrushd/#H4 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180509151451/https://www.iep.utm.edu/ibnrushd/#H4 |archive-date=2018-05-09 |access-date=2018-05-09}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Quranic Parable |url=https://quran.com/25/61 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180509151127/https://quran.com/25/61 |archive-date=2018-05-09 |access-date=2018-05-09 |website=Quran.com}}</ref>

Moses ben Maimon, widely known as [[Maimonides]], was a Jewish scholar who tried to logically prove the existence of God. Maimonides offered proofs for the existence of God, but he did not begin with defining God first, like many others do. Rather, he used the description of the earth and the universe to prove the existence of God. He talked about the Heavenly bodies and how they are committed to eternal motion. Maimonides argued that because every physical object is finite, it can only contain a finite amount of power. If everything in the universe, which includes all the planets and the stars, is finite, then there has to be an infinite power to push forth the motion of everything in the universe. Narrowing down to an infinite being, the only thing that can explain the motion is an infinite being (meaning God) which is neither a body nor a force in the body. Maimonides believed that this argument gives us a ground to believe that God is, not an idea of what God is. He believed that God cannot be understood or be compared.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Seeskin |first=Kenneth |title=Maimonides |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/maimonides/#GodViaNeg |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180526073550/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/maimonides/#GodViaNeg |archive-date=2018-05-26 |access-date=2018-05-14 |website=plato.stanford}}</ref>

==== Non-personal definitions of God ====

In [[pantheism]], God and the universe are considered to be the same thing. In this view, the natural sciences are essentially studying the nature of God. This definition of God creates the philosophical problem that a universe with God and one without God are the same, other than the words used to describe it.

[[Deism]] and [[panentheism]] assert that there is a God distinct from, or which extends beyond (either in time or in space or in some other way) the universe. These positions deny that God intervenes in the operation of the universe, including communicating with humans personally. The notion that God never intervenes or communicates with the universe, or may have evolved into the universe (as in [[pandeism]]), makes it difficult, if not by definition impossible, to distinguish between a universe with God and one without.

The ''[[Ethics (Spinoza book)|Ethics]]'' of [[Philosophy of Baruch Spinoza#Substance of God|Baruch Spinoza]] gave two demonstrations of the existence of God.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Spinoza |first=Benedictus de |url=https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Ethics_(Spinoza)/Part_1 |title=Ethics |at=Part 1, Prop. 11}}</ref> The God of Spinoza is uncaused by any external force and has no [[free will]], it is not personal and not anthropomorphic.

==== Debate about how theism should be argued ====

In Christian faith, theologian and philosopher Thomas Aquinas made a distinction between: (a) preambles of faith and (b) articles of faith.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Sommer |first=Josh |date=2022-03-31 |title=Philosophy & Preambles of Faith |url=https://thebaptistbroadcast.com/philosophy-preambles-of-faith |access-date=2023-10-24 |website=The Baptist Broadcast |language=en-US}}</ref> The preambles include alleged truths contained in revelation which are nevertheless demonstrable by reason, e.g., the immortality of the soul, the existence of God. The articles of faith, on the other hand, contain truths that cannot be proven or reached by reason alone and presuppose the truths of the preambles, e.g., in Christianity, the [[Trinity|Holy Trinity]], is not demonstrable and presupposes the existence of God.

The argument that the existence of God can be known to all, even prior to exposure to any divine revelation, predates Christianity.{{clarify|date=April 2022}} [[Paul the Apostle]] made this argument when he said that pagans were without excuse because "since the creation of the world God's invisible nature, namely, his eternal power and deity, has been clearly perceived in the things that have been made".<ref>{{Bibleverse-lb||Romans|1:20|NIV}}.</ref> In this, Paul alludes to the proofs for a creator, later enunciated by Thomas Aquinas<ref>For the proofs of God's existence by Thomas Aquinas see [[Quinquae viae]].</ref> and others, that had also been explored by the Greek philosophers.

Another apologetical school of thought, including Dutch and American [[Reformed Churches|Reformed]] thinkers (such as [[Abraham Kuyper]], [[Benjamin Warfield]], and [[Herman Dooyeweerd]]), emerged in the late 1920s. This school was instituted by [[Cornelius Van Til]], and came to be popularly called [[presuppositional apologetics]] (though Van Til felt "transcendental" would be a more accurate title). The main distinction between this approach and the more classical [[Evidentialism|evidentialist]] approach is that the presuppositionalist denies any common ground between the believer and the non-believer, except that which the non-believer denies, namely, the assumption of the truth of the theistic worldview. In other words, presuppositionalists do not believe that the existence of God can be proven by appeal to raw, uninterpreted, or "brute" facts, which have the same (theoretical) meaning to people with fundamentally different worldviews, because they deny that such a condition is even possible. They claim that the only possible proof for the existence of God is that the very same belief is the necessary condition to the intelligibility of all other human experience and action. They attempt to prove the existence of God by means of appeal to the [[Transcendence (philosophy)|transcendental]] necessity of the belief—indirectly (by appeal to the unavowed presuppositions of the non-believer's worldview) rather than directly (by appeal to some form of common factuality). In practice this school uses what have come to be known as [[Transcendental argument for the existence of God|transcendental arguments]]. These arguments claim to demonstrate that all human experience and action (even the condition of unbelief, itself) is a proof for the existence of God, because God's existence is the necessary condition of their intelligibility.

Protestant Christians note that the Christian faith teaches "[[salvation]] is by faith",<ref>{{Bibleverse-lb|2|Timothy|3:14–15|NIV}} <cite>NIV</cite> "But as for you, continue in what you have learned and have become convinced of, because you know those from whom you learned it, and how from infancy you have known the holy Scriptures, which are able to make you wise for salvation through faith in Christ Jesus." ''The Holy Bible, New International Version''. International Bible Society. 1984.</ref> and that faith is reliance upon the faithfulness of God. The most extreme example of this position is called [[fideism]], which holds that faith is simply the will to believe, and argues that if God's existence were rationally demonstrable, faith in its existence would become superfluous. [[Søren Kierkegaard]] argued that objective knowledge, such as 1+1=2, is unimportant to existence. If God could rationally be proven, his existence would be unimportant to humans.{{Citation needed|date=February 2012}} It is because God cannot rationally be proven that his existence is important to us. In ''The Justification of Knowledge'', the [[Calvinism|Calvinist]] theologian [[Robert L. Reymond]] argues that believers should not attempt to prove the existence of God. Since he believes all such proofs are fundamentally unsound, believers should not place their confidence in them, much less resort to them in discussions with non-believers; rather, they should accept the content of revelation by faith. Reymond's position is similar to that of his mentor [[Gordon Clark]], which holds that all worldviews are based on certain unprovable first premises (or, axioms), and therefore are ultimately unprovable. The Christian theist therefore must simply choose to start with Christianity rather than anything else, by a "[[leap of faith]]". This position is also sometimes called [[presuppositional apologetics]], but should not be confused with the Van Tillian variety.

=== Atheism ===

{{Main|Atheism}}

In the philosophy of religion, [[atheism]] is standardly defined as the [[metaphysical]] claim that God does not exist. In 1972, [[Antony Flew]] proposed defining atheism as the psychological state of lacking any belief in God. However, Flew's definition is usually rejected, due to the need for a name for the direct opposite [[proposition]] to theism, the metaphysical claim that God does exist.<ref name="Draper"/>

==== Positive atheism ====

{{Main|Negative and positive atheism}}

[[Positive atheism]] (also called "strong atheism" and "hard atheism") is a proposed form of atheism that asserts that no deities exist.<ref name="Flew1976">{{Cite book |last=Flew |first=Antony |title=The Presumption of Atheism, and other Philosophical Essays on God, Freedom, and Immortality |publisher=Barnes and Noble |year=1976 |location=New York |pages=14ff |chapter=The Presumption of Atheism |quote=In this interpretation an atheist becomes: not someone who positively asserts the non-existence of God; but someone who is simply not a theist. Let us, for future ready reference, introduce the labels 'positive atheist' for the former and 'negative atheist' for the latter. |author-link=Antony Flew |access-date=2011-12-10 |chapter-url=http://www.positiveatheism.org/writ/flew01.htm |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20051012172554/http://www.positiveatheism.org/writ/flew01.htm |archive-date=2005-10-12 |url-status=dead}}</ref><ref name="mmartin">{{Cite book |last=Martin |first=Michael |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ISBN0521842700 |title=The Cambridge Companion to Atheism |publisher=Cambridge University Press |year=2006 |isbn=978-0-521-84270-9 |access-date=2016-01-27 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150502153531/http://books.google.com/books?vid=ISBN0521842700 |archive-date=2015-05-02 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="synonyms">{{Cite web |year=2007 |title=Definitions of the term "Atheism" |url=http://www.religioustolerance.org/atheist4.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101206205828/http://www.religioustolerance.org/atheist4.htm |archive-date=2010-12-06 |access-date=2010-06-01 |publisher=Ontario Consultants on Religious Tolerance}}</ref> The strong atheist explicitly asserts the non-existence of gods.

==== Negative atheism ====

Negative atheism (also called "weak atheism" and "soft atheism") is a proposed form of atheism other than positive, wherein a person does not believe in the existence of any deities, but does not explicitly assert there to be none.<ref name="Flew1976" /><ref name="mmartin" /><ref name="synonyms" />

=== Agnosticism ===

{{Main|Agnosticism}}

Agnosticism is the view that the [[truth value]] of certain claims—especially claims about the existence of any deity, but also other religious and metaphysical claims—is unknown or unknowable.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Carroll |first=Robert |date=2009-02-22 |title=agnosticism |url=http://skepdic.com/agnosticism.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090925141206/http://www.skepdic.com/agnosticism.html |archive-date=2009-09-25 |access-date=2009-10-17 |website=The Skeptic's Dictionary |publisher=skepdic.com}}</ref> Agnosticism does not define one's belief or disbelief in gods; agnostics may still identify themselves as theists or atheists.<ref name="Agnostic Types">{{Cite web |last=Cline |first=Austin |title=What is Agnosticism? |work=About.com Religion & Spirituality |url=http://atheism.about.com/od/aboutagnosticism/p/overview.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120426195921/http://atheism.about.com/od/aboutagnosticism/p/overview.htm |archive-date=2012-04-26 |access-date=2009-01-08 |publisher=[[About.com]]}}</ref>

==== Strong agnosticism ====

[[Strong agnosticism]] is the belief that it is impossible for humans to know whether or not any deities exist.

==== Weak agnosticism ====

{{Main|Weak agnosticism}}

Weak agnosticism is the belief that the existence or nonexistence of deities is unknown but not necessarily unknowable.

==== Agnostic theism ====

{{Main|Agnostic theism}}

Agnostic theism is the [[philosophical]] view that encompasses both theism and agnosticism. An agnostic theist believes in the existence of a god or God, but regards the basis of this proposition as ''unknown or inherently unknowable''. Agnostic theists may also insist on ignorance regarding the properties of the gods they believe in.<ref name="about">{{Cite web |date=2012-04-13 |title=Introduction to Agnosticism: What is Agnostic Theism? Believing in God, but not Knowing God |url=http://atheism.about.com/od/aboutagnosticism/a/theism.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110605134502/http://atheism.about.com/od/aboutagnosticism/a/theism.htm |archive-date=2011-06-05 |access-date=2013-05-14 |publisher=Atheism.about.com}}</ref>

==== Agnostic atheism ====

{{Main|Agnostic atheism}}

Agnostic atheism is a philosophical position that encompasses both atheism and agnosticism. Agnostic atheists are atheistic because they do not hold a [[belief]] in the existence of any deity and agnostic because they claim that the existence of a [[deity]] is either unknowable in principle or currently unknown in fact.

The theologian [[Robert Flint (theologian)|Robert Flint]] explains:

{{Blockquote|If a man have failed to find any good reason for believing that there is a God, it is perfectly natural and rational that he should not believe that there is a God; and if so, he is an atheist, although he assume no superhuman knowledge, but merely the ordinary human power of judging of evidence. If he go farther, and, after an investigation into the nature and reach of human knowledge, ending in the conclusion that the existence of God is incapable of proof, cease to believe in it on the ground that he cannot know it to be true, he is an agnostic and also an atheist, an agnostic-atheist—an atheist because an agnostic."<ref>{{Cite book |last=Flint |first=Robert |url=https://archive.org/details/bub_gb_DWMtAAAAYAAJ |title=Agnosticism |publisher=C. Scribner sons |year=1903 |page=[https://archive.org/details/bub_gb_DWMtAAAAYAAJ/page/n66 50] |chapter=Erroneous Views of Agnosticism |quote=agnostic atheism. |access-date=2009-11-15}}</ref>}}

=== Apatheism ===

{{Main|Apatheism}}

An apatheist is someone who is not interested in accepting or denying any claims that gods exist or do not exist. An apatheist lives as if there are no gods and explains natural [[phenomena]] without reference to any deities. The existence of gods is not rejected, but may be designated unnecessary or useless; gods neither provide purpose to [[Personal life|life]], nor influence [[everyday life]], according to this view.<ref name="Zdybicka-p20">{{cite book |last=Zdybicka |first=Zofia J. |year=2005 |contribution=Atheism |url=http://ptta.pl/pef/ 
|page=20 |contribution-url=http://ptta.pl/pef/haslaen/a/atheism.pdf |editor-first=Andrzej |editor-last=Maryniarczyk |title=Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy |volume=1 |publisher=Polish Thomas Aquinas Association |access-date=2010-05-04}}</ref>

=== Ignosticism ===

{{Main|Ignosticism}}

The ignostic (or igtheist) usually concludes that the question of God's existence or nonexistence is usually not worth discussing because concepts like "God" are usually not sufficiently or clearly defined. Ignosticism or igtheism is the theological position that every other theological position (including [[agnosticism]] and atheism) assumes too much about the concept of God and many other theological concepts. It can be defined as encompassing two related views about the existence of God. The view that a coherent definition of God must be presented before the question of the existence of God can be meaningfully discussed. Furthermore, if that definition is [[Falsifiability|unfalsifiable]], the ignostic takes the [[Theological noncognitivism|theological noncognitivist]] position that the question of the existence of God (per that definition) is meaningless.{{Citation needed|reason=Citation needed for what seems very dubious Original Research (OR). The OR seems especially dubious as seemingly coming from a pseudo-Popperian perspective; Karl Popper objected to Logical Positivists' insistence that what was not verifiable was meaningless, and brought in Falsifiability partly to oppose them, but he also said that they were abusing the word 'meaningless' in a way that would wrongly render many important areas of human thought and experience 'meaningless'; there's no reason to suppose that ignostics are generally pseudo-Popperians, nor to unwittingly or wittingly imply it in this article. But all that's probably a lot less relevant here than the fact that the statement is seemingly OR.|date=August 2018}} In this case, the concept of God is not considered meaningless; the term "God" is considered meaningless. The second view is synonymous with theological noncognitivism, and skips the step of first asking "What is meant by 'God'?" before proclaiming the original question "Does God exist?" as meaningless.

