View source for Belief

{{Short description|Mental state of holding a proposition or premise to be true}}
{{About|the general concept|other uses}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=May 2017}}
{{Epistemology sidebar}}
A '''belief''' is a subjective [[Attitude (psychology)|attitude]] that something is [[truth|true]] or a [[State of affairs (philosophy)|state of affairs]] is the case. A subjective attitude is a [[mental state]] of having some [[Life stance|stance]], take, or [[opinion]] about something.<ref>{{citation |last= Primmer |first= Justin |editor-last= Primmer |editor-first= Justin |contribution= Belief |title= The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher= The Metaphysics Research Lab |location= Stanford, CA |year= 2018 |url= http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief/ |access-date= 2008-09-19 |archive-date= 15 November 2019 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20191115080001/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief/ |url-status= live }}</ref> In [[epistemology]], philosophers use the term "belief" to refer to attitudes about the world which can be either [[truth value|true or false]].<ref name="SEP Belief">{{cite web |title=Belief |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief/ |website=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=22 June 2020 |archive-date=15 November 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191115080001/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief/ |url-status=live }}</ref> To believe something is to take it to be true; for instance, to believe that snow is white is comparable to accepting the truth of the [[proposition]] "snow is white". However, holding a belief does not require active [[introspection]]. For example, few individuals carefully consider whether or not the sun will rise tomorrow, simply assuming that it will. Moreover, beliefs need not be ''occurrent'' (e.g. a person actively thinking "snow is white"), but can instead be ''dispositional'' (e.g. a person who if asked about the color of snow would assert "snow is white").<ref name="SEP Belief"/>

There are various ways that contemporary [[philosopher]]s have tried to describe beliefs, including as representations of ways that the world could be ([[Jerry Fodor]]), as dispositions to act as if certain things are true ([[Roderick Chisholm]]), as interpretive schemes for making sense of someone's actions ([[Daniel Dennett]] and [[Donald Davidson (philosopher)|Donald Davidson]]), or as mental states that fill a particular function ([[Hilary Putnam]]).<ref name="SEP Belief"/> Some have also attempted to offer significant revisions to our notion of belief, including [[Eliminativism|eliminativists]] about belief who argue that there is no phenomenon in the natural world which corresponds to our [[folk psychology|folk psychological]] concept of belief ([[Paul Churchland]]) and [[Formal epistemology|formal epistemologists]] who aim to replace our bivalent notion of belief ("either we have a belief or we don't have a belief") with the more permissive, probabilistic notion of credence ("there is an entire spectrum of degrees of belief, not a simple dichotomy between belief and non-belief").<ref name="SEP Belief"/><ref name="SEP Formal Belief">{{cite web |title=Formal Representations of Belief |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/formal-belief/ |website=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=22 June 2020 |archive-date=11 July 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200711105817/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/formal-belief/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

Beliefs are the subject of various important philosophical debates. Notable examples include: "What is the rational way to revise one's beliefs when presented with various sorts of evidence?", "Is the content of our beliefs entirely determined by our mental states, or do the relevant [[fact]]s have any bearing on our beliefs (e.g. if I believe that I'm holding a glass of water, is the non-mental fact that water is H<sub>2</sub>O part of the content of that belief)?", "How fine-grained or coarse-grained are our beliefs?", and "Must it be possible for a belief to be expressible in language, or are there non-linguistic beliefs?"<ref name="SEP Belief"/>

== Conceptions ==
Various conceptions of the essential features of beliefs have been proposed, but there is no consensus as to which is the right one. ''Representationalism'' is the traditionally dominant position. Its most popular version maintains that attitudes toward representations, which are typically associated with propositions, are mental attitudes that constitute beliefs. These attitudes are part of the internal constitution of the mind holding the attitude. This view contrasts with ''functionalism'', which defines beliefs not in terms of the internal constitution of the mind but in terms of the function or the causal role played by beliefs. According to ''dispositionalism'', beliefs are identified with dispositions to behave in certain ways. This view can be seen as a form of functionalism, defining beliefs in terms of the behavior they tend to cause. ''Interpretationism'' constitutes another conception, which has gained popularity in contemporary philosophy. It holds that the beliefs of an entity are in some sense dependent on or relative to someone's interpretation of this entity. ''Representationalism'' tends to be associated with mind-body-dualism. ''Naturalist'' considerations against this dualism are among the motivations for choosing one of the alternative conceptions.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/>

=== Representationalism ===
Representationalism characterizes beliefs in terms of [[mental representation]]s. Representations are usually defined as objects with [[semantic properties]]{{mdash}}like having content, referring to something, or being true or false.<ref name="Schwitzgebel">{{cite web |last1=Schwitzgebel |first1=Eric |title=Belief |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |date=2019 |access-date=22 June 2020 |archive-date=15 November 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191115080001/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Pitt">{{cite web |last1=Pitt |first1=David |title=Mental Representation |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mental-representation/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=2 April 2021 |date=2020 |archive-date=6 August 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190806134216/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mental-representation/ |url-status=live }}</ref> Beliefs form a special class of mental representations since they do not involve sensory qualities in order to represent something, unlike perceptions or episodic memories.<ref name="Borchert">{{cite book |last1=Borchert |first1=Donald |title=Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd Edition |date=2006 |publisher=Macmillan |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BORMEO |chapter=Belief |access-date=2 April 2021 |archive-date=12 January 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210112065913/https://philpapers.org/rec/BORMEO |url-status=live }}</ref> Because of this, it seems natural to construe beliefs as attitudes towards propositions, which also constitute non-sensory representations, i.e. as [[propositional attitudes]]. As [[mental attitude]]s, beliefs are characterized by both their content and their mode.<ref name="Borchert"/> The content of an attitude is what this attitude is directed at: its object. Propositional attitudes are directed at propositions.<ref>{{cite web |title=Philosophy of mind – Propositional attitudes |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/philosophy-of-mind/Propositional-attitudes |website=Encyclopedia Britannica |access-date=2 April 2021 |language=en |archive-date=19 July 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200719083018/https://www.britannica.com/topic/philosophy-of-mind/Propositional-attitudes |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Oppy |first1=Graham |title=Propositional attitudes |url=https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/propositional-attitudes/v-1 |website=www.rep.routledge.com |access-date=2 April 2021 |language=en |archive-date=4 March 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210304193042/https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/propositional-attitudes/v-1 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Pitt"/> Beliefs are usually distinguished from other propositional attitudes, like desires, by their mode or the way in which they are directed at propositions. The mode of beliefs has a mind-to-world [[direction of fit]]: beliefs try to represent the world as it is; they do not, unlike desires, involve an intention to change it.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/><ref name="Borchert"/> For example, if Rahul believes that it will be sunny today, then he has a mental attitude towards the proposition "It will be sunny today" which affirms that this proposition is true. This is different from Sofía's desire that it will be sunny today, despite the fact that both Rahul and Sofía have attitudes toward the same proposition. The mind-to-world direction of fit of beliefs is sometimes expressed by saying that beliefs aim at truth.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Fassio |first1=Davide |title=Aim of Belief |url=https://iep.utm.edu/beli-aim/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=2 April 2021 |archive-date=11 February 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210211210202/https://iep.utm.edu/beli-aim/ |url-status=live }}</ref> This aim is also reflected in the tendency to [[Belief revision|revise one's belief]] upon receiving new evidence that an existing belief is false.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/> Upon hearing a forecast of bad weather, Rahul is likely to change his mental attitude but Sofía is not.

There are different ways of conceiving how mental representations are realized in the mind. One form of this is the ''[[language of thought hypothesis]]'', which claims that mental representations have a language-like structure, sometimes referred to as "mentalese".<ref>{{cite web |last1=Katz |first1=Matthew |title=Language of Thought Hypothesis |url=https://iep.utm.edu/lot-hypo/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=31 March 2021 |archive-date=28 February 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210228211147/https://iep.utm.edu/lot-hypo/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Craig">{{cite book |last1=Craig |first1=Edward |title=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |date=1996 |publisher=Routledge |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BEAREO |chapter= |access-date=2 April 2021 |archive-date=16 January 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210116111145/https://philpapers.org/rec/BEAREO |url-status=live }}</ref> Just like regular language, this involves simple elements that are combined in various ways according to syntactic rules to form more complex elements that act as bearers of meaning.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/><ref name="Craig"/> On this conception, holding a belief would involve storing such a complex element in one's mind. Different beliefs are separated from each other in that they correspond to different elements stored in the mind. A more holistic alternative to the "language of thought hypothesis" is the ''map-conception'', which uses an analogy of maps to elucidate the nature of beliefs.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/><ref name="Craig"/> According to this view, the belief system of a mind should be conceived of not as a set of many individual sentences but as a map encoding the information contained in these sentences.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/><ref name="Craig"/> For example, the fact that Brussels is halfway between Paris and Amsterdam can be expressed both linguistically as a sentence and in a map through its internal geometrical relations.