Some philosophers have seen ignosticism as a variation of agnosticism or atheism,<ref name="The Argument From Non-Cognitivism">{{Cite web |title=The Argument From Non-Cognitivism |url=http://www.strongatheism.net/library/atheology/argument_from_noncognitivism/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140429162223/http://www.strongatheism.net/library/atheology/argument_from_noncognitivism/ |archive-date=2014-04-29 |access-date=2008-02-11}}</ref> while others{{Who|date=December 2016}} have considered it to be distinct.{{Citation needed|date=December 2016}} An ignostic maintains that he cannot even say whether he is a [[Theism|theist]] or an atheist until a sufficient definition of theism is put forth.

The term "ignosticism" was coined in the 1960s by [[Sherwin Wine]], a [[rabbi]] and a founding figure of [[Humanistic Judaism]]. The term "igtheism" was coined by the [[Secular humanism|secular humanist]] [[Paul Kurtz]] in his 1992 book ''The New Skepticism''.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2010-07-28 |title=isms of the week: Agnosticism and Ignosticism |newspaper=The Economist |url=https://www.economist.com/blogs/johnson/2010/07/definitions_1 |url-status=live |access-date=December 19, 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111216014452/http://www.economist.com/blogs/johnson/2010/07/definitions_1 |archive-date=December 16, 2011}}</ref>

== Philosophical issues ==

=== The problem of the supernatural ===

One problem posed by the question of the existence of God is that traditional beliefs usually ascribe to God various [[supernatural]] powers. Supernatural beings may be able to conceal and reveal themselves for their own purposes, as for example in the tale of [[Baucis and Philemon]]. In addition, according to concepts of God, God is not part of the natural order, but the ultimate creator of nature and of the scientific laws. Thus in [[Aristotelianism|Aristotelian philosophy]], God is viewed as part of the explanatory structure needed to support scientific conclusions and any powers God possesses are—strictly speaking—of the natural order that is derived from God's place as originator of nature (see also [[Monadology]]).

In [[Karl Popper]]'s [[philosophy of science]], belief in a supernatural God is outside the natural domain of scientific investigation because all scientific hypotheses must be falsifiable in the natural world. The [[non-overlapping magisteria]] view proposed by [[Stephen Jay Gould]] also holds that the existence (or otherwise) of God is irrelevant to and beyond the domain of science.

Scientists follow the [[scientific method]], within which theories must be verifiable by [[physical experiment]]. The majority of prominent conceptions of God explicitly or effectively posit a being whose existence is not testable either by proof or disproof.<ref>{{Cite book |author=Spitzer |first=Robert J. |title=New proofs for the existence of God: contributions of contemporary physics and philosophy |date=2010 |publisher=William B. Eerdmans Pub |isbn=978-0-8028-6383-6 |location=Grand Rapids, Michigan |pages=73 |language=en-us |oclc=466359148}}</ref> Therefore, the question of God's existence may lie outside the purview of modern science [[Relationship between religion and science|by definition]].<ref>{{Cite book |author=Stenger |first=Victor J. |title=God : the failed hypothesis : how science shows that God does not exist |date=2007 |publisher=Prometheus Books |isbn=978-1-59102-481-1 |location=Amherst, New York |pages=43 |language=en-us |oclc=72988016}}</ref> The [[Catholic Church]] maintains that knowledge of the existence of God is the "natural light of human reason".<ref>Catechism of the Catholic Church, Paragraph 47; cf. Canons of the First Vatican Council, 2:2.</ref> [[Fideism|Fideists]] maintain that belief in God's existence may not be amenable to demonstration or refutation, but rests on [[faith]] alone.

[[Logical positivism|Logical positivists]] such as [[Rudolf Carnap]] and [[A. J. Ayer]] viewed any talk of gods as literal nonsense. For the logical positivists and adherents of similar schools of thought, statements about religious or other transcendent experiences can not have a [[truth value]], and are deemed to be without meaning, because such statements do not have any clear verification criteria. As the Christian biologist Scott C. Todd put it "Even if all the data pointed to an intelligent designer, such a hypothesis is excluded from science because it is not naturalistic."<ref>Scott C. Todd, "A View from Kansas on that Evolution Debate," Nature, Vol. 401, September 30, 1999, p. 423.</ref> This argument limits the domain of science to the empirically observable and limits the domain of God to the empirically unprovable.

=== Nature of relevant proofs and arguments ===

[[John Polkinghorne]] suggests that the nearest analogy to the existence of God in physics is the ideas of [[quantum mechanics]] which are seemingly paradoxical but make sense of a great deal of disparate data.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Polkinghorne |first=John |title=Belief in God in an Age of Science |publisher=Yale University Press |year=1998 |isbn=978-0-300-07294-5 |author-link=John Polkinghorne}}</ref>

Alvin Plantinga compares the question of the existence of God to the question of the existence of [[Problem of other minds|other minds]], claiming both are notoriously impossible to "prove" against a determined skeptic.<ref>Plantinga, Alvin. ''Other Minds: A Study of the Rational Justification of Belief in God,'' Cornell (1990). {{ISBN|0-8014-9735-3}} and ''Warranted Christian Belief,'' Oxford University Press (2000), {{ISBN|0-19-513193-2}}.</ref>

One approach, suggested by writers such as Stephen D. Unwin, is to treat (particular versions of) theism and [[Naturalism (philosophy)|naturalism]] as though they were two hypotheses in the [[Bayesian probability|Bayesian]] sense, to list certain data (or alleged data), about the world, and to suggest that the likelihoods of these data are significantly higher under one hypothesis than the other.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Debate the Existence of God – Beale v Howson |url=http://www.starcourse.org/discussion/ |access-date=2023-11-16 |website=www.starcourse.org}}</ref> Most of the arguments for, or against, the existence of God can be seen as pointing to particular aspects of the universe in this way. In almost all cases it is not seriously suggested by proponents of the arguments that they are irrefutable, merely that they make one worldview seem significantly more likely than the other. However, since an assessment of the weight of evidence depends on the [[prior probability]] that is assigned to each worldview, arguments that a theist finds convincing may seem thin to an atheist and vice versa.<ref>See e.g. ''The Probability of God'' by ''Stephen D. Unwin'' its criticism in [[The God Delusion]], and the critical comment in that article.</ref>

Philosophers, such as [[Wittgenstein]], take a view that is considered [[Anti-realism|anti-realist]] and oppose philosophical arguments related to God's existence. For instance, [[Charles Taylor (philosopher)|Charles Taylor]] contends that the real is whatever will not go away. If we cannot reduce talk about God to anything else, or replace it, or prove it false, then perhaps God is as real as anything else.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2004-08-30 |title=iep.utm.edu |url=http://www.iep.utm.edu/wittgens/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130512033044/http://www.iep.utm.edu/wittgens/ |archive-date=2013-05-12 |access-date=2013-05-14 |publisher=iep.utm.edu}}</ref>

In [[George Berkeley]]'s ''[[A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge]]'' of 1710, he argued that a "naked thought" cannot exist, and that a perception is a thought; therefore only minds can be proven to exist, since all else is merely an idea conveyed by a perception. From this Berkeley argued that the universe is based upon observation and is non-objective. However, he noted that the universe includes "ideas" not perceptible to humankind, and that there must, therefore, exist an omniscient superobserver, which perceives such things. Berkeley considered this proof of the existence of the Christian god.

=== Outside of Western thought ===

Existence in absolute truth is central to [[Vedanta]] epistemology. Traditional sense perception based approaches were put into question as possibly misleading due to preconceived or superimposed ideas. But though all object-cognition can be doubted, the existence of the doubter remains a fact even in ''[[nastika]]'' traditions of ''mayavada'' schools following [[Adi Shankara]].<ref name="isbn0-7914-7081-4">{{Cite book |last=Klostermaier |first=Klaus K. |url=https://archive.org/details/surveyhinduismth00klos |title=A survey of Hinduism |publisher=State University of New York Press |year=2007 |isbn=978-0-7914-7081-7 |location=Albany, New York |page=[https://archive.org/details/surveyhinduismth00klos/page/n375 357] |language=en-us |url-access=limited}}</ref> The five eternal principles to be discussed under ontology, beginning with God or Isvara, the [[Ultimate Reality]] cannot be established by the means of [[logic]] alone, and often require superior proof.<ref>Sudesh Narang (1984), ''The Vaisnava Philosophy According to Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa'', p. 30.</ref>

In [[Vaisnavism]] [[Vishnu]], or his intimate ontological form of [[Krishna]], is equated to the personal absolute God of the Western traditions. Aspects of Krishna as ''[[svayam bhagavan]]'' in original Absolute Truth, ''[[sat chit ananda]]'', are understood originating from three essential attributes of Krishna's form, i.e., "eternal existence" or ''{{IAST|sat}}'', related to the ''[[brahman]]'' aspect; "knowledge" or chit, to the ''[[paramatman]]''; and "bliss" or ''ananda'' in [[Sanskrit]], to ''[[bhagavan]]''.<ref name="isbn0-231-12256-X">{{Cite book |last1=Ekstrand |first1=Maria |title=The Hare Krishna movement: the postcharismatic fate of a religious transplant |title-link=Hare Krishna movement |last2=Bryant |first2=Edwin H. |publisher=[[Columbia University Press]] |year=2004 |isbn=978-0-231-12256-6 |location=[[New York City|New York]] |page=[https://archive.org/details/harekrishnamovem00brya/page/n29 7] |language=en-us}}</ref>

== Arguments ==

=== Arguments for the existence of God===

==== Logical arguments ====

===== Aquinas' Five Ways =====

{{Main|Five Ways (Aquinas)}}

In article 3, question 2, first part of his ''[[Summa Theologica]]'', [[Thomas Aquinas]] developed his five arguments for God's existence. These arguments are grounded in an Aristotelian ontology and make use of the [[Infinite regress|infinite regression argument]].<ref name="Aquinas 1274">{{Cite book |last=Aquinas |first=Thomas |url=http://www.newadvent.org/summa/ |title=Summa Theologica |year=1274 |at=Part 1, Question 2, Article 3 |access-date=2012-06-20 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120615112233/http://www.newadvent.org/summa/ |archive-date=2012-06-15 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last1=Aquinas |first1=Thomas |title=Summa of the Summa |last2=Kreeft |first2=Peter |publisher=Ignatius Press |year=1990 |isbn=9780898703009 |pages=65–69}}</ref> Aquinas did not intend to fully prove the existence of God as he is orthodoxly conceived (with all of his traditional attributes), but proposed his Five Ways as a first stage, which he built upon later in his work.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Davies, Brian |title=The Thought of Thomas Aquinas |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=1992 |isbn=9780191520440 |page=26}}</ref> Aquinas' Five Ways argued from the [[unmoved mover]], [[first cause]], [[necessary being]], [[argument from degree]], and the [[Five Ways (Aquinas)#Fifth way: Argument from Final Cause or Ends|argument from final cause]].<ref name="Aquinas 1274"/>

* The unmoved mover argument: things in the world are in motion, something can only be caused to move by a mover, therefore everything in the world must be moved by an unmoved mover. 
* The first cause argument: things in the world have a cause, and nothing is the cause of itself, so everything in the world must have a first cause or an uncaused cause. 
* The necessary being argument: things in the world are contingent, and contingent beings cannot exist without a cause, so everything in the world must be caused by a necessary being. 
* The degree argument: there are degrees of goodness and perfection among things, and something of a maximum degree must be the cause of things of a lower degree, so there must be a supremely good and perfect cause for all good things. 
* The final cause argument: things in the world act for an end or purpose, but only an intelligent being can direct itself towards a purpose, so there must be an intelligent being that directs things towards their purpose.

===== Cosmological argument =====

{{Main|Cosmological argument}}

The cosmological argument is an [[a posteriori]] argument for a cause or reason for the cosmos.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Craig |first=William Lane |title=The Cosmological Argument From Plato to Leibniz |date=October 2001 |publisher=[[Wipf and Stock Publishers]] |isbn=1-57910-787-7 |location=Eugene, Oregon |pages=x |language=en-us}}</ref>

One type of cosmological, or "first cause" argument, typically called the [[Kalam cosmological argument]], asserts that since everything that begins to exist has a cause, and the universe began to exist, the universe must have had a cause which was itself not caused. This ultimate first cause is identified with God. Christian apologist [[William Lane Craig]] gives a version of this argument in the following form:<ref>{{Cite web |last=Craig |first=William Lane |title=The Existence of God and the Beginning of the Universe |url=http://www.leaderu.com/truth/3truth11.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130123023313/http://www.leaderu.com/truth/3truth11.html |archive-date=23 January 2013 |access-date=22 June 2008 |website=Truth Journal |publisher=Leaderu.com}}</ref>

# Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
# The Universe began to exist.
# Therefore, the Universe had a cause.