=== Functionalism ===
[[Functionalism (philosophy of mind)|Functionalism]] contrasts with representationalism in that it defines beliefs not in terms of the internal constitution of the mind but in terms of the function or the causal role played by them.<ref name="Levin">{{cite web |last1=Levin |first1=Janet |title=Functionalism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/functionalism/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=2 April 2021 |date=2018 |archive-date=18 April 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210418140903/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/functionalism/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Polger">{{cite web |last1=Polger |first1=Thomas W. |title=Functionalism |url=https://iep.utm.edu/functism/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=2 April 2021 |archive-date=19 May 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190519120233/https://www.iep.utm.edu/functism/ |url-status=live }}</ref> This view is often combined with the idea that the same belief can be realized in various ways and that it does not matter how it is realized as long as it plays the causal role characteristic to it.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/><ref>{{cite web |last1=Bickle |first1=John |title=Multiple Realizability |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/multiple-realizability/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=2 April 2021 |date=2020 |archive-date=16 March 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210316094454/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/multiple-realizability/ |url-status=live }}</ref> As an analogy, a [[hard drive]] is defined in a functionalist manner: it performs the function of storing and retrieving digital data. This function can be realized in many different ways: being made of plastic or steel, or using magnetism or laser.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/> Functionalists hold that something similar is true for beliefs (or mental states in general).<ref name="Levin"/><ref name="Polger"/> Among the roles relevant to beliefs is their relation to perceptions and to actions: perceptions usually cause beliefs and beliefs cause actions.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/> For example, seeing that a traffic light has switched to red is usually associated with a belief that the light is red, which in turn causes the driver to bring the car to a halt. Functionalists use such characteristics to define beliefs: whatever is caused by perceptions in a certain way and also causes behavior in a certain way is called a belief. This is not just true for humans but may include animals, hypothetical aliens or even computers.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/><ref name="Levin"/> From this perspective, it would make sense to ascribe the belief that a traffic light is red to a [[self-driving car]] behaving just like a human driver.

Dispositionalism is sometimes seen as a specific form of functionalism.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/> It defines beliefs only concerning their role as causes of behavior or as [[dispositions]] to behave in a certain way.<ref name="Quilty-Dunn">{{cite journal |last1=Quilty-Dunn |first1=Jake |last2=Mandelbaum |first2=Eric |title=Against dispositionalism: belief in cognitive science |journal=Philosophical Studies |date=1 September 2018 |volume=175 |issue=9 |pages=2353–2372 |doi=10.1007/s11098-017-0962-x |language=en |issn=1573-0883 |doi-access=free }}</ref><ref name="Audi">{{cite book |last1=Audi |first1=Robert |title=The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy |publisher=Cambridge University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/AUDTCD-2 |chapter=Belief |year=1999 |access-date=2 April 2021 |archive-date=14 April 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210414132344/https://philpapers.org/rec/AUDTCD-2 |url-status=live }}</ref> For example, a belief that there is a pie in the pantry is associated with the disposition to affirm this when asked and to go to the pantry when hungry.<ref name="Borchert"/> While it is uncontroversial that beliefs shape our behavior, the thesis that beliefs can be defined exclusively through their role in producing behavior has been contested.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/><ref name="Quilty-Dunn"/> The problem arises because the mechanisms shaping our behavior seem to be too complex to single out the general contribution of one particular belief for any possible situation.<ref name="Borchert"/> For example, one may decide not to affirm that there is a pie in the pantry when asked because one wants to keep it secret. Or one might not eat the pie despite being hungry, because one also believes that it is poisoned.<ref name="Borchert"/> Due to this complexity, we are unable to define even a belief as simple as this one in terms of the behavioral dispositions for which it could be responsible.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/>

=== Interpretationism ===
According to interpretationism, the beliefs of an entity are in some sense dependent on, or relative to, someone's interpretation of this entity.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/><ref name="Child1"/> [[Daniel Dennett]] is an important defender of such a position. He holds that we ascribe beliefs to entities in order to predict how they will behave. Entities with simple behavioral patterns can be described using physical laws or in terms of their function. Dennett refers to these forms of explanation as the "physical stance" and the "design stance". These stances are contrasted with the [[intentional stance]], which is applied to entities with a more complex behavior by ascribing beliefs and desires to these entities.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Dennett |first1=Daniel |title=The Intentional Stance |date=1989 |publisher=The MIT Press |isbn=978-0262040938 |url= https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/intentional-stance |language=en |access-date=2 April 2021 |archive-date=15 April 2021 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20210415044716/https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/intentional-stance |url-status= live }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1= Dennett |first1= Daniel C. |title=Précis of ''The Intentional Stance'' |journal=Behavioral and Brain Sciences |date=1988 |volume=11 |issue=3 |pages=495–505 |doi= 10.1017/S0140525X00058611 |doi-broken-date= 1 November 2024 |citeseerx=10.1.1.1026.2283 |s2cid=145750868}}</ref> For example, we can predict that a chess player will move her queen to f7 if we ascribe to her the desire to win the game and the belief that this move will achieve that. The same procedure can also be applied to predicting how a chess computer will behave. The entity has the belief in question if this belief can be used to predict its behavior.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/> Having a belief is relative to an interpretation since there may be different equally good ways of ascribing beliefs to predict behavior.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/> So there may be another interpretation that predicts the move of the queen to f7 that does not involve the belief that this move will win the game. Another version of interpretationism is due to [[Donald Davidson (philosopher)|Donald Davidson]],<ref name="Child1"/> who uses the thought experiment of [[radical interpretation]], in which the goal is to make sense of the behavior and language of another person from scratch without any knowledge of this person's language.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/> This process involves ascribing beliefs and desires to the speaker. The speaker really has these beliefs if this project can be successful in principle.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/>

Interpretationism can be combined with eliminativism and instrumentalism about beliefs. Eliminativists hold that, strictly speaking, there are no beliefs. Instrumentalists agree with eliminativists but add that belief-ascriptions are useful nonetheless.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/> This usefulness can be explained in terms of interpretationism: belief-ascriptions help us in predicting how entities will behave. It has been argued that interpretationism can also be understood in a more realistic sense: that entities really have the beliefs ascribed to them and that these beliefs participate in the causal network.<ref name="Child4">{{cite book |last1=Child |first1=William |title=Causality, Interpretation, and the Mind |publisher=Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press |url= https://philpapers.org/rec/CHICIA |chapter=4. Causalism and Interpretationism: The Problem of Compatibility |year= 1994 |access-date= 2 April 2021 |archive-date= 5 May 2016 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20160505023634/http://philpapers.org/rec/CHICIA |url-status=live }}</ref> But, for this to be possible, it may be necessary to define interpretationism as a methodology and not as an [[ontological]] outlook on beliefs.<ref name="Child1">{{cite book |last1=Child |first1=William |title=Causality, Interpretation, and the Mind |publisher=Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press |url= https://philpapers.org/rec/CHICIA |chapter= 1. Interpretationism |year= 1994 |access-date=2 April 2021 |archive-date=5 May 2016 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20160505023634/http://philpapers.org/rec/CHICIA |url-status=live }}</ref>

=== Origins ===
Biologist [[Lewis Wolpert]] discusses the importance of [[causality|causal]] beliefs and associates the making and use of [[tool]]s with the origin of human beliefs.<ref>
{{cite book
 |last1                = Wolpert
 |first1               = Lewis
 |author-link1         = Lewis Wolpert
 |date                 = 3 February 2011
 |orig-date            = 2006
 |chapter              = Belief
 |title                = Six Impossible Things Before Breakfast: The Evolutionary Origins of Belief
 |url                  = https://books.google.com/books?id=Zu-Z0ttQj3oC
 |publication-place    = London
 |publisher            = Faber & Faber
 |edition              = reprint
 |isbn                 = 9780571266722
 |access-date          = 22 December 2023
 |quote                = Causal beliefs are a fundamental characteristic of humans; animals, by contrast, [...] have very few causal beliefs. Beliefs come from a wide variety of sources that include the individual's experiences, the influence of authority, and the interpretation of events. At their core, beliefs establish a cause-and-effect relationship between events [...] From an evolutionary point of view, beliefs should help the individual survive, and I will argue that they had their origin in tool making and use.
}} 
</ref>

=== Historical ===
In the context of [[Ancient Greek philosophy|Ancient Greek thought]], three related concepts were identified regarding the concept of belief: ''[[Pistis#Pistis in rhetoric|pistis]]{{Broken anchor|date=2024-09-28|bot=User:Cewbot/log/20201008/configuration|target_link=Pistis#Pistis in rhetoric|reason= The anchor (Pistis in rhetoric) [[Special:Diff/894307820|has been deleted]].}},'' ''[[doxa]],'' and ''[[dogma]].'' Simplified, ''Pistis'' refers to "[[Trust (social science)|trust]]" and "confidence," ''doxa'' refers to "[[opinion]]" and "acceptance," and ''dogma'' refers to the [[Philosophical theory|positions]] of a philosopher or of a [[Philosophical movement|philosophical school]] such as [[Stoicism]].

== Types ==
Beliefs can be categorized into various types depending on their ontological status, their degree, their object or their semantic properties.