===== Ontological argument =====

{{Main|Ontological argument}}

The ontological argument has been formulated by philosophers including [[St. Anselm]] and [[René Descartes]]. The argument proposes that God's existence is self-evident. The logic, depending on the formulation, reads roughly as follows:<ref name="Nolan">{{Cite web |last=Nolan |first=Lawrence |title=Descartes' Ontological Argument |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-ontological/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120513205040/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-ontological/ |archive-date=2012-05-13 |access-date=2012-06-20 |publisher=Stanford}}</ref>

{{Blockquote|
Whatever is contained in a clear and distinct idea of a thing must be predicated of that thing; but a clear and distinct idea of an absolutely perfect Being contains the idea of actual existence; therefore since we have the idea of an absolutely perfect Being such a Being must really exist.<ref name="Nolan" />}}

Thomas Aquinas criticized the argument for proposing a definition of God which, if God is transcendent, should be impossible for humans.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Aquinas |first=Thomas |url=http://www.newadvent.org/summa/ |title=Summa Theologica |year=1274 |at=Part 1, Question 2 |access-date=2012-06-20 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120615112233/http://www.newadvent.org/summa/ |archive-date=2012-06-15 |url-status=live}}</ref> Immanuel Kant criticized the proof from a logical standpoint: he stated that the term "God" really signifies two different terms: both idea of God, and God. Kant concluded that the proof is equivocation, based on the ambiguity of the word God.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Kreeft |first=Peter |title=Socrates Meets Kant |publisher=Ignatius Press |year=2009 |isbn=9781586173487}}</ref> Kant also challenged the argument's assumption that existence is a predicate (of perfection) because it does not add anything to the essence of a being. If existence is not a predicate, then it is not [[Logical truth|necessarily true]] that the greatest possible being exists.<ref>{{Cite encyclopedia |title=Ontological Argument |encyclopedia=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |url=http://www.iep.utm.edu/ont-arg |access-date=October 12, 2011 |last=Himma |first=Kenneth Einar |date=27 April 2005 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121027042158/http://www.iep.utm.edu/ont-arg/ |archive-date=27 October 2012 |url-status=live}}</ref> A common rebuttal to Kant's critique is that, although "existence" does add something to both the concept and the reality of God, the concept would be vastly different if its referent is an unreal Being.{{Citation needed|date=August 2013}} Another response to Kant is attributed to Alvin Plantinga, who says that even if one were to grant that existence is not a real predicate, ''necessary existence'', which is the correct formulation of an understanding of God, ''is'' a real predicate.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Plantinga 'The Ontological Argument' Text |url=http://mind.ucsd.edu/syllabi/02-03/01w/readings/plantinga.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130314123846/http://mind.ucsd.edu/syllabi/02-03/01w/readings/plantinga.html |archive-date=2013-03-14 |access-date=2013-05-14 |publisher=Mind.ucsd.edu}}</ref>

====== Gödel's ontological proof======
{{Excerpt|Gödel's ontological proof}}
The proof<ref>Gödel's proof is reprinted on pp. 403–404, 429–437 of: {{cite book |author=Gödel |first=Kurt |url=https://monoskop.org/images/a/aa/Kurt_G%C3%B6del_Collected_Works_Volume_III_1995.pdf |title=Unpublished Essays and Lectures |date=March 1995 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=0-19-507255-3 |editor=Feferman |editor-first=Solomon |edition=1st |series=Collected Works |volume=III |location=Oxford, England |editor-last2=Dawson Jr. |editor-first2=John W. |editor-last3=Goldfarb |editor-first3=Warren |editor-last4=Parsons |editor-first4=Charles |editor-last5=Solovay |editor-first5=Robert M.}}</ref>{{#tag:ref |The presentation below follows that in Koons (2005),<ref name="Koons.2005"/> p.3-7.}} uses [[modal logic]], which distinguishes between [[logical truth|''necessary'' truths]] and [[Contingency (philosophy)|''contingent'' truths]]. In the most common semantics for modal logic, many "[[Modal logic#Semantics|possible worlds]]" are considered. A [[truth]] is ''necessary'' if it is true in all possible worlds. By contrast, if a statement happens to be true in our world, but is false in another world, then it is a ''contingent'' truth. A statement that is true in some world (not necessarily our own) is called a ''[[logically possible|possible]]'' truth.

Furthermore, the proof uses [[higher-order logic|higher-order]] (modal) logic because the definition of God employs an explicit quantification over properties.<ref>Fitting, 2002, p. 139</ref>

First, Gödel axiomatizes the notion of a "positive property":<ref group=note>It assumes that it is possible to single out ''positive'' properties from among all properties. Gödel comments that "Positive means positive in the [[morality|moral]] [[aesthetics|aesthetic]] sense (independently of the accidental structure of the world)... It may also mean pure ''attribution'' as opposed to ''privation'' (or containing privation)." (Gödel 1995), see also manuscript in (Gawlick 2012).</ref> for each property ''φ'', either ''φ'' or its [[negation]] ¬''φ'' must be positive, but not both (axiom 2). If a positive property ''φ'' implies a property ''ψ'' in each possible world, then ''ψ'' is positive, too (axiom 1).<ref group=note>As a profane example, if the property of being green is positive, that of not being red is, too (by axiom 1), hence that of being red is negative (by axiom 2). More generally, at most one color can be considered positive.</ref> Gödel then argues that each positive property is "possibly exemplified", i.e. applies at least to some object in some world (theorem 1). Defining an object to be Godlike if it has all positive properties (definition 1),<ref group=note>Continuing the color example, a godlike object must have the unique color that is considered positive, or no color at all; both alternatives may seem counter-intuitive.</ref> and requiring that property to be positive itself (axiom 3),<ref group=note>If one considers the [[partial order]] <math> \preceq </math> defined by <math> \varphi \preceq \psi </math> if <math> \square \forall y (\varphi(y) \to \psi(y)) </math>, then Axioms 1-3 can be summarized by saying that positive properties form an [[ultrafilter]] on this ordering. Definition 1 and Axiom 4 are needed to establish the ''Godlike'' property as principal element of the ultrafilter.</ref> Gödel shows that in ''some'' possible world a Godlike object exists (theorem 2), called "God" in the following.<ref group=note>By removing all modal operators from axioms, definitions, proofs, and theorems, a modified version of theorem 2 is obtained saying "∃''x'' ''G''(''x'')", i.e. "There exists an object which has all positive, but no negative properties". Nothing more than axioms 1-3, definition 1, and theorems 1-2 needs to be considered for this result.</ref> Gödel proceeds to prove that a Godlike object exists in ''every'' possible world.

====== Meinongian argument ======
{{Excerpt|Meinongian argument}}

====== Trademark argument ======
{{Excerpt|Trademark argument}}

===== Plantinga's free-will defense =====
{{Excerpt|Alvin Plantinga's free-will defense}}
Specifically, the argument from evil asserts that the following set of propositions are, by themselves, logically inconsistent or contradictory:
# God is [[omniscient]] (all-knowing)
# God is [[omnipotent]] (all-powerful)
# God is [[omnibenevolent]] (morally perfect)
# There is evil in the world

Plantinga's free-will defense begins by noting a distinction between ''moral evil'' and ''physical evil'' (Plantinga's defense primarily references moral evil), then asserting that Mackie's argument failed to establish an ''explicit'' logical contradiction between God and the existence of moral evil. In other words, Plantinga shows that (1–4) are not on their own contradictory, and that any contradiction must originate from an atheologian's ''implicit'' unstated assumptions, assumptions representing premises not stated in the argument itself. With an ''explicit'' contradiction ruled out, an atheologian must add premises to the argument for it to succeed.{{sfn|Plantinga|1977|loc=ch.&nbsp;4|p=12-17}} Nonetheless, if Plantinga had offered no further argument, then an atheologian's intuitive impressions that a contradiction must exist would have remained unanswered. Plantinga sought to resolve this by offering two further points.{{sfn|Plantinga|1977|loc=ch.&nbsp;4|p=23-25}}

First, Plantinga, using [[modal logic]], pointed out that omnipotence is the power to do all things logically possible, and thus God could not be expected to do things that are logically impossible.<ref>{{cite web |title=Logical Problem of Evil |url=https://iep.utm.edu/evil-log/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy}}</ref> God could not, for example, create square circles, act contrary to his nature, or, more relevantly, create beings with free will that would never choose evil.{{sfn|Plantinga|1977|loc=ch.&nbsp;4|p=17}} Taking this latter point further, Plantinga argued that the moral value of human free will is a credible offsetting justification that God could have as a morally justified reason for permitting the existence of evil.{{sfn|Plantinga|1977|loc=ch.&nbsp;4|p=27}} Plantinga did not claim to have shown that the conclusion of the logical problem is wrong, nor did he assert that God's reason for allowing evil is, in fact, to preserve free will. Instead, his argument sought only to show that the [[logical problem of evil]] was invalid.{{sfn|Plantinga|1977|loc=ch.&nbsp;4|p=34}}

Plantinga's defense has received strong support among academic philosophers, with many agreeing that it defeated the logical problem of evil.<ref name="Howard-Snyder">{{harvnb|Howard-Snyder|O'Leary-Hawthorne|1998|p=1}}: "It used to be widely held by philosophers that God and evil are incompatible. Not any longer. Alvin Plantinga's Free Will Defense is largely responsible for this shift."</ref><ref>{{harvnb|Meister|2009|p=134}}: "Most philosophers have agreed that the free will defense has defeated the logical problem of evil.&nbsp;... Because of [Plantinga's argument], it is now widely accepted that the logical problem of evil has been sufficiently rebutted."</ref><ref name=":1">{{cite web |last=Craig |first=William Lane |author-link=William Lane Craig |title=The Problem of Evil |url=https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/popular-writings/existence-nature-of-god/the-problem-of-evil/ |website=Reasonable Faith |access-date=27 April 2019 |quote=Therefore, I'm very pleased to be able to report that it is widely agreed among contemporary philosophers that the logical problem of evil has been dissolved. The co-existence of God and evil is logically possible.}}</ref>{{sfnm |1a1=Alston |1y=1991 |1p=49 |2a1=Peterson |2a2=Hasker |2a3=Reichenbach |2a4=Basinger |2y=1991 |2p=133}} Contemporary atheologians{{sfnm |1a1=Bergmann |1y=1999 |2a1=LaFollette |2y=1980 |3a1=Howard-Snyder |3a2=O'Leary-Hawthorne |3y=1998}} have presented arguments claiming to have found the additional premises needed to create an explicitly contradictory [[theism|theistic]] set by adding to the propositions 1–4.

===== Proof of the Truthful =====
{{Excerpt|Proof of the Truthful}}

==== Empirical arguments ====

===== Argument from beauty =====

{{Excerpt|Argument from beauty}}

===== Argument from consciousness =====

{{Excerpt|Argument from consciousness}}

===== Argument from design =====

{{Excerpt|Teleological argument}}

===== Argument from natural laws =====
{{main|Natural-law argument}}
The [[Natural-law argument|argument from natural law]]s (promoted by [[Isaac Newton]], [[René Descartes]], and [[Robert Boyle]]) holds that the existence of God is evident by the observation of [[Scientific law|governing laws]] and existing order in the Universe.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Harrison |first1=Peter |last2=Roberts |first2=Jon H. |title=Science without God? rethinking the history of scientific naturalism |date=2019 |publisher=Oxford University Press |location=Oxford, United Kingdom |isbn=9780198834588 |edition=First}}</ref>

===== Argument from psychedelics =====
{{Further|Philosophy of psychedelics}}
Human subjects in scientific studies have reported that [[psychedelic drugs]] such as [[LSD]], [[mescaline]], [[psilocybin mushroom]]s, and [[DMT]] provide perceptions of a transcendent reality, including encounters with God.<ref>{{cite news |title=Experiences of 'Ultimate Reality' or 'God' Confer Lasting Benefits to Mental Health |url=https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/news/newsroom/news-releases/2019/04/experiences-of-ultimate-reality-or-god-confer-lasting-benefits-to-mental-health |work=www.hopkinsmedicine.org |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=Wade |first1=Grace |title=Religious leaders given psilocybin say they "felt God" |url=https://www.newscientist.com/article/2379589-religious-leaders-given-psilocybin-say-they-felt-god/ |work=New Scientist}}</ref> 
Since prehistory, cultures around the world have used [[entheogen]]s for the purpose of enabling [[mystical experience]]s. In ''[[The Doors of Perception]]'', English philosopher and writer [[Aldous Huxley]] recounts his mystical experiences while he was under the influence of mescaline, arguing that the human brain normally filters reality, and that such drugs remove this filter, exposing humans to a broader spectrum of conscious awareness which he calls the "[[Mind at Large]]".