=== Occurrent and dispositional ===
Having an occurrent belief that the [[Grand Canyon]] is in Arizona involves entertaining the representation associated with this belief{{mdash}}for example, by actively thinking about it. But the great majority of our beliefs are not active most of the time: they are merely dispositional.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/> They usually become activated or occurrent when needed or relevant in some way and then fall back into their dispositional state afterwards.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/> For example, the belief that 57 is greater than 14 was probably dispositional to the reader before reading this sentence, has become occurrent while reading it and may soon become dispositional again as the mind focuses elsewhere. The distinction between occurrent and dispositional beliefs is sometimes identified with the distinction between conscious and unconscious beliefs.<ref name="Bartlett">{{cite journal |last1=Bartlett |first1= Gary |title=Occurrent States |journal=Canadian Journal of Philosophy |date=2018 |volume=48 |issue=1 |pages=1–17 |doi=10.1080/00455091.2017.1323531 |s2cid=220316213 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BAROS-4 |access-date=3 April 2021 |archive-date=4 May 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210504181849/https://philpapers.org/rec/BAROS-4 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Frise">{{cite journal |last1=Frise |first1=Matthew |title=Eliminating the Problem of Stored Beliefs |journal=American Philosophical Quarterly |date=2018 |volume=55 |issue=1 |pages=63–79 |doi=10.2307/45128599 |jstor=45128599 |s2cid=149057271 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/FRIETP-3 |access-date=3 April 2021 |archive-date=1 June 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210601042950/https://philpapers.org/rec/FRIETP-3 |url-status=live |doi-access=free }}</ref> But it has been argued that, despite overlapping, the two distinctions do not match. The reason for this is that beliefs can shape one's behaviour and be involved in one's reasoning even if the subject is not conscious of them. Such beliefs are cases of unconscious occurrent mental states.<ref name="Bartlett"/> On this view, being occurrent corresponds to being active, either consciously or unconsciously.<ref name="Frise"/>

A dispositional belief is not the same as a disposition to believe.<ref name="Audi"/> We have various dispositions to believe given the right perceptions; for example, to believe that it is raining given a perception of rain. Without this perception, there is still a disposition to believe but no actual dispositional belief.<ref name="Audi"/> On a dispositionalist conception of belief, there are no occurrent beliefs, since all beliefs are defined in terms of dispositions.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/>

=== Full and partial ===
An important dispute in formal epistemology concerns the question of whether beliefs should be conceptualized as ''full'' beliefs or as ''partial'' beliefs.<ref name="Genin">{{cite web |last1=Genin |first1=Konstantin |last2=Huber |first2=Franz |title=Formal Representations of Belief |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/formal-belief/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=1 April 2021 |date=2021 |archive-date=13 April 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210413164951/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/formal-belief/ |url-status=live }}</ref> Full beliefs are all-or-nothing attitudes: either one has a belief in a proposition or one does not. This conception is sufficient to understand many belief ascriptions found in everyday language: for example, Pedro's belief that the Earth is bigger than the Moon. But some cases involving comparisons between beliefs are not easily captured through full beliefs alone: for example, that Pedro's belief that the Earth is bigger than the Moon is more certain than his belief that the Earth is bigger than Venus. Such cases are most naturally analyzed in terms of partial beliefs involving degrees of belief, so-called ''[[Credence (statistics)|credences]]''.<ref name="Genin"/><ref name="Olsson"/> The higher the degree of a belief, the more certain the believer is that the believed proposition is true.<ref name="Hartmann"/> This is usually formalized by numbers between 0 and 1: a degree of 1 represents an absolutely certain belief, a belief of 0 corresponds to an absolutely certain disbelief and all the numbers in between correspond to intermediate degrees of certainty. In the [[Bayesian epistemology|Bayesian approach]], these degrees are interpreted as [[subjective probabilities]]:<ref>{{cite web |last1=Hájek |first1=Alan |title=Interpretations of Probability: 3.3 The Subjective Interpretation |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/probability-interpret/#SubPro |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=6 March 2021 |date=2019 |archive-date=17 February 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210217013520/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/probability-interpret/#SubPro |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Pettigrew">{{cite journal |last1=Pettigrew |first1=Richard |title=Précis of Accuracy and the Laws of Credence |journal=Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |date=2018 |volume=96 |issue=3 |pages=749–754 |doi=10.1111/phpr.12501 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/PETPOA-3 |access-date=3 April 2021 |archive-date=1 June 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210601042948/https://philpapers.org/rec/PETPOA-3 |url-status=live |hdl=1983/d9f3e1c4-1bc9-4e04-b74c-dba4eb795393 |hdl-access=free }}</ref> e.g. a belief of degree 0.9 that it will rain tomorrow means that the agent thinks that the probability of rain tomorrow is 90%. Bayesianism uses this relation between beliefs and probability to define the norms of rationality in terms of the laws of probability.<ref name="Hartmann">{{cite book |last1=Hartmann |first1=Stephan |last2=Sprenger |first2=Jan |title=The Routledge Companion to Epistemology |date=2010 |publisher=London: Routledge |pages=609–620 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BOVSIO |chapter=Bayesian Epistemology |access-date=3 April 2021 |archive-date=16 May 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210516095047/https://philpapers.org/rec/BOVSIO |url-status=live }}</ref> This includes both synchronic laws about what one should believe at any moment and diachronic laws about how one should revise one's beliefs upon receiving new evidence.<ref name="Olsson">{{cite book |last1=Olsson |first1=Erik J. |title=Introduction to Formal Philosophy |date=2018 |publisher=Springer |pages=431–442 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/OLSBE |chapter=Bayesian Epistemology |access-date=3 April 2021 |archive-date=16 May 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210516095057/https://philpapers.org/rec/OLSBE |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Hartmann"/>

The central question in the dispute between full and partial beliefs is whether these two types are really distinct types or whether one type can be explained in terms of the other.<ref name="Genin"/> One answer to this question is called the ''Lockean thesis''. It states that partial beliefs are basic and that full beliefs are to be conceived as partial beliefs above a certain threshold: for example, every belief above 0.9 is a full belief.<ref name="Genin"/><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Dorst |first1=Kevin |title=Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy |journal=Mind |date=2019 |volume=128 |issue=509 |pages=175–211 |doi=10.1093/mind/fzx028 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/DORLME-2 |access-date=3 April 2021 |archive-date=20 October 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201020201413/https://philpapers.org/rec/DORLME-2 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Locke |first1=Dustin Troy |title=The Decision-Theoretic Lockean Thesis |journal=Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy |date=2014 |volume=57 |issue=1 |pages=28–54 |doi=10.1080/0020174x.2013.858421 |s2cid=85521556 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/LOCTDL |access-date=3 April 2021 |archive-date=5 July 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160705133728/http://philpapers.org/rec/LOCTDL |url-status=live }}</ref> Defenders of a primitive notion of full belief, on the other hand, have tried to explain partial beliefs as full beliefs about probabilities.<ref name="Genin"/> On this view, having a partial belief of degree 0.9 that it will rain tomorrow is the same as having a full belief that the probability of rain tomorrow is 90%. Another approach circumvents the notion of probability altogether and replaces degrees of belief with degrees of disposition to revise one's full belief.<ref name="Genin"/> From this perspective, both a belief of degree 0.6 and a belief of degree 0.9 may be seen as full beliefs. The difference between them is that the former belief can readily be changed upon receiving new evidence while the latter is more stable.<ref name="Genin"/>

=== Belief-in and belief-that ===
Traditionally, philosophers have mainly focused in their inquiries concerning belief on the notion of ''belief-that''.<ref name="Price">{{cite journal |last1=Price |first1=H. H. |title=Belief 'In' and Belief 'That' |journal=Religious Studies |date=1965 |volume=1 |issue=1 |pages=5–27 |doi=10.1017/S0034412500002304 |s2cid=170731716 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/PRIBIA |access-date=2 March 2021 |archive-date=1 June 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210601043007/https://philpapers.org/rec/PRIBIA |url-status=live }}</ref> Belief-that can be characterized as a [[propositional attitude]] to a claim which is either true or false. ''Belief-in'', on the other hand, is more closely related to notions like trust or faith in that it refers usually to an attitude to persons.<ref name="Price"/> ''Belief-in'' plays a central role in many [[religious traditions]] in which ''belief in God'' is one of the central virtues of their followers.<ref name="Williams">{{cite journal |last1=Williams |first1=John N. |title=Belief-in and Belief in God |journal=Religious Studies |date=1992 |volume=28 |issue=3 |pages=401–406 |doi=10.1017/s0034412500021740 |s2cid=170864816 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/WILBAB-3 |access-date=2 March 2021 |archive-date=19 May 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210519211421/https://philpapers.org/rec/WILBAB-3 |url-status=live }}</ref> The difference between belief-in and belief-that is sometimes blurry since various expressions using the term "belief in" seem to be translatable into corresponding expressions using the term "belief that" instead.<ref name="Macintosh2">{{cite journal |last1=Macintosh |first1=J. J. |title=Belief-in Revisited: A Reply to Williams |journal=Religious Studies |date=1994 |volume=30 |issue=4 |pages=487–503 |doi=10.1017/S0034412500023131 |s2cid=170786861 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/MACBRA-4 |access-date=2 March 2021 |archive-date=29 September 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200929102145/https://philpapers.org/rec/MACBRA-4 |url-status=live }}</ref> For example, a ''belief in'' fairies may be said to be a ''belief that'' fairies exist.<ref name="Williams"/> In this sense, belief-in is often used when the entity is not real, or its existence is in doubt. Typical examples would include: "he believes in witches and ghosts" or "many children believe in [[Santa Claus]]" or "I believe in a deity".<ref name="Macintosh"/> Not all usages of belief-in concern the existence of something: some are ''commendatory'' in that they express a positive attitude towards their object.<ref name="Macintosh">{{cite book |last1=Macintosh |first1=Jack |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |date=2005 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/HONTOC-2 |chapter=Belief-in |access-date=2 March 2021 |archive-date=29 January 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210129082636/https://philpapers.org/rec/HONTOC-2 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Price"/> It has been suggested that these cases can also be accounted for in terms of belief-that. For example, a ''belief in'' marriage could be translated as a ''belief that'' marriage is good.<ref name="Williams"/> Belief-in is used in a similar sense when expressing [[self-confidence]] or faith in one's self or one's abilities.

Defenders of a reductive account of belief-in have used this line of thought to argue that ''belief in God'' can be analyzed in a similar way: e.g. that it amounts to a belief that God exists with his characteristic attributes, like [[omniscience]] and [[omnipotence]].<ref name="Williams"/> Opponents of this account often concede that belief-in may entail various forms of belief-that, but that there are additional aspects to belief-in that are not reducible to belief-that.<ref name="Macintosh2"/> For example, a ''belief in'' an ideal may involve the ''belief that'' this ideal is something good, but it additionally involves a positive evaluative attitude toward this ideal that goes beyond a mere propositional attitude.<ref name="Williams"/> Applied to the ''belief in'' God, opponents of the reductive approach may hold that a ''belief that'' God exists may be a necessary pre-condition for ''belief in'' God, but that it is not sufficient.<ref name="Williams"/><ref name="Macintosh2"/>

=== ''De dicto'' and ''de re'' ===
{{see also|De dicto and de re}}
The difference between ''de dicto'' and ''de re'' beliefs or the corresponding ascriptions concerns the contributions singular terms like names and other referential devices make to the semantic properties of the belief or its ascription.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/><ref name="Broackes">{{cite journal |last1=Broackes |first1=Justin |title=Belief de Re and de Dicto |journal=Philosophical Quarterly |date=1986 |volume=36 |issue=144 |pages=374–383 |doi=10.2307/2220191 |jstor=2220191 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BROBDR |access-date=3 April 2021 |archive-date=17 November 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161117193918/http://philpapers.org/rec/BROBDR |url-status=live }}</ref> In regular contexts, the [[truth-value]] of a sentence does not change upon substitution of co-referring terms.<ref name="Nelson">{{cite web |last1=Nelson |first1=Michael |title=Propositional Attitude Reports: The De Re/De Dicto Distinction |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prop-attitude-reports/dere.html |website=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=2 April 2021 |archive-date=13 April 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210413223910/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prop-attitude-reports/dere.html |url-status=live }}</ref> For example, since the names "Superman" and "Clark Kent" refer to the same person, we can replace one with the other in the sentence "Superman is strong" without changing its truth-value; this issue is more complicated in case of belief ascriptions.<ref name="Nelson"/> For example, Lois believes that Superman is strong but she does not believe that Clark Kent is strong.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/> This difficulty arises due to the fact that she does not know that the two names refer to the same entity. Beliefs or belief ascriptions for which this substitution does not generally work are ''de dicto'', otherwise, they are ''de re''.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/><ref name="Nelson"/><ref name="Broackes"/> In a ''de re'' sense, Lois does believe that Clark Kent is strong, while in a ''de dicto'' sense she does not. The contexts corresponding to ''de dicto'' ascriptions are known as [[Opaque context|referentially opaque contexts]] while ''de re'' ascriptions are referentially transparent.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/><ref name="Nelson"/>

===Collective belief===
A collective belief is referred to when people speak of what "we" believe when this is not simply elliptical for what "we all" believe.<ref>
{{cite book
 | last1 = Dancy
 | first1 = Jonathan
 | author-link1 = Jonathan Dancy
 | year = 2014
 | edition = 2
 | title = A Companion to Epistemology
 | url = https://books.google.com/books?id=WToMZZoTu_QC
 | series = Just the Facts101
 | publisher = Content Technologies Inc.
 | isbn = 978-1478400028
 | access-date = 30 Apr 2019
 | quote = A collective belief is referred to when people speak of what 'we' believe when this is not simply elliptical for what 'we all' believe.
}}</ref>
Sociologist [[Émile Durkheim]] wrote of collective beliefs and proposed that they, like all "[[social fact]]s", "inhered in" social [[Group (sociology)|groups]] as opposed to individual persons. [[Jonathan Dancy]] states that "Durkheim's discussion of collective belief, though suggestive, is relatively obscure".<ref>
{{cite book
 | last1 = Dancy
 | first1 = Jonathan
 | author-link1 = Jonathan Dancy
 | year = 2014
 | edition = 2
 | title = A Companion to Epistemology
 | url = https://books.google.com/books?id=WToMZZoTu_QC
 | series = Just the Facts101
 | publisher = Content Technologies Inc.
 | publication-date = 2016
 | isbn = 978-1478400028
 | access-date = 30 Apr 2019
 | quote = Sociologist Émile Durkheim wrote of collective beliefs and proposed that they, like all 'social facts', 'inhered in' social groups as opposed to individual persons. Durkheim's discussion of collective belief, though suggestive, is relatively obscure.
}}</ref>
[[Margaret Gilbert]] has offered a related account in terms of the joint commitment of a number of persons as a body to accept a certain belief. According to this account, individuals who together collectively believe something need not personally believe it individually. Gilbert's work on the topic has stimulated a developing literature among philosophers.<ref>{{Cite journal |last= Gilbert |first= Margaret |date= 1987 |title= Modelling collective belief |url= http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00485446 |journal= Synthese |volume= 73 |issue= 1 |pages= 185–204 |doi= 10.1007/bf00485446|s2cid= 46976878|issn= 0039-7857}}</ref> One question that has arisen is whether and how philosophical accounts of belief in general need to be sensitive to the possibility of collective belief.

Collective belief can play a role in [[Control theory (sociology)|social control]]<ref>
{{cite book
 |last1                = Innes
 |first1               = Martin
 |date                 = 16 December 2003
 |chapter              = A history of the idea of social control
 |title                = Understanding Social Control: Deviance, crime and social order
 |url                  = https://books.google.com/books?id=jwBEBgAAQBAJ
 |series               = UK Higher Education OUP Humanities & Social Sciences Criminology
 |publication-place    = Maidenhead, Berkshire
 |publisher            = McGraw-Hill Education (UK)
 |page                 = 22
 |isbn                 = 9780335225880
 |access-date          = 30 October 2023
 |quote                = [...] all states and all collectives draw upon shared remembrances of the past to establish or preserve a sense of shared identity and a collective belief system. A coherent approach to understanding the functions of social control for collective life is to be found in Erikson's (1966) discussion of the social control of witchcraft in seventeenth-century New England.
}} 
</ref>
and serve as a touchstone for identifying and purging [[heresies]],<ref>
{{cite book
 |last1                = Sandkühler
 |first1               = Hans Jörg
 |editor-last1         = Abel
 |editor-first1        = Günter
 |editor-link1         = Günter Abel
 |editor-last2         = Conant
 |editor-first2        = James
 |editor-link2         = James F. Conant
 |date                 = 23 December 2011
 |chapter              = Critique of Representation: Cultures of Knowledge - Humanly Speaking
 |title                = Rethinking Epistemology
 |url                  = https://books.google.com/books?id=py412Sy7XpwC
 |series               = Berlin Studies in Knowledge Research, volume 1
 |volume               = 1
 |publication-place    = Berlin
 |publisher            = Walter de Gruyter
 |page                 = 185
 |isbn                 = 9783110253573
 |access-date          = 30 October 2023
 |quote                = Collective belief systems are characterized by the belief of knowing what counts as proper beliefs; divergence is condemned as heresy, betrayal, apostasy, etc.
}} 
</ref>
[[Deviance (sociology)|deviancy]]<ref>
{{cite book
 |last1                = Visano
 |first1               = L. A.
 |year                 = 1998
 |title                = Crime and Culture: Refining the Traditions
 |url                  = https://books.google.com/books?id=g7ZIAAAAYAAJ
 |publication-place    = Toronto
 |publisher            = Canadian Scholars Press
 |page                 = 51
 |isbn                 = 9781551301273
 |access-date          = 30 October 2023
 |quote                = [...] deviance cannot be studied in isolation nor understood apart from [...] overwhelmingly binding collective belief systems.
}} 
</ref>
or political [[deviationism]].

== Contents ==
As [[mental representation]]s, beliefs have contents, which is what the belief is about or what it represents. Within philosophy, there are various disputes about how the contents of beliefs are to be understood. Holists and molecularists hold that the content of one particular belief depends on or is determined by other beliefs belonging to the same subject, which is denied by atomists. The question of dependence or determination also plays a central role in the internalism-externalism- debate. Internalism states that the contents of someone's beliefs depend only on what is internal to that person and are determined entirely by things going on inside this person's head. Externalism, on the other hand, holds that the relations to one's environment also have a role to play in this.