===== Argument from sensus divinitatis =====
The argument from ''[[sensus divinitatis]]'' (Latin for 'sense of divinity') posits that humans are born with an innate sense, or cognitive mechanism, that grants them awareness of God's presence. [[Alvin Plantinga]] argues that if beliefs formed by sensory experience can be considered properly basic, requiring no external justification, then beliefs in theism formed by a ''sensus divinitatis'' can be considered properly basic as well, and thus require no external justification.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Webb |first1=Mark |title=Religious Experience |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/religious-experience/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |date=2022}}</ref> Research in the [[cognitive science of religion]] suggests that the human brain has a natural and evolutionary predisposition towards theistic beliefs, which [[Kelly James Clark]] argues is empirical evidence for the presence of a ''sensus divinitatis''.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Stewart |first1=Melville Y. |title=Science and Religion in Dialogue |date=2010 |publisher=Wiley-Blackwell |location=Malden, MA |isbn=9781405189217}}</ref>

===== Rational warrant =====

Philosopher [[Stephen Toulmin]] is notable for his work in the history of ideas<ref>{{Cite web |title=Stephen Edelston Toulmin |url=https://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/600670/Stephen-Edelston-Toulmin |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140714133155/https://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/600670/Stephen-Edelston-Toulmin |archive-date=14 July 2014 |access-date=16 June 2014 |website=Encyclopædia Britannica}}</ref> that features the (rational) warrant: a statement that connects the premises to a conclusion.

Joseph Hinman applied Toulmin's approach in his argument for the existence of God, particularly in his book ''The Trace of God: A Rational Warrant for Belief''.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Hinman |first=Joseph |title=The Trace of God: A Rational Warrant for Belief |date=2014-05-28 |publisher=GrandViaduct |isbn=978-0-9824087-1-1 |edition=1}}</ref> Instead of attempting to prove the existence of God, Hinman argues you can "demonstrate the rationally-warranted nature of belief".<ref>{{Cite web |last=Hinman |first=Joseph |title=On Rational Warrant |url=http://metacrock.blogspot.com/2010/07/on-rational-warrant.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140714233756/http://metacrock.blogspot.com/2010/07/on-rational-warrant.html |archive-date=2014-07-14 |access-date=2014-06-13 |website=Metacrock|date=11 July 2010 }}</ref>

Hinman uses a wide range of studies, including ones by Robert Wuthnow, Andrew Greeley, Mathes and Kathleen Nobel to establish that mystical experiences are life-transformative in a way that is significant, positive and lasting.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Hinman |first=Joseph |title=The Trace of God: A Rational Warrant for Belief |date=2014-05-28 |publisher=GrandViaduct |isbn=978-0-9824087-1-1 |edition=1 |pages=85–92}}</ref> He draws on additional work to add several additional major points to his argument. First, the people who have these experiences not only do not exhibit traditional signs of mental illness but, often, are in better mental and physical health than the general population due to the experience.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Hinman |first=Joseph |title=The Trace of God: A Rational Warrant for Belief |date=2014-05-28 |publisher=GrandViaduct |isbn=978-0-9824087-1-1 |edition=1 |pages=90–92}}</ref> Second, the experiences work. In other words, they provide a framework for navigating life that is useful and effective.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Hinman |first=Joseph |title=The Trace of God: A Rational Warrant for Belief |date=2014-05-28 |publisher=GrandViaduct |isbn=978-0-9824087-1-1 |edition=1 |pages=100–103}}</ref> All of the evidence of the positive effects of the experience upon people's lives he, adapting a term from [[Derrida]], terms "the trace of God": the footprints left behind that point to the impact.

Finally, he discusses how both religious experience and belief in God is, and has always been, normative among humans:<ref>{{Cite book |last=Hinman |first=Joseph |title=The Trace of God: A Rational Warrant for Belief |date=2014-05-28 |publisher=GrandViaduct |isbn=978-0-9824087-1-1 |edition=1 |pages=104–105}}</ref> people do not need to prove the existence of God. If there is no need to prove, Hinman argues, and the Trace of God (for instance, the impact of mystical experiences on them), belief in God is rationally warranted.{{Clarify|date=January 2017}}

==== Inductive arguments ====

Some have put forward arguments for the existence of God based on [[inductive reasoning]]. For example, one class of philosophers asserts that the proofs for the existence of God present a fairly large probability though not absolute certainty. A number of obscure points, they say, always remain; an act of faith is required to dismiss these difficulties. This view is maintained, among others, by the [[Scotland|Scottish]] statesman [[Arthur Balfour]] in his book ''The Foundations of Belief'' (1895). The opinions set forth in this work were adopted in [[France]] by [[Ferdinand Brunetière]], the editor of the ''[[Revue des deux Mondes]]''. Many orthodox Protestants express themselves in the same manner, as, for instance, Dr. E. Dennert, President of the Kepler Society, in his work ''Ist Gott tot?''<ref>(Stuttgart, 1908).</ref>

==== Metaphysical arguments ====
===== Argument from degree =====
{{Excerpt|Argument from degree}}

===== Argument from desire =====
{{Excerpt|Argument from desire}}
C. S. Lewis, in ''[[Mere Christianity]]'' and elsewhere, posed that all natural desires have a natural object. One thirsts, and there exists water to quench this thirst; One hungers, and there exists food to satisfy this hunger. He then argued that the human desire for perfect justice, perfect peace, perfect happiness, and other intangibles strongly implies the existence of such things, though they seem unobtainable on earth. He further posed that the unquenchable desires of this life strongly imply that we are intended for a different life, necessarily governed by a God who can provide the desired intangibles.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Lewis |first=C. S. |title=Mere Christianity, Bk. III |chapter=10}}</ref>

===== Argument from love =====
{{Excerpt|Argument from love}}

===== Argument from mathematics =====
{{Further|Philosophy of mathematics|Mathematics and God}}
The argument from mathematics is presented by American philosopher [[William Lane Craig]]. In the [[philosophy of mathematics]], the ontological status of mathematical entities, such as numbers, sets, and functions is debated. Within this philosophical context, two primary positions emerge: [[mathematical realism]] and [[mathematical anti-realism]]. Realists argue that mathematical objects exist independently of human thought as abstract, non-causal entities. In contrast, anti-realists deny the independent existence of these mathematical objects. A pivotal issue in this debate is the phenomenon that physicist [[Eugene Wigner]] termed "the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics." This refers to the ability of mathematics to describe and predict phenomena in the natural world, exemplified by theoretical physicist [[Peter Higgs]]' use of mathematical equations to predict the existence of a fundamental particle, which was verified experimentally decades later.

Craig posits that this effectiveness presents a significant philosophical question about the applicability of mathematics, regardless of one's stance on the existence of mathematical entities. He argues that theism provides a more compelling framework for understanding this phenomenon than [[metaphysical naturalism]]. Under realism, non-theistic perspectives might view the alignment of mathematical abstractions with physical reality as a mere coincidence. However, a theistic realist might argue that this alignment is intentional, as a Supreme Being created the world based on these abstract [[mathematical structure]]s. On the other hand, anti-realists, particularly those of a naturalistic persuasion, see mathematical relationships as reflections of real-world interactions, without necessitating abstract entities. Yet, Craig challenges this view by questioning why the physical world inherently exhibits such complex mathematical patterns without an intentional design. In contrast, the theistic anti-realist has a straightforward explanation: the world reflects a complex mathematical structure because it was created by God following an abstract model. Thus, Craig concludes that theism offers a superior explanation for why mathematics applies so effectively to understanding and predicting the physical world.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Ruloff |first1=Colin |last2=Horban |first2=Peter |title=Contemporary arguments in natural theology: God and rational belief |date=2021 |publisher=Bloomsbury Academic |location=London New York Oxford New Delhi Sydney |isbn=9781350093850}}</ref>

===== Argument from morality =====
{{Excerpt|Argument from morality}}

===== Argument from reason =====
{{Excerpt|Argument from reason}}

===== Transcendental argument =====
{{Excerpt|Transcendental argument for the existence of God}}

==== Subjective arguments ====
===== Argument from religious experience =====
{{main|Argument from religious experience}}
The argument from religious experience holds that the best explanation for [[religious experience]]s is that they are actual perceptions of God's presence. Philosopher Robert Sloan Lee notes that this argument possesses an "unexpected resilience" despite seemingly being able to be easily defeated by simple objections, such as pointing out the existence of [[hallucination]]s.<ref name="lee">{{cite book |last=Lee|first=Robert Sloan|date=July 1, 2021 |editor-last=Branson|editor-first=Beau|title=Introduction to Philosophy: Philosophy of Religion|publisher=Rebus Community|url=https://press.rebus.community/intro-to-phil-of-religion/chapter/non-standard-arguments-for-gods-existence/ |chapter=Non-Standard Arguments for God's existence |isbn=9781989014233}}</ref> Philosopher [[William J. Abraham]] states "We do not generally believe that because some reports of ordinary natural objects sometimes involve illusion, hallucination, and the like, then all reports do so".<ref name="lee"/> He continues, "If we insist that they apply only to religious experience, then we face the embarrassing fact that we apply standards in the religious sphere which we do not apply elsewhere".<ref name="lee"/>

===== Arguments from witnesses' testimony =====

Arguments from testimony rely on the testimony or experience of witnesses, possibly embodying the propositions of a specific revealed [[religion]]. Swinburne argues that it is a principle of rationality that one should accept testimony unless there are strong reasons for not doing so.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Swinburne |first=Richard |title=[[Is There a God?]] |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=1996 |isbn=978-0-19-823545-3 |author-link=Richard Swinburne}}</ref>

* The [[witness argument]] gives credibility to personal [[witness]]es, contemporary and throughout the ages. A variation of this is the [[argument from miracles]] (also referred to as "the priest stories") which relies on testimony of supernatural events to establish the existence of God.
* The [[Argument from common consent|majority argument]] argues that the theism of people throughout most of recorded history and in many different places provides ''[[prima facie]]'' demonstration of God's existence.
* Islam asserts that the revelation of its holy book, the [[Qur'an]], and its unique literary attributes, vindicate its divine authorship, and thus the existence of God.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Islamic Awareness: The Challenge of the Qur'an |url=http://www.islamic-awareness.org/Quran/Miracle/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160912050734/http://www.islamic-awareness.org/Quran/Miracle/ |archive-date=2016-09-12 |access-date=2016-08-28}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=The Inimitability of the Qur'an |url=http://www.hamzatzortzis.com/essays-articles/exploring-the-quran/ |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160922115521/http://www.hamzatzortzis.com/essays-articles/exploring-the-quran/ |archive-date=2016-09-22 |access-date=2016-08-28}}</ref>
* [[The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints]], also known as [[Mormonism]], similarly asserts that the miraculous appearance of God, Jesus Christ, and angels to [[Joseph Smith]] and others and subsequent finding and translation of the [[Book of Mormon]] establishes the existence of God. The whole [[Latter Day Saint movement]] makes the same claim for example [[Community of Christ]], [[Church of Christ (Temple Lot)]], [[Church of Jesus Christ (Bickertonite)]], [[Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (Strangite)]], [[Church of Jesus Christ (Cutlerite)]], etc.{{Citation needed|date=June 2016}}
** The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (Strangite), similarly asserts that the finding and translation of the [[Plates of Laban]], also known as the Brass Plates, into the [[Book of the Law of the Lord]] and [[Voree plates]] by [[James Strang]], [[One Mighty and Strong]], establishes the existence of God.{{Citation needed|date=June 2016}}
** Various sects that have broken from the Church of Christ (Temple Lot) (such as [[Church of Christ "With the Elijah Message"]] and [[Church of Christ (Assured Way)]]) claim that the message brought by [[John the Baptist]], One Mighty and Strong, to [[Otto Fetting]] and [[W. A. Draves]] in [[The Word of the Lord|The Word of the Lord Brought to Mankind by an Angel]] establishes the existence of God.{{Citation needed|date=June 2016}}

====== Arguments from historical events ======
* [[Christianity]] and [[Judaism]] assert that God intervened in key specific moments in history, especially at [[the Exodus]] and the giving of the [[Ten Commandments]] in front of all the tribes of Israel, positing an argument from empirical evidence stemming from sheer number of witnesses, thus demonstrating his existence.<ref name="Greco2013">{{Cite book |last=Greco |first=John |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=CfVDG8aAcLIC&pg=PA134 |title=God and the Gods: A Compelling Investigation and Personal Quest for the Truth About God of the Bible and the Gods of Ancient History |date=26 June 2013 |publisher=iUniverse |isbn=978-1-4759-9597-8 |pages=134– |language=en-us}}</ref>{{Unreliable source?|date=July 2020}}
* [[Christological argument]]s assert that certain events of the Christian [[New Testament]] are historically accurate, and prove God's existence, namely:
** The [[Resurrection of Jesus]]<ref>{{Cite book |last=Polkinghorne |first=John |title=Science and Christian Belief |pages=108–122 |author-link=John Polkinghorne}}</ref> (an [[argument from miracles]])

====== Arguments from the authority of historical personages ======
These arguments are an [[appeal to authority]]:
* The claims of Jesus, as a morally upstanding person, to be the son of God 
* Jesus, said to be a wise person, believed that God exists 
* The belief of [[Lekhraj Kripalani]], who founded the [[Brahma Kumaris]] religion when God was said to enter his body<ref>"Based on our real life experiences we clearly know that it was God, the Supreme Soul, Shiva, Himself, had entered into his body. It was God who had revealed the truth about the coming destruction, and of the establishment of the heavenly world which would then follow. And it was God Himself who had given the sign that he, Dada, was to be His medium and the engine for creating such a divine world." {{Cite web |url=http://brahmakumaris.org/about-us/history/60.html |title=Divine Descent of God |access-date=March 6, 2011 |archive-date=July 25, 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110725102100/http://brahmakumaris.org/about-us/history/60.html }}</ref><ref>Babb, Lawrence A. (1987). Redemptive Encounters: Three Modern Styles in the Hindu Tradition (Comparative Studies in Religion and Society). Oxford University Press. {{ISBN|0-7069-2563-7}}.</ref>