=== Atomism, molecularism and holism ===
The disagreement between ''atomism, molecularism and holism'' concerns the question of how the content of one belief depends on the contents of other beliefs held by the same subject.<ref name="Block"/> Atomists deny such dependence relations, molecularists restrict them to only a few closely related beliefs while holists hold that they may obtain between any two beliefs, however unrelated they seem.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/><ref name="Pitt"/><ref name="Block"/> For example, assume that Mei and Benjamin both affirm that [[Jupiter]] is a planet. The most straightforward explanation, given by the atomists, would be that they have the same belief, i.e. that they hold the same content to be true. But now assume that Mei also believes that [[Pluto]] is a planet, which is denied by Benjamin. This indicates that they have different concepts of [[planet]], which would mean that they were affirming different contents when they both agreed that Jupiter is a planet. This reasoning leads to molecularism or holism because the content of the Jupiter-belief depends on the Pluto-belief in this example.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/><ref name="Block"/>

An important motivation for this position comes from [[W. V. Quine]]'s [[confirmational holism]], which holds that, because of this interconnectedness, we cannot confirm or disconfirm individual hypotheses, that confirmation happens on the level of the theory as a whole.<ref name="Block"/><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Wagner |first1=Steven J. |title=Quine's Holism |journal=Analysis |date=1986 |volume=46 |issue=1 |pages=1–6 |doi=10.2307/3328733 |jstor=3328733 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/3328733 |issn=0003-2638 |access-date=5 April 2021 |archive-date=1 June 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210601042957/https://www.jstor.org/stable/3328733?seq=1 |url-status=live }}</ref> Another motivation is due to considerations of the nature of learning: it is often not possible to understand one concept, like [[force]] in [[Newtonian physics]], without understanding other concepts, like [[mass]] or [[kinetic energy]].<ref name="Block">{{cite book |last1=Block |first1=Ned |title=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |date=1996 |publisher=Routledge |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BLOMAS |chapter=Holism, Mental and Semantic |access-date=5 April 2021 |archive-date=15 August 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160815130429/http://philpapers.org/rec/BLOMAS |url-status=live }}</ref> One problem for holism is that genuine disagreements seem to be impossible or very rare: disputants would usually talk past each other since they never share exactly the same web of beliefs needed to determine the content of the source of the disagreement.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/><ref name="Block"/>

=== Internalism and externalism ===
''Internalism and externalism'' disagree about whether the contents of our beliefs are determined only by what's happening in our head or also by other factors.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/><ref name="Pitt"/><ref name="Rowlands">{{cite web |last1=Rowlands |first1=Mark |last2=Lau |first2=Joe |last3=Deutsch |first3=Max |title=Externalism About the Mind |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/content-externalism/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=4 April 2021 |date=2020 |archive-date=13 April 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210413163023/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/content-externalism/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Smith">{{cite web |last1=Smith |first1=Basil |title=Internalism and Externalism in the Philosophy of Mind and Language |url=https://iep.utm.edu/int-ex-ml/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=4 April 2021 |archive-date=6 May 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210506234940/https://iep.utm.edu/int-ex-ml/ |url-status=live }}</ref> Internalists deny such a dependence on external factors. They hold that a person and a molecule-by-molecule copy would have exactly the same beliefs. [[Hilary Putnam]] objects to this position by way of his [[twin Earth thought experiment]]. He imagines a twin Earth in another part of the universe that is exactly like ours, except that their water has a different chemical composition despite behaving just like ours.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/><ref name="Rowlands"/><ref name="Smith"/> According to Putnam, the reader's thought that water is wet is about ''our water'' while the reader's twin's thought on twin Earth that water is wet is about ''their water''. This is the case despite the fact that the two readers have the same molecular composition. So it seems necessary to include external factors in order to explain the difference. One problem with this position is that this difference in content does not bring any causal difference with it: the two readers act in exactly the same way. This casts doubt on the thesis that there is any genuine difference in need of explanation between the contents of the two beliefs.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/><ref name="Rowlands"/><ref name="Smith"/>

==Epistemology==
{{Main|Epistemology}}
[[File:Classical_definition_of_Kno.svg|thumb|236px<!--(approx Sidebar/Infobox)-->|A [[Venn diagram]] illustrating the traditional [[definition of knowledge]] as justified true belief (represented by the yellow circle). The Gettier problem gives us reason to think that not all justified true beliefs constitute knowledge.]]
Epistemology is concerned with delineating the boundary between justified belief and [[opinion]],<ref>Oxford Dictionaries – [http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/epistemology definition] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160906221037/http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/epistemology |date=6 September 2016 }} published by [[OUP]] [Retrieved 2015-08-09]</ref> and involved generally with a theoretical [[philosophical]] study of [[knowledge]]. The primary problem in epistemology is to understand what is needed to have knowledge. In a notion derived from [[Plato]]'s dialogue ''[[Theaetetus (dialogue)|Theaetetus]]'', where the epistemology of [[Socrates]] most clearly departs from that of the [[sophist]]s, who appear to have defined knowledge as "[[justified true belief]]". The tendency to base knowledge (''[[episteme]]'') on common opinion (''[[doxa]]'') Socrates dismisses, results from failing to distinguish a [[dispositive]] belief (''doxa'') from knowledge (''episteme'') when the opinion is regarded correct (n.b., ''orthé'' not ''[[alethia]]''), in terms of right, and juristically so (according to the premises of the dialogue), which was the task of the [[rhetor]]s to prove. Plato dismisses this possibility of an affirmative relation between opinion and knowledge even when the one who opines grounds his belief on the rule and is able to add justification (''[[logos]]'': reasonable and necessarily plausible assertions/evidence/guidance) to it.{{Citation needed |date=February 2024}} A belief can be based fully or partially on [[intuition]].<ref>{{Citation |last=Pust |first=Joel |title=Intuition |date=2019 |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/intuition/ |encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |editor-last=Zalta |editor-first=Edward N. |edition=Summer 2019 |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=2022-09-27}}</ref>

Plato has been credited for the ''justified true belief'' theory of knowledge, even though Plato in the ''Theaetetus'' elegantly dismisses it, and even posits this argument of Socrates as a cause for his death penalty. The epistemologists, [[Edmund Gettier|Gettier]]<ref>{{cite journal|last=Gettier|first=E.L.|year=1963|title=Is justified true belief knowledge?|url=https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01439314/file/2013%20Gettier%20Conocimiento.pdf|journal=[[Analysis (journal)|Analysis]]|volume=23|issue=6|pages=121–123|doi=10.1093/analys/23.6.121|jstor=3326922|access-date=24 September 2019|archive-date=2 September 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190902025339/https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01439314/file/2013%2520Gettier%2520Conocimiento.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref> and [[Alvin Goldman|Goldman]],<ref>{{cite journal|last=Goldman|first=A.I.|s2cid=53049561|year=1967|title=A causal theory of knowing|journal=[[The Journal of Philosophy]]|volume=64|issue=12|pages=357–372|doi=10.2307/2024268|jstor=2024268}}</ref> have questioned the "justified true belief" definition.

===Justified true belief<!--Justified true belief' redirects here-->===
{{See also|Definitions of knowledge#Justified true belief}}
'''Justified true belief'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--> is a definition of [[knowledge]] that gained approval during the [[Age of Enlightenment|Enlightenment]], "justified" standing in contrast to "revealed". There have been attempts to trace it back to [[Plato]] and his dialogues, more specifically in the ''[[Theaetetus (dialogue)|Theaetetus]],<ref>The received view holds it that Plato's theory presents knowledge as remembering eternal truths and justification reawakens memory, see {{cite book|title=Plato on Knowledge and Forms: Selected Essays|last=Fine|first=G.|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=2003|isbn=978-0199245581|location=New York|pages=5–7|chapter=Introduction}}</ref>'' and the ''[[Meno]]''. The concept of justified true belief states that in order to know that a given proposition is true, one must not only believe the relevant true proposition but also have justification for doing so. In more formal terms, an agent <math>S</math> knows that a proposition <math>P</math> is true [[if and only if]]:
* <math>P</math> is true
* <math>S</math> believes that <math>P</math> is true, and
* <math>S</math> is justified in believing that <math>P</math> is true

That theory of knowledge suffered a significant setback with the discovery of [[Gettier problem]]s, situations in which the above conditions were seemingly met but where many philosophers deny that anything is known.<ref>{{cite book|title=The Foundations of Knowing|last=Chisholm|first=Roderick|publisher=University of Minnesota Press|year=1982|isbn=978-0816611034|location=Minneapolis|chapter=Knowledge as Justified True Belief|author-link=Roderick Chisholm}}</ref> [[Robert Nozick]] suggested a [[Gettier problems#Fred Dretske's conclusive reasons and Robert Nozick's truth-tracking|clarification]] of "justification" which he believed eliminates the problem: the justification has to be such that were the justification false, the knowledge would be false.<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://archive.org/details/isbn_9780674664791|title=Philosophical explanations|last=Nozick, Robert.|date=1981|publisher=Harvard University Press|isbn=0674664485|location=Cambridge, Mass.|oclc=7283862}}</ref> Bernecker and Dretske (2000) argue that "no epistemologist since Gettier has seriously and successfully defended the traditional view."<ref>{{cite book|title=Knowledge. Readings in contemporary epistemology|last1=Bernecker|first1=Sven|last2=Dretske|first2=Fred|date=2000|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0198752615|location=Oxford|page=3}}</ref>{{rp|3}} On the other hand, [[Paul Boghossian]] argues that the justified true belief account is the "standard, widely accepted" definition of knowledge.<ref name="Boghossian on Justification">{{Citation|author=Paul Boghossian|title=Fear of Knowledge: Against relativism and constructivism|date=2007|url=https://global.oup.com/academic/product/fear-of-knowledge-9780199230419?cc=us&lang=en&|location=Oxford, UK|publisher=Clarendon Press|isbn=978-0199230419|access-date=20 April 2017|archive-date=7 October 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171007022310/https://global.oup.com/academic/product/fear-of-knowledge-9780199230419?cc=us&lang=en&|url-status=live}}, Chapter 2, p. 15.</ref>

===Belief systems===
A '''belief system''' comprises a set of mutually supportive beliefs. The beliefs of any such system can be [[Religious belief|religious]], [[Philosophy|philosophical]], [[politics|political]], [[Ideology|ideological]], or a combination of these.<ref name= meadows2008 >"A system is an interconnected set of elements that is coherently organized in a way that achieves something." —[[Donella Meadows]] (2008) ''[https://wtf.tw/ref/meadows.pdf Thinking in Systems: A Primer] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210502081905/https://wtf.tw/ref/meadows.pdf |date=2 May 2021 }}'' p.11, as quoted by [https://medium.com/intercultural-mindset/belief-systems-what-they-are-and-how-they-affect-you-1cd87aa775ff Tim Rettig (2017) Belief Systems: what they are and how they affect you] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210516171438/https://medium.com/intercultural-mindset/belief-systems-what-they-are-and-how-they-affect-you-1cd87aa775ff |date=16 May 2021 }}</ref>

====Glover's view====
The British philosopher [[Jonathan Glover]], following Meadows (2008), says that beliefs are always part of a belief system, and that tenanted belief systems are difficult for the tenants to completely revise or reject.<ref name=BitesGlover>{{Cite web |url=http://philosophybites.com/2011/10/jonathan-glover-on-systems-of-belief.html |title="Jonathan Glover on systems of belief", Philosophy Bites Podcast, Oct 9 2011 |access-date=5 July 2014 |archive-date=14 October 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111014052132/http://philosophybites.com/2011/10/jonathan-glover-on-systems-of-belief.html |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite book|author= Elizabeth A. Minton, Lynn R. Khale|title= Belief Systems, Religion, and Behavioral Economics|year= 2014|location= New York|publisher= Business Expert Press LLC|isbn= 978-1606497043|url= https://books.google.com/books?id=hk5pngEACAAJ|access-date= 30 April 2019|archive-date= 22 December 2019|archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20191222011727/https://books.google.com/books?id=hk5pngEACAAJ|url-status= live}}</ref> He suggests that beliefs have to be considered [[holistically]], and that no belief exists in isolation in the mind of the believer. Each belief always implicates and relates to other beliefs.<ref name=BitesGlover/> Glover provides the example of a patient with an illness who returns to a doctor, but the doctor says that the prescribed medicine is not working. At that point, the patient has a great deal of flexibility in choosing what beliefs to keep or reject: the patient could believe that the doctor is incompetent, that the doctor's assistants made a mistake, that the patient's own body is unique in some unexpected way, that Western medicine is ineffective, or even that Western science is entirely unable to discover truths about ailments.<ref name=BitesGlover/>

This insight has relevance for [[inquisitor]]s, [[missionaries]], [[agitprop]] groups and [[wikt:thought police|thought-police]]. The British philosopher [[Stephen Law]] has described some belief systems (including belief in [[homeopathy]], [[psychic powers]], and [[alien abduction]]) as [[wikt:claptrap|"claptrap"]] and says that such belief-systems can "draw people in and hold them captive so they become willing slaves of claptrap ... if you get sucked in, it can be extremely difficult to think your way clear again".<ref>''[[New Scientist]]'' (magazine), 11 June 2011 [https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21028160.200-a-field-guide-to-bullshit.html A field guide to bullshit | New Scientist] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150616042330/http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21028160.200-a-field-guide-to-bullshit.html |date=16 June 2015 }} - "Intellectual black holes are belief systems that draw people in and hold them captive so they become willing slaves of claptrap. Belief in homeopathy, psychic powers, alien abductions—these are examples of intellectual black holes. As you approach them, you need to be on your guard because if you get sucked in, it can be extremely difficult to think your way clear again."</ref>

==Religion==
{{Religious text primary|section|date=August 2020}}
{{More citations needed|section|date=May 2021}}
{{Main|Faith}}
[[File:Religion collage updated.jpg|thumb]]
Religion is a personal set or institutionalized system of religious attitudes, beliefs, and practices; the service or worship of God or the supernatural.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Definition of RELIGION |url=https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/religion |access-date=2023-05-05 |website=Merriam-Webster |language=en}}</ref> Religious belief is distinct from [[ritual|religious practice]] and from [[religious behaviour]]s—with some believers not practicing [[religion]] and some practitioners not believing religion. ''Belief'' is no less of a theoretical term than is ''religion''.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Iii |first1=Thomas J. Coleman |last2=Jong |first2=Jonathan |last3=Mulukom |first3=Valerie van |date=2018-08-31 |title=Introduction to the Special Issue: What are Religious Beliefs? |url=https://brill.com/view/journals/copr/15/3/article-p279_279.xml |journal=Contemporary Pragmatism |volume=15 |issue=3 |pages=279–283 |doi=10.1163/18758185-01503001 |s2cid=171838557 |issn=1572-3429|doi-access=free }}</ref> Religious beliefs often relate to the existence, characteristics and worship of a [[deity]] or deities, to the idea of [[Miracle|divine intervention]] in the [[universe]] and in [[Personal life|human life]], or to the [[deontological]] explanations for the values and practices centered on the teachings of a [[spiritual leader]] or [[community]].<ref name="Nye 2008">{{Cite book |last=Nye |first=Malory |title=Religion: The Basics |publisher=Routledge |year=2008 |isbn=978-1134059478}}</ref> In contrast to other [[belief system]]s, religious beliefs are usually [[Codification (law)|codified]].<ref>{{cite book | title = Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief | publisher = University of California Press | author = Wittgenstein, Ludwig | year = 2007 | page = 53 | isbn = 978-0520251816}}</ref>

===Forms===
A popular view holds that different religions each have identifiable and exclusive sets of beliefs or [[creed]]s, but surveys of religious belief have often found that the official doctrine and descriptions of the beliefs offered by religious authorities do not always agree with the privately held beliefs of those who identify as members of a particular religion.<ref>{{cite book | title = An empiricist's view of the nature of religious belief | publisher = Norwood Editions (Norwood, Pa.) | author = Braithwaite, R.B. | year = 1975 | isbn = 978-0883059555}}</ref> For a broad classification of the kinds of religious belief, see below.

====Fundamentalism====
{{Main|Religious fundamentalism}}
First self-applied as a term to the conservative doctrine outlined by anti-modernist [[Protestants]] in the United States,<ref name="A.C. Dixon">{{cite web |date= 2012-11-27 |url = http://user.xmission.com/~fidelis/volume1/volume1.php |title = The Fundamentals: A Testimony to the Truth |access-date = 2012-11-28 |url-status = dead |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20121203144842/http://user.xmission.com/~fidelis/volume1/volume1.php |archive-date = 3 December 2012 }}</ref> "fundamentalism" in religious terms denotes strict adherence to an interpretation of scriptures that are generally associated with theologically conservative positions or traditional understandings of the text and are distrustful of innovative readings, new revelation, or alternative interpretations.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Bruce|first=Steve|url=http://worldcat.org/oclc/1001942770|title=Fundamentalism|date=2008|publisher=Polity|isbn=978-0745640754|oclc=1001942770}}</ref> Religious fundamentalism has been identified{{by whom|date=November 2017}} in the media as being associated with [[fanaticism|fanatical]] or [[zealotry|zealous]] political movements around the world that have used a strict adherence to a particular religious doctrine as a means to establish political identity and to enforce societal norms.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Fox|first=Jonathan|date=2018-02-13|title=An Introduction to Religion and Politics|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315183787|doi=10.4324/9781315183787|isbn=978-1315183787}}</ref>

====Orthodoxy====
{{Main|Orthodoxy}}
First used in the context of [[Early Christianity]], the term "orthodoxy" relates to religious belief that closely follows the edicts, [[apologetics|apologies]], and [[hermeneutics]] of a prevailing religious authority. In the case of Early Christianity, this authority was the communion of bishops, and is often referred to by the term "[[Magisterium]]". The term ''orthodox'' was applied{{when|date= November 2017}} almost as an epithet to a group of Jewish believers who held to pre-Enlightenment understanding of Judaism—now known as [[Orthodox Judaism]]. The [[Eastern Orthodox Church]] of Christianity and the [[Catholic Church]] each consider themselves to be the true heir to Early Christian belief and practice. The antonym of "orthodox" is "[[heterodox]]", and those adhering to orthodoxy often accuse the heterodox of [[apostasy]], [[schism (religion)|schism]], or [[heresy]].