===== Anecdotal arguments =====

{{See also|Anecdotal evidence}}

* The sincere seeker's argument, espoused by Muslim Sufis of the Tasawwuf tradition, posits that every individual who follows a formulaic path towards guidance, arrives at the same destination of conviction in the existence of God and specifically in the monotheistic tenets and laws of Islam. This apparent natural law for guidance and belief could only be consistent if the formula and supplication were being answered by the same Divine entity being addressed, as claimed in Islamic revelations. This was formally organized by Imam Abu Hamid [[Al-Ghazali]] in such notable works as "Deliverance from Error" and "The Alchemy of Happiness", in Arabic "[[Kimiya-yi sa'ādat]]". The path includes following the golden rule of no harm to others and treating others with compassion, silence or minimal speech, seclusion, daily fasting or minimalist diet of water and basic nourishment, honest wages, and daily supplication towards "the Creator of the Universe" for guidance.<ref name="Ghazali 1100">{{Cite book |last=Ghazali |first=Abu Hamid |url=http://ghazali.org/books/md/gz101.htm |title=Deliverance from Error |year=1100 |access-date=2016-08-28 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160825093541/http://ghazali.org/books/md/gz101.htm |archive-date=2016-08-25 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="Ghazali 1105">{{Cite book |last=Ghazali |first=Abu Hamid |url=http://www.ghazali.org/books/alchemy/ |title=The Alchemy of Happiness |year=1105 |access-date=2016-08-28 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160911101949/http://www.ghazali.org/books/alchemy/ |archive-date=2016-09-11 |url-status=live}}</ref>
* The [[Argument from a proper basis]] argues that belief in God is "properly basic"; that it is similar to statements like "I see a chair" or "I feel pain".{{Citation needed|date=June 2016}} Such beliefs are non-falsifiable and, thus, neither provable nor disprovable; they concern perceptual beliefs or indisputable mental states.
* In [[Germany]], the School of [[Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi]] taught that human reason is able to perceive the suprasensible. Jacobi distinguished three faculties: sense, [[reason]], and understanding. Just as sense has immediate perception of the material so has reason immediate perception of the immaterial, while the understanding brings these perceptions to a person's consciousness and unites them to one another.<ref>([[A. Stöckl]], ''Geschichte der neueren Philosophie'', II, 82 sqq.)</ref> God's existence, then, cannot be proven (Jacobi, like Immanuel Kant, rejected the absolute value of the principle of causality), it must be felt by the mind.
* The same theory was advocated in Germany by [[Friedrich Schleiermacher]], who assumed an inner religious sense by means of which people feel religious truths. According to Schleiermacher, religion consists solely in this inner perception, and dogmatic doctrines are inessential.<ref>(Stöckl, loc. cit., 199 sqq.)</ref>

==== Hindu arguments ====

The school of Vedanta argues that one of the proofs of the existence of God is the law of [[karma]]. In a commentary to [[Brahma Sutras]] (III, 2, 38, and 41), [[Adi Sankara]] argues that the original karmic actions themselves cannot bring about the proper results at some future time; neither can super sensuous, non-intelligent qualities like [[adrsta]] by themselves mediate the appropriate, justly deserved pleasure and pain. The fruits, according to him must be administered through the action of a conscious agent, namely, a supreme being ([[Ishvara]]).<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Reichenbach |first=Bruce R. |date=April 1989 |title=Karma, causation, and divine intervention |url=http://ccbs.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-PHIL/reiche2.htm |url-status=dead |journal=Philosophy East and West |volume=39 |issue=2 |pages=135–149 [145] |doi=10.2307/1399374 |jstor=1399374 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091027070413/http://ccbs.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-PHIL/reiche2.htm |archive-date=2009-10-27 |access-date=2009-12-29 |issn = 0031-8221}}</ref> The [[Nyaya]] school make similar arguments.

==== Other arguments ====

* The [[evolutionary argument against naturalism]], which argues that naturalistic evolution is incapable of providing humans with the cognitive apparatus necessary for their knowledge to have positive epistemic status.<ref>Alvin Plantinga, ''Warrant and Proper Function.''</ref>
* An argument from belief in God being properly basic as presented by Alvin Plantinga.<ref>Alvin Plantinga, ''Warranted Christian Belief.''</ref>
* Argument from Personal Identity.<ref>Richard Swinburne, ''The Coherence of Theism.''</ref>
* Argument from the "divine attributes of scientific law".<ref>This argument is articulated by Vern Poythress in chapter 1 of Redeeming Science, pp. 13–31. Available: http://www.frame-poythress.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/PoythressVernRedeemingScience.pdf#page=14 {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121114181018/http://www.frame-poythress.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/PoythressVernRedeemingScience.pdf#page=14|date=2012-11-14}}</ref>

=== Arguments against the existence of God===

<!--This section is linked from [[Atheism]]-->
The arguments below aim to show that God does not exist—by showing a creator is unnecessary or [[Proof by contradiction|contradictory]], at odds with known [[Science|scientific]] or [[History|historical]] facts, or that there is insufficient proof that God exists.

==== Logical arguments ====

<!-- This section is linked from [[Atheism]] -->
The following arguments deduce, mostly through self-contradiction, the non-existence of God as "the Creator".

* No scientific evidence of God's existence has been found. Therefore, according to [[scientific skepticism|scientific skeptic]] or [[scientism|scientist]] worldviews, one should not believe in God; more philosophically, whether or not God exists is unknown, [[Implicit and explicit atheism|or even]], God does not exist (depending on how strongly such worldviews are held; or, depending on how strongly one believes that there is no scientific evidence of God's existence).<ref>{{Cite book |last=Baggini |first=Julian |date=2003-08-28 |title=Atheism |publisher=Oxford University Press |doi=10.1093/actrade/9780192804242.001.0001 |isbn=978-0-19-280424-2}}</ref>
* [[Stephen Hawking]] and co-author [[Leonard Mlodinow]] state in their book ''[[The Grand Design (book)|The Grand Design]]'' that it is reasonable to ask who or what created the universe, but if the answer is God, [[Problem of the creator of God|then the question has merely been deflected to that of who created God]]. Both authors claim that it is possible to answer these questions purely within the realm of science, and without invoking any divine beings.<ref>Stephen Hawking, Leonard Mlodinow, ''[[The Grand Design (book)|The Grand Design]]'', p. 172.</ref> Christian scholars, like [[Leonhard Euler]] and [[Bernard d'Espagnat]],<ref name="newscientist.com">{{Cite web |last=Geftner |first=Amanda |title=Concept of 'hypercosmic God' wins Templeton Prize |url=https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn16769-concept-of-hypercosmic-god-wins-templeton-prize/ |access-date=2023-11-16 |website=New Scientist |language=en-US}}</ref> disagree with that kind of skeptical argument.
* Dawkins' [[Ultimate Boeing 747 gambit]] analogizes the above. Some theists argue that [[evolution]] and abiogenesis are akin to a hurricane assembling a Boeing 747—that the universe (or life) is too complex, cannot be made by non-living matter alone and would have to be designed by someone, who theists call God. Dawkin's counter-argument is that such a God would himself be complex—the "Ultimate" Boeing 747—and therefore require a designer.
* [[Theological noncognitivism]] is the argument that religious language – specifically, words such as "God" – are not cognitively meaningful and that irreducible definitions of God are circular.
* The analogy of [[Russell's teapot]] argues that the [[Philosophic burden of proof|burden of proof]] for the existence of God lies with the theist rather than the atheist; it can be considered an extension of [[Occam's razor|Occam's Razor]].

===== Arguments from incompatible divine properties =====

Some arguments focus on the existence of specific conceptions of God as being omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect.

'''The Omnipotence Paradox'''

The Omnipotence Paradox is a philosophical problem that challenges the idea of an all-powerful God. The paradox argues that if God is truly omnipotent, then he should be able to do anything, including things that are logically impossible. However, if God cannot do something that is logically impossible, then he is not truly omnipotent. This paradox has been debated by philosophers for centuries and continues to be a topic of discussion in modern times.

The basic form of the Omnipotence Paradox can be presented as follows: Can God create a stone so heavy that he cannot lift it? If God can create such a stone, then he is not omnipotent because he cannot lift it. If God cannot create such a stone, then he is also not omnipotent because there is something he cannot do.<ref>Rowe, William L. "The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism." American Philosophical Quarterly.</ref>

One of the earliest recorded discussions of the Omnipotence Paradox can be found in the writings of the ancient Greek philosopher [[Epicurus]]. In his work "[[Epicureanism|Letter to Menoeceus]]," Epicurus argues that if God is truly omnipotent, then he should be able to prevent evil from existing in the world. However, since evil does exist, either God is not omnipotent or he is not benevolent.<ref>{{cite book |author=[[Epicurus]] |title=Letter to Menoeceus |title-link=Epicureanism#Letter to Menoeceus |translator-first=Robert Drew |translator-last=Hicks }}</ref>

Another version of the omnipotence paradox involves God's ability to change the past. If God is truly omnipotent, then he should be able to change events that have already occurred. But if he can change the past, then he would be altering his own actions and decisions, which would mean that he was not truly free to act in the first place.<ref>Adams, Marilyn McCord. "The Problem of Evil." The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Religion.</ref>

Another early discussion of the Omnipotence Paradox can be found in the writings of the medieval philosopher St. Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas argued that God's omnipotence was limited by his own nature and by logical laws. He believed that God could not perform actions that were logically contradictory, such as creating a square circle or making 2+2=5.<ref>{{cite book |last=Aquinas |first=Thomas |author-link=Thomas Aquinas |title=Summa Theologica |title-link=Summa Theologica |translator=Fathers of the English Dominican Province }}</ref>

One of the most famous versions of this paradox is the question: "Can God create a being more powerful than himself?" This question implies a contradiction because if God is truly omnipotent, then he should be able to create anything, including a being more powerful than himself. However, if such a being exists, then God would no longer be omnipotent.<ref>Craig, William Lane. "The Coherence of Theism." Routledge.</ref>

'''The omniscience paradox'''

The omniscience paradox challenges the idea that God can know everything that will happen in the future. If God knows everything that will happen in advance, then it seems that human beings do not have free will. After all, if God already knows what we will do in every situation, then it seems that we cannot choose to do anything differently.<ref>Kane, Robert. "Free Will." The Oxford Handbook of Free Will.</ref>

Another version of the omniscience paradox involves God's knowledge of his own future actions. If God knows what he will do in advance, then it seems that he does not have the freedom to choose otherwise. But if he does not know what he will do, then he is not truly omniscient.<ref>Plantinga, Alvin. "God and Other Minds." Cornell University Press.</ref>

A more recent version of the omniscience paradox is the "paradox of the stone tablet." This argument goes as follows: suppose that God writes down everything that will happen in the future on a stone tablet. If God is truly omniscient, then he already knows what is written on the tablet. But if what is written on the tablet is true, then it seems that human beings do not have free will.<ref>Oppy, Graham. "Ontological Arguments and Belief in God." Cambridge University Press.</ref>

'''The contradiction of omniscience and omnipotence'''

The contradiction of omniscience and omnipotence has been a topic of philosophical debate for centuries. The concept of omniscience refers to the idea that God knows everything, while omnipotence refers to the idea that God is all-powerful. The contradiction arises when one considers whether an all-knowing God can also be all-powerful. If God knows everything, then he must know what he will do in the future, and if he knows what he will do in the future, then he cannot change his mind and do something else. This would mean that God is not all-powerful because he is limited by his knowledge of the future. On the other hand, if God is all-powerful, then he should be able to change his mind and do something else, but if he does this, then he cannot be all-knowing because he did not know what he was going to do in the first place.<ref>{{Citation |last1=Hoffman |first1=Joshua |title=Omnipotence |date=2022 |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2022/entries/omnipotence/ |encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |editor-last=Zalta |editor-first=Edward N. |access-date=2023-11-16 |edition=Spring 2022 |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |last2=Rosenkrantz |first2=Gary}}</ref>

'''The problem of evil'''

The problem of evil against God is one of the most challenging philosophical and theological issues. It seeks to reconcile the existence of an all-powerful, all-knowing, and benevolent God with the presence of evil and suffering in the world. This problem has been debated for centuries by philosophers, theologians, and scholars from different religious traditions.

The problem of evil can be formulated in different ways. One common formulation is the logical problem of evil, which argues that the existence of evil is logically incompatible with the existence of an all-powerful, all-knowing, and perfectly good God. This argument goes as follows:

1. Suppose God is defined by the properties of being all-powerful, all-knowing, and perfectly good.

2. If God is all-powerful, then he can prevent evil from occurring.

3. If God is all-knowing, then he knows where evil exists and knows how to eliminate evil.

4. If God is perfectly good, then he would want to prevent evil from occurring.

5. Evil exists.

6. Therefore, God does not exist.

This argument challenges the traditional concept of God as an omnipotent and omnibenevolent being who created the world and governs it with love and care. If such a God exists, why does he allow evil to happen? The existence of natural disasters, diseases, wars, crimes, and other forms of suffering seems to contradict the idea of a loving and compassionate God.

Another formulation of the problem of evil is the evidential problem of evil, which argues that while the existence of evil may not logically disprove the existence of God, it provides strong evidence against his existence. This argument acknowledges that it is possible for an all-powerful and all-good God to have reasons for allowing evil to occur that are beyond our understanding. However, it contends that the sheer amount and intensity of evil in the world make it highly unlikely that such reasons exist.

The problem of evil has been a central concern in the philosophy of religion since ancient times. In his dialogue "[[Euthyphro|The Euthyphro]]," [[Plato]] raises the question of whether the gods love what is good because it is good, or whether it is good because the gods love it. This question raises the issue of whether morality is independent of God or dependent on him. If morality is independent of God, then God may not be necessary for moral values and duties to exist. If morality is dependent on God, then it raises the problem of whether God's commands are arbitrary or whether there is a reason behind them.<ref name=":0" /><ref>Adams, Marilyn McCord. "Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God." Cornell University Press, 1999.</ref><ref>Plantinga, Alvin. "God, Freedom, and Evil." Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1977.</ref><ref>Swinburne, Richard. "The Problem of Evil." Oxford University Press, 2006.</ref>

'''The problem of divine immutability'''

The problem of divine immutability is a philosophical and theological issue that has been debated for centuries. At the heart of the problem is the question of whether or not God can change. This question has far-reaching implications for how we understand the nature of God, the relationship between God and creation, and the problem of evil.

One of the main arguments for divine immutability is based on the idea that God is perfect and complete in all respects. According to this view, if God were to change in any way, it would imply that there was something lacking or imperfect in God's nature. This would be inconsistent with the idea of a perfect and complete being.<ref>Hasker, William. "Divine Immutability." In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta.</ref>

Another argument for divine immutability is based on the idea that God exists outside of time. According to this view, God's nature is eternal and unchanging, and therefore cannot be affected by anything that happens within time. This means that God cannot change in response to events in the world, since these events are themselves temporal and subject to change.<ref>Morris, Thomas V. ''Our Idea of God: An Introduction to Philosophical Theology''. Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 2000.</ref>

However, there are also a number of arguments against divine immutability. One of these is based on the idea that if God cannot change, then it would be impossible for God to interact with the world in any meaningful way. According to this view, if God's nature is fixed and unchanging, then there can be no real relationship between God and creation.<ref>Moltmann, Jürgen. God in Creation: A New Theology of Creation and the Spirit of God. Minneapolis, Minnesota: Fortress Press, 1985.</ref>

Another argument against divine immutability is based on the problem of evil. If God cannot change, then it would seem that God must have always known about and allowed for the existence of evil in the world. This raises questions about how we can reconcile a perfectly good and loving God with a world that contains so much suffering and injustice.<ref>Swinburne, Richard. ''Providence and the Problem of Evil''. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.</ref>

'''The problem of hell'''
{{Main|Problem of hell}}
This is one of the most difficult challenges to the existence of God. The basic argument is that if God is all-powerful, all-knowing, and perfectly good, then why would he create a place of eternal punishment like hell? This question has been debated by philosophers and theologians for centuries.

The problem of hell can be traced to ancient times. The concept of an afterlife was common in many cultures, but the idea of eternal punishment was not. The ancient Greeks believed in a realm called Hades where the dead went, but it was not a place of punishment. The ancient Egyptians believed in a judgment after death that determined whether a person would go to a good or bad afterlife, but again, it was not eternal punishment. It was not until the rise of Christianity that the concept of eternal punishment in hell became widespread.

The [[Hell in Christianity|Christian concept of hell]] is based on the teachings of Jesus Christ and the Bible.{{citation needed|date=October 2023}} According to Christian theology, hell is a place of eternal punishment for those who have rejected God and lived sinful lives. It is often described as a place of fire and torment where there is weeping and gnashing of teeth. The idea of eternal punishment in hell has been controversial throughout Christian history.

One argument against the existence of God based on the problem of hell is that it seems incompatible with God's perfect goodness. If God is perfectly good, then why would he create a place like hell where people suffer for eternity? This argument has been made by many philosophers throughout history.<ref>Craig, William Lane. "The Problem Of Hell: A Philosophical Overview." Philosophia Christi 16, no. 1 (2014): 39–54.</ref><ref>Davis, Stephen T., and Daniel Kendall. "The Problem Of Hell." Theological Studies 75, no. 1 (2014): 3–22.</ref><ref>Walls, Jerry L. "Hell: The Logic Of Damnation." International Journal For Philosophy Of Religion 75, no. 2 (2014): 109–122.</ref><ref>Taliaferro, Charles. "The Problem Of Hell Reconsidered." Religious Studies 47, no. 1 (2011): 73–87.</ref><ref>Trakakis, Nick. "The Problem Of Hell: A Challenge To Theistic Belief." Sophia 52, no. 1 (2013): 5–20.</ref>

'''Transcendental Argument for the Non-existence of God (TANG)'''

The Transcendental Argument for the Non-Existence of God (TANG) is a philosophical argument that attempts to demonstrate the non-existence of God by showing that the concept of God is logically incompatible with certain necessary conditions for rationality. The argument is based on the idea that if certain necessary conditions for rationality are true, then the existence of God is impossible. The proponents of TANG argue that it is a powerful argument against theism, and it has been the subject of much debate in philosophical circles.

The basic structure of TANG can be summarized as follows:

1. If rationality exists, then certain necessary conditions for rationality must be true.

2. The existence of God is logically incompatible with these necessary conditions for rationality.

3. Therefore, if these necessary conditions for rationality are true, then the existence of God is impossible.

The proponents of TANG argue that there are three necessary conditions for rationality:

1. The laws of logic are valid.

2. Our cognitive faculties are reliable.

3. There is an objective moral standard.

According to TANG, if these three necessary conditions are true, then the existence of God is impossible.

Firstly, proponents of TANG argue that the laws of logic are valid and necessary for rationality. They contend that if the laws of logic were not valid, then we could not reason or make sense of anything. Therefore, they argue that it is necessary for rationality that the laws of logic be valid and universally applicable.

Secondly, proponents of TANG argue that our cognitive faculties must be reliable in order for us to reason rationally. They contend that if our cognitive faculties were not reliable, then we could not trust our own reasoning processes and would have no basis for knowledge or belief. Therefore, they argue that it is necessary for rationality that our cognitive faculties be reliable.

Finally, proponents of TANG argue that there must be an objective moral standard in order for us to reason rationally. They contend that if there were no objective moral standard, then we could not make moral judgments or reason about ethical issues. Therefore, they argue that it is necessary for rationality that there be an objective moral standard.

Proponents of TANG argue that the existence of God is logically incompatible with these necessary conditions for rationality. They contend that if God exists, then the laws of logic are contingent on his will and could be different from what they are. They also argue that if God exists, then our cognitive faculties are contingent on his will and could be unreliable. Finally, they argue that if God exists, then morality is contingent on his will and there is no objective moral standard.

Therefore, proponents of TANG conclude that if these necessary conditions for rationality are true, then the existence of God is impossible. They argue that the concept of God is logically incompatible with these necessary conditions and therefore cannot exist.<ref>Martin, Michael. ''Atheism: A Philosophical Justification''. Temple University Press, 1992.</ref><ref name=":2">Oppy, Graham. ''Arguing about Gods''. Cambridge University Press, 2006.</ref><ref>Gale, Richard M. ''On the Nature and Existence of God''. Cambridge University Press, 1991.</ref><ref>Smith, Quentin. ''Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology''. Clarendon Press, 1993.</ref><ref>Sobel, Jordan Howard. ''Logic and Theism: Arguments For and Against Beliefs in God''. Cambridge University Press, 2004.</ref>

'''Atheist-Existential Argument'''

The [[Atheistic existentialism|atheist-existential]] argument posits that human existence is characterized by absurdity, meaninglessness, and despair. According to this argument, humans are finite beings living in an infinite universe, and their existence is devoid of any inherent purpose or meaning. Proponents of this argument contend that if God existed, He would have provided humanity with a clear purpose and meaning for existence. However, since no such purpose or meaning exists, it follows that God does not exist.

[[Jean-Paul Sartre]] was one of the most prominent proponents of the atheist-existential argument. In his book ''[[Existentialism Is a Humanism|Existentialism is a Humanism]],'' Sartre argues that human existence is absurd because there is no inherent purpose or meaning to life. He contends that humans are free to create their own meaning and purpose but are ultimately responsible for their choices and actions. Sartre asserts that if God existed, He would have provided humanity with a clear purpose and meaning for existence. However, since no such purpose or meaning exists, it follows that God does not exist.<ref>Sartre, Jean-Paul. ''Existentialism is a Humanism''. Yale University Press, 2007.</ref>

Similarly, [[Friedrich Nietzsche]] argues in his book ''[[Thus Spoke Zarathustra]]'' that human existence is meaningless because there is no inherent purpose or meaning to life. Nietzsche contends that humans must create their own values and meanings, and that the concept of God is a human invention that serves as a crutch for those who cannot accept the absurdity of existence. Nietzsche asserts that the death of God is a necessary step in human evolution, as it allows humanity to embrace its freedom and create its own values and meanings.<ref>{{cite book |last=Nietzsche |first=Friedrich |title=Thus Spoke Zarathustra |title-link=Thus Spoke Zarathustra |publisher=Penguin Classics |year=2003 }}</ref>

[[Albert Camus]] also presents a similar argument in his book ''[[The Myth of Sisyphus]]''. Camus argues that human existence is absurd because there is no inherent purpose or meaning to life. He contends that humans must create their own meaning in the face of this absurdity, and that the concept of God is a distraction from this task. Camus asserts that the only way to confront the absurdity of existence is through rebellion, which involves embracing life despite its lack of inherent meaning.<ref>{{cite book |last=Camus |first=Albert |title=The Myth of Sisyphus |title-link=The Myth of Sisyphus |publisher=Vintage International |year=1991 }}</ref>

[[Martin Heidegger]] also presents an existentialist argument for the non-existence of God in his book ''[[Being and Time]]''. Heidegger contends that human existence is characterized by anxiety and dread because humans are aware of their mortality and the ultimate futility of their actions. He argues that if God existed, He would have provided humanity with a clear purpose and meaning for existence, thus alleviating this anxiety. However, since no such purpose or meaning exists, it follows that God does not exist.<ref>Heidegger, Martin. ''Being and Time''. Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 2008.</ref><ref>Solomon, Robert C., and Kathleen M. Higgins, editors. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death. Oxford University Press, 2013.</ref>

'''The "no reason" argument'''

The "no reason" argument tries to show that an omnipotent and omniscient being would not have any reason to act in any way, specifically by creating the universe, because it would have no needs, wants, or desires since these very concepts are subjectively human. Since the universe exists, there is a contradiction, and therefore, an omnipotent god cannot exist. This argument is expounded upon by [[Scott Adams]] in the book ''[[God's Debris]]'', which puts forward a form of [[Pandeism]] as its fundamental theological model. A similar argument is put forward in [[Ludwig von Mises]]'s "Human Action". He referred to it as the "praxeological argument" and claimed that a perfect being would have long ago satisfied all its wants and desires and would no longer be able to take action in the present without proving that it had been unable to achieve its wants faster—showing it imperfect.

The argument is based on the idea that if something exists, there must be a reason or explanation for its existence. Therefore, if God exists, there must be a reason or explanation for his existence. However, proponents of the "no reason" argument argue that there is no reason or explanation for God's existence, and therefore he does not exist.

One of the main proponents of the "no reason" argument is [[J. L. Mackie]]. In his book ''The Miracle of Theism: Arguments For and Against the Existence of God'', Mackie argues that the concept of an uncaused cause, which is often used to explain God's existence, is flawed. He argues that if everything must have a cause or explanation for its existence, then God must also have a cause or explanation for his existence. However, since God is often described as an uncaused cause, this creates a contradiction in the concept of God.<ref>{{cite book |last=Mackie |first=J. L. |author-link=J. L. Mackie |title=The Miracle of Theism: Arguments For and Against the Existence of God |year=1982 }}</ref>

Another proponent of the "no reason" argument is Bertrand Russell. In his book ''[[Why I Am Not a Christian]]'', Russell argues that the concept of God as an uncaused cause is illogical. He argues that if everything must have a cause or explanation for its existence, then God must also have a cause or explanation for his existence. However, since God is often described as an uncaused cause, this creates a contradiction in the concept of God.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Russell |first=Bertrand |date=2020-04-22 |title=Why I am not a Christian |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315099552 |doi=10.4324/9781315099552|isbn=9781351583459 |s2cid=153862737 }}</ref>

Furthermore, proponents of the "no reason" argument argue that the burden of proof lies with those who claim that God exists. They argue that since there is no evidence or reason to believe in God's existence, it is more reasonable to assume that he does not exist.

In addition to these arguments, proponents of the "no reason" argument also point to the problem of evil as evidence against God's existence. They argue that if God is all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good, then he would not allow evil to exist in the world for any reason. He would have no specific reason for doing so. However, since evil does exist and is allowed to, this creates a contradiction in the concept of God.<ref>{{cite journal | url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/20009775 | jstor=20009775 | last1=Rowe | first1=William L. | title=The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism | journal=American Philosophical Quarterly | date=1979 | volume=16 | issue=4 | pages=335–341 }}</ref><ref>Oppy, Graham Robert. ''Arguing About Gods''.</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last=Drange |first=Theodore M. |title=The Arguments From Evil and Nonbelief |journal=Religious Studies |volume=28 |year=1992 |pages=347–365 }}</ref>

==== Empirical arguments ====

The following empirical arguments rely on observations or experimentation to yield their conclusions.

'''Argument from naturalism'''

The argument from naturalism is a philosophical argument that asserts that the natural world is all there is and that supernatural explanations are unnecessary. This argument is based on the premise that the universe operates according to natural laws and that these laws can be discovered through scientific inquiry. The argument from naturalism has been a topic of debate among philosophers for centuries, with proponents and opponents presenting various arguments and counterarguments.

The argument from naturalism can be traced to ancient Greek philosophy, where philosophers such as [[Democritus]] and Epicurus argued that the universe was composed of atoms and void, with no need for supernatural explanations. However, it was not until the Enlightenment period in the 18th century that naturalism became a dominant philosophical position. During this time, philosophers such as David Hume and Immanuel Kant argued that knowledge could only be derived from empirical observation and rational analysis, without recourse to supernatural explanations.