====Modernism/reform====
The [[Renaissance]] and later the [[Age of Enlightenment|Enlightenment]] in Europe exhibited varying degrees of [[religious tolerance]] and intolerance towards new and old religious ideas. The ''[[philosophes]]'' took particular exception to many of the more fantastical claims of religions and directly challenged religious authority and the prevailing beliefs associated with the established churches. In response to the liberalizing political and social movements, some religious groups attempted to integrate Enlightenment ideals of rationality, equality, and individual liberty into their belief systems, especially in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. [[Reform Judaism]]<ref>{{Cite web |title=What is Reform Judaism? |url=https://www.reformjudaism.org/what-reform-judaism |access-date=2022-03-27 |website=Reform Judaism |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |title=Reform Judaism {{!}} Britannica |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/Reform-Judaism |access-date=2022-03-27 |newspaper=Encyclopedia Britannica |language=en}}</ref> and [[Liberal Christianity]] offer two examples of such religious associations.

=== Attitudes to other religions ===
Adherents of particular religions deal with the differing doctrines and practices espoused by other religions or by other [[religious denomination]]s in a variety of ways.

====Exclusivism====
{{See also|Religious exclusivism}}
People with exclusivist beliefs typically explain other beliefs either as in error, or as corruptions or counterfeits of the [[one true faith|true faith]]. This approach is a fairly consistent feature among smaller [[new religious movement]]s that often rely on doctrine that claims a unique [[revelation]] by the [[Founders of religious traditions|founders]] or [[leader]]s, and considers it a matter of faith that the "correct" religion has a monopoly on truth. All three major [[Abrahamic religions|Abrahamic monotheistic religions]] have passages in their holy scriptures that attest to the primacy of the scriptural testimony, and indeed [[monotheism]] itself is often{{quantify|date=June 2018}} vouched{{by whom|date= November 2017}} as an innovation characterized specifically by its explicit rejection of earlier polytheistic faiths.

Some exclusivist faiths incorporate a specific element of [[proselytization]]. This is a strongly-held belief in the Christian tradition which follows the doctrine of the [[Great Commission]], and is less emphasized by the Islamic faith where the [[Quran]]ic edict "There shall be no compulsion in religion" (2:256) is often quoted as a justification for toleration of alternative beliefs. The [[Conversion to Judaism|Jewish tradition]] does not actively seek out converts.

Exclusivism correlates with conservative, fundamentalist, and orthodox approaches of many religions, while pluralistic and syncretist approaches either explicitly downplay or reject the exclusivist tendencies within a religion.{{citation needed|date=November 2017}}<ref>{{Cite book|last=Meister|first=Chad|title=The Oxford Handbook of Religious Diversity|publisher=OUP US|year=2011|isbn=978-0195340136}}</ref>

====Inclusivism====
People with [[inclusivism|inclusivist]] beliefs recognize some truth in all faith [[system]]s, highlighting agreements and minimizing differences. This attitude is sometimes associated{{by whom|date= November 2017}} with [[Interfaith dialog]]ue or with the Christian [[Ecumenical]] movement, though in principle such attempts at pluralism are not necessarily inclusivist and many actors in such interactions (for example, the [[Roman Catholic Church]]) still hold to exclusivist dogma while participating in inter-religious organizations. Explicitly inclusivist religions include many that are associated with the [[New Age]] movement, as well as modern reinterpretations of [[Hinduism]] and [[Buddhism]]. The [[Baháʼí Faith]] considers it doctrine that there is truth in all faith systems.

[[Religious pluralism|Pluralism]] and [[syncretism]] are two closely related concepts. People with pluralist beliefs make no distinction between faith systems, viewing each one as valid within a particular culture. People with syncretic views blend the views of a variety of different religions or traditional beliefs into a unique fusion which suits their particular [[experience]]s and contexts ([[eclecticism]]). [[Unitarian Universalism]] exemplifies a syncretic faith.

===Adherence===
{{See also|Existence of God}}
Typical reasons for adherence to religion include the following:
* Some see belief in a deity as necessary for [[Morality|moral behavior]].<ref name="moore">Compare: {{cite magazine | date = 2005-03-07 | url = http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2005/110/13.0.html | title = Roy Moore: 'We Have No Morality Without an Acknowledgment of God' | magazine = [[Christianity Today]] | access-date = 2006-05-19 | archive-date = 8 January 2009 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20090108205932/http://www.christianitytoday.com./ct/2005/110/13.0.html | url-status = live }}</ref>
* Some regard religious practices as serene, beautiful, and conducive to religious experiences, which in turn support religious beliefs.<ref>{{cite web | last = Miller | first = David Ian | date = 2005-02-15 | url = http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/gate/archive/2005/02/15/findrelig.DTL | title = Finding My Religion: Steve Georgiou on his faith and mentor, minimalist poet Robert Lax | publisher = SFGate | access-date = 2006-05-19 | archive-date = 16 May 2012 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20120516095524/http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=%2Fgate%2Farchive%2F2005%2F02%2F15%2Ffindrelig.DTL | url-status = live }}</ref>
* Organized religions promote a [[sense of community]] among their followers, and the moral and cultural common ground of these communities makes them attractive to people with similar [[values]].<ref name="repa">{{cite web | last = Repa | first = J. Theodore | date = 1998-10-18 | url = http://pages.nyu.edu/~jtr1/sermon.htm | title = Building Community: The Marriage of Religion and Education | access-date = 2006-05-19 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20060907172411/http://pages.nyu.edu/~jtr1/sermon.htm | archive-date = 7 September 2006 | url-status = dead | df = dmy-all }}</ref> Indeed, while religious beliefs and practices are usually connected, some individuals with substantially secular beliefs still participate in religious practices for cultural reasons.<ref>Note for example the concept of a [[cultural Christian]].</ref>
* Each religion asserts that it is a means by which its adherents may come into closer contact with the Divine, with Truth, and with [[spiritual power]]. They all promise to free adherents from spiritual bondage, and to bring them into spiritual freedom. It naturally follows that a religion which can free its adherents from deception, sin, and spiritual death will have significant mental-health benefits. [[Abraham Maslow]]'s research after [[World War II]] showed that [[the Holocaust|Holocaust]] survivors tended to be those who held strong religious beliefs (not necessarily temple attendance, etc.), suggesting that belief helped people cope in extreme circumstances. [[Humanistic psychology]] went on to investigate how religious or spiritual identity may have correlations with longer lifespan and better health. The study found that humans may particularly need religious ideas to serve various emotional needs such as the need to feel loved, the need to belong to homogeneous groups, the need for understandable explanations and the need for a guarantee of ultimate justice. Other factors may involve sense of [[Motivation|purpose]], sense of [[Identity (social science)|identity]], or a sense of contact with the divine. See also ''[[Man's Search for Meaning]]'', by [[Viktor Frankl]], detailing his experience with the importance of religion in surviving the Holocaust. Critics assert that the very fact that religion was the primary selector for research subjects may have introduced a bias, and that the fact that all subjects were Holocaust survivors may also have had an effect. According to Larson et al. (2000), "[m]ore longitudinal research with better multidimensional measures will help further clarify the roles of these [religious] factors and whether they are beneficial or harmful."<ref name="larson">{{cite journal | last = Larson | first = David B. | author2 = Susan S. Larson | author3 = Harold G. Koenig | date = October 2000 | title = Research Findings on Religious Commitment and Mental Health | journal = Psychiatric Times | volume = 17 | issue = 10 | url = http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/p001078.html | access-date = 2006-05-19 | archive-date = 8 January 2009 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20090108120239/http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/p001078.html | url-status = live }}</ref>

Psychologist [[James Alcock]] also summarizes a number of apparent benefits which reinforce religious belief. These include prayer appearing to account for successful resolution of problems, "a bulwark against existential anxiety and fear of annihilation," an increased sense of control, companionship with one's deity, a source of self-significance, and group identity.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Alcock |first1=James |author-link1=James Alcock |title=The God Engine |journal=[[Skeptical Inquirer]] |date=2018 |volume=42 |issue=5 |pages=32–38}}</ref>