One of the key premises of the argument from naturalism is that the natural world is all there is. According to this view, there are no supernatural entities or forces that exist beyond the physical realm. This premise is based on the assumption that everything in the universe operates according to natural laws, which can be discovered through scientific inquiry. As philosopher [[Paul Kurtz]] states, "the naturalistic outlook holds that nature is a self-contained system of physical causes and effects"<ref>{{cite book |last=Kurtz |first=Paul |author-link=Paul Kurtz |title=The New Skepticism: Inquiry and Reliable Knowledge |publisher=Prometheus Books |year=1992 }}</ref>

Another important premise of the argument from naturalism is that supernatural explanations are unnecessary. According to this view, any phenomenon in the universe can be explained through natural causes and processes, without invoking supernatural entities or forces. This premise is based on the assumption that naturalistic explanations are sufficient to account for all observed phenomena. As philosopher [[William L. Rowe]] states, "Naturalism holds that there is no need to postulate any supernatural entities or forces in order to explain the world".<ref>{{cite book |last=Rowe |first=William L. |author-link=William L. Rowe |chapter=The Argument from Naturalism |title=The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology |editor-first=William Lane |editor-last=Craig |editor-first2=J. P. |editor-last2=Moreland |publisher=Wiley-Blackwell |year=2012 |pages=331–350 }}</ref>

Proponents of the argument from naturalism argue that naturalistic explanations are more parsimonious than supernatural explanations. This means that naturalistic explanations are simpler and require fewer assumptions than supernatural explanations. For example, if a person observes a tree falling, a naturalistic explanation would be that the tree fell due to gravity, whereas a supernatural explanation would be that a deity caused the tree to fall. The naturalistic explanation is simpler and requires fewer assumptions than the supernatural explanation.

Opponents of the argument from naturalism argue that there are phenomena in the universe that cannot be explained through naturalistic causes and processes. These phenomena are often referred to as "supernatural" or "[[paranormal]]" and include things like miracles, psychic abilities, and [[near-death experience]]s. According to opponents of naturalism, these phenomena require supernatural explanations.

However, proponents of the argument from naturalism counter that there is no empirical evidence to support supernatural explanations for these phenomena. They argue that many supposed supernatural phenomena can be explained through naturalistic causes and processes. For example, near-death experiences can be explained through changes in brain chemistry and oxygen deprivation, rather than as evidence of an afterlife.<ref>Plantinga, Alvin. ''Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, and Naturalism''. Oxford University Press, 2011.</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=Swinburne |first=Richard |title=Is There a God? |title-link=Is There a God? |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2010 }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=Dennett |first=Daniel C. |title=Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon |publisher=Penguin Books |year=2007 }}</ref>

'''The Argument from Evolution'''

The Argument from Evolution against God's existence is a philosophical argument that attempts to prove the non-existence of God by using the theory of evolution. The argument is based on the idea that the theory of evolution provides a natural explanation for the diversity of life on Earth, and therefore, there is no need to invoke a divine creator.

The theory of evolution was first proposed by [[Charles Darwin]] in his book ''[[On the Origin of Species]]'' in 1859. According to the theory, all living organisms have evolved over time from a common ancestor through a process of natural selection. Natural selection is the process by which certain traits become more or less common in a population over time depending on their usefulness for survival and reproduction. Over millions of years, this process has led to the vast diversity of life we see on Earth today.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Darwin |first=Charles |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.5962/bhl.title.959 |title=Origin of species |date=1900 |publisher=H. M. Caldwell |location=New York, New York and Boston, Massachusetts |doi=10.5962/bhl.title.959}}</ref>

One of the key arguments against God's existence based on evolution is known as the argument from imperfection. This argument suggests that if God were responsible for creating all life on Earth, then why would he create imperfect organisms? For example, why would he create animals with vestigial organs that serve no purpose or cause suffering?<ref>{{cite book |last=Gould |first=S. J. |year=1991 |title=Bully for Brontosaurus: Reflections in Natural History |title-link=Bully for Brontosaurus |publisher=W. W. Norton & Company }}</ref>

Another argument against God's existence based on evolution is known as the argument from bad design. This argument suggests that if God were responsible for creating all life on Earth, then why would he create organisms with such poor design features? For example, why would he create animals with eyes that are poorly designed or prone to disease?<ref>Dawkins, R. (1986). ''The Blind Watchmaker: Why the Evidence of Evolution Reveals a Universe Without Design''. W. W. Norton & Company.</ref>

'''The Euthyphro dilemma'''

The Euthyphro dilemma is a philosophical problem that raises questions about the relationship between morality and God's existence. The dilemma was first presented by the ancient Greek philosopher Plato in his dialogue "Euthyphro." The dilemma asks whether something is morally good because God commands it, or whether God commands it because it is morally good. This dilemma has been used as an argument against the existence of God, as it seems to suggest that either God is not necessary for morality or that God's commands are arbitrary and not based on any objective standard of morality.<ref name=":0">Plato. "Euthyphro." The Collected Dialogues of Plato, edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, Princeton University Press, 1961.</ref>

The first horn of the dilemma suggests that something is morally good because God commands it. This view is known as divine command theory, which states that moral truths are grounded in God's will or commands. According to this view, God's commands determine what is right and wrong, and morality is dependent on God's existence. If God did not exist, then there would be no objective basis for morality.

The second horn of the dilemma suggests that God commands something because it is morally good. This view implies that there is an objective standard of morality that exists independently of God's will. In other words, God recognizes what is morally good and commands us to follow it. This view is known as moral realism, which holds that moral truths exist independently of human opinion or belief.

Critics of the divine command theory argue that it leads to a problematic conclusion: if something is morally good simply because God commands it, then anything could be considered morally good if God commanded it. For example, if God commanded us to kill innocent people, then killing innocent people would be considered morally good according to divine command theory. This seems to suggest that morality is arbitrary and dependent on God's whims rather than being grounded in any objective standard.

On the other hand, critics of moral realism argue that it raises questions about the nature of morality itself. If there is an objective standard of morality that exists independently of God's will, then what is the source of this standard? Is it a natural law, or is it something else entirely? Furthermore, if there is an objective standard of morality, then why do different cultures and societies have different moral codes? This seems to suggest that morality is not as objective as moral realists claim.<ref>Adams, Robert Merrihew. "Divine Command Metaethics Modified Again." The Journal of Religious Ethics, vol. 33, no. 1, 2005, pp. 29–50.</ref><ref>Craig, William Lane. "The Euthyphro Dilemma." Reasonable Faith, 2010, www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/scholarly-writings/divine-command-theory/the-euthyphro-dilemma/.</ref><ref>Korsgaard, Christine M. "The Sources of Normativity." Cambridge University Press, 1996.</ref><ref>Nielsen, Kai. "Ethics Without God." Prometheus Books, 1990.</ref>

'''The problem of anthropic argument'''

The [[Anthropic principle|anthropic argument]] is a philosophical and theological concept that argues that the universe and its physical laws are finely tuned to allow for the existence of life and, therefore, must have been designed by an intelligent creator. Proponents of this argument claim that the odds of the universe existing as it does by chance are so astronomically low that it is more reasonable to believe in a creator than not. However, opponents of the anthropic argument argue that it is flawed and does not necessarily prove the existence of God.

One of the main criticisms of the anthropic argument is that it suffers from the fallacy of [[selection bias]]. This is because proponents only consider the universe as it exists today, without taking into account all the other possible ways it could have existed. For example, if the physical laws were different, life as we know it may not have been possible, but that does not mean that some other form of life could not have existed under those conditions. Therefore, opponents argue that just because our universe allows for life does not necessarily mean that it was designed to do so.

Another criticism of the anthropic argument is that it assumes that life is inherently valuable and important. Opponents argue that this is a subjective value judgment and cannot be used as evidence for the existence of God. Additionally, opponents point out that there are many aspects of the universe that are not conducive to life, such as [[black hole]]s or [[supernova]]e, which could be seen as evidence against a benevolent creator.

Furthermore, opponents argue that the anthropic argument is based on a flawed understanding of [[probability]]. They claim that just because something is unlikely does not mean it is impossible, and therefore, low probabilities cannot be used as evidence for design. Additionally, opponents argue that probability calculations can only be made if all possible outcomes are known, which is impossible in the case of the universe.

Opponents of the anthropic argument also point out that there are alternative explanations for the fine-tuning of the universe. Some scientists propose the [[Multiverse|multiverse theory]], which suggests that our universe is just one of many possible universes, each with its own set of physical laws. In this scenario, it is not surprising that we find ourselves in a universe that allows for life because we could not exist in any other type of universe. Other scientists suggest that the physical constants of the universe are not actually fixed but can vary over time, which could explain why our universe appears to be finely tuned for life.<ref>Craig, William Lane. ''The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology''. Wiley-Blackwell, 2012.</ref><ref name=":2" /><ref name=":1" /><ref>Leslie, John. ''Universes''. Routledge, 1989.</ref><ref>Martin, Michael. ''The Cambridge Companion to Atheism''. Cambridge University Press, 2007.</ref>

'''Argument from the problem of miracles'''

The problem of miracles is rooted in the concept of natural law, which assumes that the universe operates according to predictable and consistent laws. According to this view, any event that violates natural law, such as a miracle, cannot occur. Therefore, if a miracle is claimed to have occurred, it must be either a misunderstanding or a deliberate deception.

One of the most prominent advocates of the problem of miracles was the Scottish philosopher David Hume. In his essay "[[Of Miracles]]," Hume argued that it is always more reasonable to believe that someone is mistaken or lying than to accept that a miracle has occurred. He claimed that there is no amount of testimony or evidence that can prove a miracle beyond doubt because it always contradicts natural law. Hume's argument was based on his empiricist philosophy, which held that all knowledge comes from sensory experience and that claims about supernatural events are not supported by such experience.<ref>Hume, David. "Of Miracles." In An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, edited by Tom L. Beauchamp, 114–123. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.</ref>

'''The argument from the problem of religious experience'''

This argument suggests that religious experiences are subjective and cannot be verified or falsified, making them unreliable as evidence for the existence of God.

The argument from the problem of religious experience against God's existence can be formulated as follows:

1. Religious experiences are subjective and cannot be verified or falsified.

2. If religious experiences cannot be verified or falsified, then they are unreliable as evidence for the existence of God.

3. Therefore, religious experiences are unreliable as evidence for the existence of God.

Premise 1 is based on the fact that religious experiences are personal and subjective. They are often described in terms of feelings, emotions, and sensations that are difficult to describe or measure objectively. For example, a person may claim to have had a mystical experience in which they felt a deep sense of unity with all things. However, this experience cannot be objectively measured or verified by others. It is purely subjective and exists only in the mind of the individual who had it.

Premise 2 follows logically from premise 1. If religious experiences cannot be verified or falsified, then they cannot be used as evidence to support any particular belief about God's existence or nature. This is because there is no way to distinguish between genuine religious experiences and mere hallucinations or delusions. Without objective criteria for verifying or falsifying religious experiences, they remain purely subjective and cannot be used as evidence in any rational debate about the existence of God.

Premise 3 is the conclusion that follows logically from premises 1 and 2. If religious experiences are unreliable as evidence for the existence of God, then they cannot be used to support any argument for the existence of God. This means that any argument that relies on religious experiences as evidence for God's existence is inherently flawed and cannot be taken seriously by those who demand objective evidence for their beliefs.<ref>Alston, William P. "Religious Experience and Religious Belief." The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 67, no. 14, 1970, pp. 471–476.</ref><ref>Draper, Paul. "The Problem of the Hiddenness of God and the Problem of Evil." Religious Studies, vol. 35, no. 3, 1999, pp. 331–352.</ref><ref>Hick, John. ''An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent''. Yale University Press, 1989.</ref><ref>James, William. ''The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature''. Penguin Classics, 2002.</ref><ref>Rowe, William L. "Religious Experience and the Principle of Credulity." International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 16, no. 2, 1984, pp. 73–93.</ref>

===== Argument from inconsistent revelations =====

{{Excerpt|Argument from inconsistent revelations}}

===== Argument from parsimony =====

The argument from [[Maximum parsimony (phylogenetics)|parsimony]] (using [[Occam's razor]]) contends that since natural (non-supernatural) theories adequately explain the [[development of religion]] and belief in gods,<ref>''Religion Explained: The Evolutionary Origins of Religious Thought'', Pascal Boyer, Basic Books (2001).</ref> the actual existence of such supernatural agents is superfluous and may be dismissed unless otherwise proven to be required to explain the phenomenon.

===== Argument from historical induction =====

The argument from "historical induction" concludes that since most theistic religions throughout history (e.g. [[ancient Egyptian religion]], [[Religion in ancient Greece|ancient Greek religion]]) and their gods ultimately come to be regarded as untrue or incorrect, all theistic religions, including contemporary ones, are therefore most likely untrue/incorrect by induction. [[H. L. Mencken]] wrote a short piece about the topic entitled "Memorial Service" in 1922.<ref>H. L. Mencken, [http://jonathongreen.co.uk/h-l-mencken-where-is-the-graveyard-of-dead-gods/ "Where is the Graveyard of Dead Gods?"]. {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180917143203/http://jonathongreen.co.uk/h-l-mencken-where-is-the-graveyard-of-dead-gods/|date=2018-09-17}}.</ref> It is implied as part of Stephen F. Roberts' popular quotation:

<blockquote>I contend that we are both atheists. I just believe in one fewer god than you do. When you understand why you dismiss all the other possible gods, you will understand why I dismiss yours.</blockquote>

===== Argument from nonbelief =====

{{Excerpt|Argument from nonbelief}}

===== Arguments from the poor design of the universe =====

The [[problem of evil]] contests the existence of a god who is both omnipotent and [[Omnibenevolence|omnibenevolent]] by arguing that such a god should not permit the existence of [[evil]] or [[suffering]]. The theist responses are called [[Theodicy|theodicies]]. Similarly, the [[argument from poor design]] contends that an all-powerful, benevolent creator god would not have created lifeforms, including humans, which seem to exhibit poor design.

[[Richard Carrier]] has argued that the universe itself seems to be very ill-designed for life, because the vast majority of the space in the universe is utterly hostile to it. This is arguably unexpected on the hypothesis that the universe was designed by a god, especially a [[personal god]]. Carrier contends that such a god could have easily created a [[Geocentric model|geocentric universe]] ''[[ex nihilo]]'' in [[Young Earth creationism|the recent past]], in which most of the volume of the universe is inhabitable by humans and other lifeforms—precisely the kind of universe that most humans believed in until the [[History of science|rise of modern science]]. While a personal god ''might'' have created the kind of universe we observe, Carrier contends that this is not the kind of universe we would most ''likely'' expect to see if such a god existed. He finally argues that, unlike theism, our observations about the nature of the universe are strongly expected on the hypothesis of atheism, since the universe would have to be vast, very old, and almost completely devoid of life if life were to have [[Abiogenesis|arisen by sheer chance]].<ref>{{Cite encyclopedia |year=2011 |title=Neither Life Nor The Universe Appear Intelligently Designed |encyclopedia=The End of Christianity |publisher=Prometheus Books |location=Amherst, New York |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=kXbaUE8cT64C |last=Carrier |first=Richard |author-link=Richard Carrier |editor-last=Loftus |editor-first=John W. |isbn=978-1-61614-414-2}}</ref>

==== Subjective arguments ====

{{See also|Anecdotal evidence}}

Similar to the [[Wiktionary:subjective#Pronunciation|subjective]] arguments for the existence of God, subjective arguments against God's existence mainly rely on the testimony or experience of witnesses, or the propositions of a revealed religion in general.

* The witness argument gives credibility to personal witnesses, contemporary and from the past, who disbelieve or strongly doubt the existence of God.
* The conflicted religions argument notes that many religions give differing accounts as to what God is and what God wants; since all the contradictory accounts cannot be correct, many if not all religions must be incorrect.
* The disappointment argument claims that if, when asked for, there is no visible help from God, there is no reason to believe that there is a God.

==== Hindu arguments ====

[[Atheism in Hinduism|Atheistic Hindu doctrines]] cite various arguments for rejecting a creator God or ''Ishvara''. The ''[[Samkhyapravachana Sutra|IAST]]'' of the [[Samkhya]] school states that there is no philosophical place for a creator God in this system. It is also argued in this text that the existence of Ishvara (God) cannot be proved and hence cannot be admitted to exist.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Sinha |first1=Nandalal |url=http://archive.org/details/thesamkhyaphilos00sinhuoft |series=The Sacred Books of the Hindus |volume=XI: Samkhya Philosophy |title=The Samkhya Philosophy Containing (1) Samkhya-Pravachana Sutram, With the Vritti of Aniruddha, and the Bhasya of Vijnana Bhiksu and Extracts From the Vritti-Sara of Mahadeva Vedantin; (2) Tatva Samasa; (3) Samkhya Karika; (4) Panchasikha Sutram |translator-first=Nandlal |translator-last=Sinha |date=1915 |publisher=Allahabad Panini Office }}</ref> Classical Samkhya argues against the existence of God on metaphysical grounds. For instance, it argues that an unchanging God cannot be the source of an ever-changing world. It says God is a necessary metaphysical assumption demanded by circumstances.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Rajadhyaksha |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ihkRAQAAIAAJ |title=The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy |year=1959 |page=95 |access-date=2016-01-27 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160101025131/https://books.google.com/books?id=ihkRAQAAIAAJ |archive-date=2016-01-01 |url-status=live}}</ref> The Sutras of Samkhya endeavor to prove that the idea of God is inconceivable and self-contradictory, and some{{Which|date=June 2012}} commentaries speak plainly on this subject. The ''Sankhya- tattva-kaumudi'', commenting on Karika 57, argues that a perfect God can have no need to create a world, and if God's motive is kindness, Samkhya questions whether it is reasonable to call into existence beings who while non-existent had no suffering. Samkhya postulates that a benevolent deity ought to create only happy creatures, not an imperfect world like the real world.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Eliot |first=Charles |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=K4ZpPleiyokC |title=Hinduism and Buddhism, Vol II. (of 3) |date=2007-09-01 |isbn=9781406862966 |page=243 |publisher=Echo Library |access-date=2016-01-27 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140103130540/http://books.google.com/books?id=K4ZpPleiyokC |archive-date=2014-01-03 |url-status=live}}</ref>

According to Sinha, the following arguments were given by Samkhya philosophers against the idea of an eternal, self-caused, creator God:

* If the existence of [[Karma (Hinduism)|karma]] is assumed, the proposition of God as a moral governor of the universe is unnecessary. For, if God enforces the consequences of actions then he can do so without karma. If however, he is assumed to be within the law of karma, then karma itself would be the giver of consequences and there would be no need of a God.
* Even if karma is denied, God still cannot be the enforcer of consequences. Because the motives of an enforcer God would be either egoistic or altruistic. Now, God's motives cannot be assumed to be altruistic because an altruistic God would not create a world so full of suffering. If his motives are assumed to be egoistic, then God must be thought to have desire, as agency or authority cannot be established in the absence of desire. However, assuming that God has desire would contradict God's eternal freedom which necessitates no compulsion in actions. Moreover, desire, according to Samkhya, is an attribute of prakṛti and cannot be thought to grow in God. 
* Despite arguments to the contrary, if God is still assumed to contain unfulfilled desires, this would cause him to suffer pain and other similar human experiences. Such a worldly God would be no better than Samkhya's notion of higher self.
* Furthermore, there is no proof of the existence of God. He is not the object of perception, there exists no general proposition that can prove him by inference.

Therefore, Samkhya maintained that the various cosmological, ontological and teleological arguments could not prove God.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Sinha |first=Nandalal |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=6l-CtwAACAAJ&q=The+samkhya+philosophy+by+Nandlal+Sinha |title=The Samkhya Philosophy; Containing Samkhya-Pravachana Sutram, with the Vritti of Aniruddha, and the Bhasya of Vijnana Bhiksu and Extracts from the Vritti-Sara of Mahadeva Vedantin; Tatva Samasa; Samkhya Karika; Panchasikha Sutram. Translated and EDI |date=2012 |publisher=HardPress |isbn=978-1-4076-9891-5 |language=en}}</ref>

Proponents of the school of [[Mimamsa]], which is based on [[ritual]]s and [[orthopraxy]], decided that the evidence allegedly proving the existence of God is insufficient. They argue that there is no need to postulate a maker for the world, just as there is no need for an author to compose the Vedas or a god to validate the rituals.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Neville |first=Robert |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ThLR13JpCWsC |title=Religious truth |year=2001 |isbn=9780791447789 |page=51 |publisher=SUNY Press |access-date=2016-01-27 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160101025131/https://books.google.com/books?id=ThLR13JpCWsC |archive-date=2016-01-01 |url-status=live}}</ref> Mimamsa argues that the gods named in the Vedas have no existence apart from the ''[[mantra]]s'' that speak their names. In that regard, the power of the mantras is what is seen as the power of gods.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Coward |first=Harold |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=LkE_8uch5P0C |title=The perfectibility of human nature in eastern and western thought |date=2008-02-07 |isbn=9780791473368 |page=114 |publisher=SUNY Press |author-link=Harold Coward |access-date=2016-01-27 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160101025131/https://books.google.com/books?id=LkE_8uch5P0C |archive-date=2016-01-01 |url-status=live}}</ref>

== Psychological aspects ==

{{See also|Evolutionary psychology of religion}}
[[File:Europe belief in God.svg|thumb|Europeans polled who "believe in a god", according to [[Eurobarometer]] in 2005]]

[[File:North America Religious Belief.svg#/media/File:North America Religious Belief.svg|thumb|North Americans polled about religious identity 2010–2012|link=File:North_America_Religious_Belief.svg]]

Several authors have offered psychological or sociological explanations for belief in the existence of deities.

[[Psychologist]]s observe that the majority of humans often ask existential questions such as "why we are here" and whether life has purpose. Some psychologists{{Weasel inline|date=June 2012}} have posited that religious beliefs may recruit cognitive mechanisms in order to satisfy these questions. [[William James]] emphasized the inner religious struggle between [[Depression (mood)|melancholy]] and happiness, and pointed to [[trance]] as a cognitive mechanism. [[Sigmund Freud]] stressed fear and pain, the need for a powerful parental figure, the obsessional nature of ritual, and the hypnotic state a community can induce as contributing factors to the psychology of religion.

[[Pascal Boyer]]'s ''Religion Explained'' (2002), based in part on his anthropological field work, treats belief in God as the result of the brain's tendency towards [[agency detection]]. Boyer suggests that, because of evolutionary pressures, humans err on the side of attributing agency where there is not any. In Boyer's view, belief in supernatural entities spreads and becomes culturally fixed because of their memorability. The concept of "minimally counterintuitive" beings that differ from the ordinary in a small number of ways (such as being invisible, able to fly, or having access to strategic and otherwise secret information) leave a lasting impression that spreads through word-of-mouth.

[[Scott Atran]]'s ''In Gods We Trust: The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion'' (2002) makes a similar argument and adds examination of the socially coordinating aspects of shared belief. In ''Minds and Gods: The Cognitive Foundations of Religion'', Todd Tremlin follows Boyer in arguing that universal human cognitive process naturally produces the concept of the supernatural. Tremlin contends that an agency detection device (ADD) and a [[theory of mind]] module (ToMM) lead humans to suspect an agent behind every event. Natural events for which there is no obvious agent may be attributed to God (c.f. [[Act of God]]).

== See also ==

* [[Apologetics]]
* [[Copleston–Russell debate]]
* [[Christian existential apologetics]]
* [[Efficacy of prayer]]
* ''[[The Existence of God (book)]]''
* [[Existence of Jesus]]
* [[Gödel's ontological proof]]
* ''[[Is There a God?]]''
* [[Metaphysics]]
* [[Pascal's Wager]]
* [[Problem of evil]]
* [[Problem of the creator of God]]
* [[Relationship between religion and science]]
* [[Spectrum of theistic probability]]
* ''[[The Atheist Experience]]''
* [[Transcendental theology]]

==Notes==

{{Reflist|group=note}}

== References ==

{{Reflist|refs=
<ref name="Koons.2005">{{cite report | url=http://www.robkoons.net/media/69b0dd04a9d2fc6dffff80b4ffffd524.pdf | author=Robert C. Koons | author-link=Robert Koons |title=Sobel on Gödel's Ontological Proof | institution=University of Texas at Austin | type=Unpublished Paper | date=Jul 2005 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200802202333/http://www.robkoons.net/media/69b0dd04a9d2fc6dffff80b4ffffd524.pdf | archive-date = 2020-08-02 }}</ref>}}

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; Lectures
*[[Hegel]], ''[[s:en:Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of God|Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of God]]''

== Further reading ==

* [[Richard Dawkins]], ''[[The God Delusion]]'', Black Swan, 2007 ({{ISBN|978-0-552-77429-1}}).
* [[Christopher Hitchens]], ''[[God is Not Great|God is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything]]''. Twelve Books, 2007 ({{ISBN|978-0-446-57980-3}}).
* Hick, John, ed. (1964). ''The Existence of God: Readings'', in ''The Problems of Philosophy Series''. New York: Macmillan Company.
* {{Cite web |last=Plantinga |first=Alvin |author-link=Alvin Plantinga |title=Two Dozen (or so) Theistic Arguments |url=http://www.calvin.edu/academic/philosophy/virtual_library/articles/plantinga_alvin/two_dozen_or_so_theistic_arguments.pdf |url-status=dead |publisher=[[Calvin College]] |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080724042130/http://www.calvin.edu/academic/philosophy/virtual_library/articles/plantinga_alvin/two_dozen_or_so_theistic_arguments.pdf |archive-date=2008-07-24 |access-date=2007-11-25}}
* {{Cite book |last=Schneider |first=Nathan |title=God in Proof: The Story of a Search from the Ancients to the Internet |publisher=University of California Press |year=2013 |isbn=9780520269071 |author-link=Nathan Schneider}}
* {{Cite book |last=Swinburne |first=Richard |title=The Existence of God |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2004 |isbn=978-0199271672 |edition=2nd |location=Oxford, England |author-link=Richard Swinburne}}
* {{Cite book |title=Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2018 |isbn=978-0190842222 |editor-last=Walls |editor-first=Jerry L. |location=Oxford, England |editor-last2=Dougherty |editor-first2=Trent}}

== External links ==
{{Wikiquote}}
{{Wikibooks|God and Religious Toleration/The proof of God}}
{{Wikiversity|Existence of God}}
* [http://www.apollos.ws/philosophy-of-religion-article/ A Collection of Arguments for the Existence of God] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170626175350/http://www.apollos.ws/philosophy-of-religion-article/ |date=2017-06-26 }}
* [https://web.archive.org/web/19970215095230/http://www.alislam.org/books/essence1/chap2.htm Proofs of God's Existence: Islam—Ahmadiyyat] (PDF)
* [http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608b.htm The Existence of God]—''[[Catholic Encyclopedia]]''
* [http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/ip/pg1.htm The Classical Islamic Arguments for the Existence of God] by Majid Fakhry
* [https://www.jw.org/en/library/books/Is-There-a-Creator-Who-Cares-About-You/ Is There a Creator Who Cares About You?]—[[JW.org]]

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