===Apostasy===
{{Main|Apostasy}}
{{See also|Existence of God#Arguments against the existence of God or gods}}
Typical reasons for rejection of religion include:
* Some people regard certain fundamental doctrines of some religions as illogical, contrary to experience, or unsupported by sufficient [[evidence]]; such people may reject one or more religions for those reasons.<ref name="russell">For example: {{cite web |last= Russell |first = Bertrand |author-link = Bertrand Russell |date = 1927|url = http://www.positiveatheism.org/hist/russell0.htm |title = Why I am Not a Christian |access-date = 2006-05-19 |url-status = dead |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20061119081311/http://www.positiveatheism.org/hist/russell0.htm |archive-date = 2006-11-19}}</ref> Even some believers may have difficulty accepting particular religious assertions or doctrines. Some people believe the body of evidence available to humans to be insufficient to justify certain religious beliefs. They may thus disagree with religious interpretations of ethics and human purpose, or with various [[creation myth]]s. This reason has perhaps{{original research inline|date= November 2017}} been aggravated by the protestations and emphases of some [[Fundamentalist Christianity|fundamentalist Christians]].
* Some religions include beliefs that certain groups of people are inferior or sinful and deserve contempt, persecution, or even death, and that non-believers will be punished for their unbelief in an [[after-life]].<ref>For example, some [[Muslim]]s believe that women are inferior to men. Some [[Christians]] share this belief. At the time of the [[American Civil War]] of 1861–1865, many Southerners used passages from the [[Bible]] to justify race-based [[slavery]]. Certain campaigners have used the Christian religion as a reason to persecute and to deny the rights of homosexuals, on the basis that the Christian biblical God disapproves of homosexuality, and by implication of homosexuals. Compare http://www.godhatesfags.com {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210307223124/https://www.godhatesfags.com/ |date=7 March 2021 }}</ref> Adherents to a religion may feel antipathy to unbelievers. Numerous examples exist of people of one religion or sect using religion as an excuse to murder people with different religious beliefs. To mention just a few examples:
** the slaughter of the [[Huguenot]]s by French [[Catholics]] in the sixteenth century
** [[Hindu]]s and [[Muslim]]s killing each other when [[Pakistan]] separated from India in 1947
** the persecution and killing of [[Shiite]] Muslims by [[Sunni]] Muslims in Iraq
** the murder of [[Protestant]]s by [[Catholics]] and vice versa in [[Ireland]] (both of these examples in the late twentieth century)
** the [[Israeli–Palestinian conflict]] that continues {{as of | 2018 | lc = on}} – According to some critics of religion, such beliefs can encourage completely unnecessary conflicts and in some cases even wars. Many [[atheist]]s believe that, because of this, religion is incompatible with world peace, freedom, civil rights, equality, and good government. On the other hand, most religions perceive atheism as a threat and will vigorously and even violently<ref name=":0" /> defend themselves against religious sterilization, making the attempt to remove public religious practices a source of strife.<ref name=":0">Beauchamp, Philip (pseudonym of Jeremy Bentham) [https://books.google.com/books?id=qiRQAAAAIAAJ ''Analysis of the Influence of Natural Religion on the Temporal Happiness of Mankind''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200204213852/https://books.google.com/books?id=qiRQAAAAIAAJ&printsec=frontcover |date=4 February 2020 }}, 1822, R. Carlile, London, at page 76: "Of all human antipathies, that which the believer in a God bears to the unbeliever is the fullest, the most unqualified, and the most universal"</ref>
* Some people may be unable to accept the values that a specific religion promotes and will therefore not join that religion. They may also be unable to accept the proposition that those who do not believe will go to hell or be damned, especially if said nonbelievers are close to the person.

==Psychology==
{{More citations needed|section|date=May 2021}}
Mainstream psychology and related disciplines have traditionally treated belief as if it were the simplest form of mental representation and therefore one of the building blocks of conscious thought.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Bering|first=Jesse|date=2006|title=The Cognitive Psychology of Belief in the Supernatural|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1511/2006.58.142|journal=American Scientist|volume=94|issue=2|pages=142|doi=10.1511/2006.58.142|issn=0003-0996}}</ref> Philosophers have tended to be more abstract in their analysis, and much of the work examining the viability of the belief concept stems from philosophical analysis.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Barnett|first=Zach|date=2019-01-01|title=Philosophy Without Belief|url=https://academic.oup.com/mind/article/128/509/109/3897540|journal=Mind|language=en|volume=128|issue=509|pages=109–138|doi=10.1093/mind/fzw076|issn=0026-4423}}</ref>

The concept of belief presumes a subject (the believer) and an object of belief (the proposition). Like other [[propositional attitude]]s, belief implies the existence of [[mental state]]s and [[intentionality]], both of which are hotly debated topics in the [[philosophy of mind]], whose foundations and relation to brain states are still controversial.

Beliefs are sometimes divided into [[core beliefs]] (that are actively thought about) and [[dispositional belief]]s (that may be ascribed to someone who has not thought about the issue). For example, if asked "do you believe tigers wear pink pajamas?" a person might answer that they do not, despite the fact they may never have thought about this situation before.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Bell |first1=V. |last2=Halligan |first2=P.W. |last3=Ellis |first3=H.D. |year=2006 |chapter=A Cognitive Neuroscience of Belief |editor1-first=Peter W. |editor1-last=Halligan |editor2-first=Mansel |editor2-last=Aylward |title=The Power of Belief: Psychological Influence on Illness, Disability, and Medicine |location=Oxford |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0198530107 }}</ref>

Philosopher [[Lynne Rudder Baker]] has outlined four main contemporary approaches to belief in her book ''Saving Belief'':<ref>{{cite book |first=Lynne Rudder |last=Baker |title=Saving Belief: A Critique of Physicalism |publisher=Princeton University Press |year=1989 |isbn=978-0691073200 }}</ref>
* Our common-sense understanding of belief is correct – Sometimes called the "mental sentence theory," in this conception, beliefs exist as coherent entities, and the way we talk about them in everyday life is a valid basis for scientific endeavor. [[Jerry Fodor]] was one of the principal defenders of this point of view.
* Our common-sense understanding of belief may not be entirely correct, but it is close enough to make some useful predictions – This view argues that we will eventually reject the idea of belief as we know it now, but that there may be a correlation between what we take to be a belief when someone says "I believe that snow is white" and how a future theory of psychology will explain this behavior. Philosopher [[Stephen Stich]] has argued for this particular understanding of belief.
* Our common-sense understanding of belief is entirely wrong and will be completely superseded by a radically different theory that will have no use for the concept of belief as we know it – Known as [[eliminativism]], this view (most notably proposed by [[Paul Churchland|Paul]] and [[Patricia Churchland]]) argues that the concept of belief is like obsolete theories of times past such as [[the four humours]] theory of medicine, or the [[phlogiston theory]] of combustion. In these cases science has not provided us with a more detailed account of these theories, but completely rejected them as valid scientific concepts to be replaced by entirely different accounts. The Churchland argue that our common-sense concept of belief is similar in that as we discover more about neuroscience and the brain, the inevitable conclusion will be to reject the belief hypothesis in its entirety.
* Our common-sense understanding of belief is entirely wrong; however, treating people, animals, and even computers as if they had beliefs is often a successful strategy – The major proponents of this view, [[Daniel Dennett]] and [[Lynne Rudder Baker]], are both eliminativists in that they hold that beliefs are not a scientifically valid concept, but they do not go as far as rejecting the concept of belief as a predictive device. Dennett gives the example of playing a computer at chess. While few people would agree that the computer held beliefs, treating the computer as if it did (e.g. that the computer believes that taking the opposition's queen will give it a considerable advantage) is likely to be a successful and predictive strategy. In this understanding of belief, named by Dennett ''the [[intentional stance]]'', belief-based explanations of mind and behaviour are at a different level of explanation and are not reducible to those based on fundamental neuroscience, although both may be explanatory at their own level.
Strategic approaches make a distinction between rules, norms and beliefs as follows:
* Rules. Explicit regulative processes such as policies, laws, inspection routines, or incentives. Rules function as a coercive regulator of behavior and are dependent upon the imposing entity's ability to enforce them.
* Norms. Regulative mechanisms accepted by the social collective. Norms are enforced by normative mechanisms within the organization and are not strictly dependent upon law or regulation.
* Beliefs. The collective perception of fundamental truths governing behavior. The adherence to accepted and shared beliefs by members of a social system will likely persist and be difficult to change over time. Strong beliefs about determinant factors (i.e., security, survival, or honor) are likely to cause a social entity or group to accept rules and norms.<ref>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Army (2012). Information Operations. Joint Publication 3–13. Joint Doctrine Support Division, Suffolk, VA. p. 22.</ref>

===Belief formation and revision===
{{See also|Belief revision}}
Belief revision is a term commonly used to refer to the modification of beliefs. An extensive amount of scientific research and philosophical discussion exists around belief revision. Generally speaking, the process of belief revision entails the believer weighing the set of truths and/or evidence, and the dominance of a set of truths or evidence on an alternative to a held belief can lead to revision. One process of belief revision is [[Bayesian inference|Bayesian updating]] (or [[Bayesian inference]]) and is often referenced for its mathematical basis and conceptual simplicity.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Parr |first1=Thomas |last2=Rees |first2=Geraint |last3=Friston |first3=Karl J. |date=2018 |title=Computational Neuropsychology and Bayesian Inference |journal=Frontiers in Human Neuroscience |volume=12 |page=61 |doi=10.3389/fnhum.2018.00061 |pmid=29527157 |pmc=5829460 |issn=1662-5161 |doi-access=free }}</ref> However, such a process may not be representative for individuals whose beliefs are not easily characterized as probabilistic.

There are several techniques for individuals or groups to change the beliefs of others; these methods generally fall under the umbrella of [[persuasion]]. Persuasion can take on more specific forms such as [[consciousness raising]] when considered in an activist or political context. Belief modification may also occur as a result of the experience of outcomes. Because [[goal]]s are based, in part on beliefs, the success or failure at a particular goal may contribute to modification of beliefs that supported the original goal.

Whether or not belief modification actually occurs is dependent not only on the extent of truths or evidence for the alternative belief, but also characteristics outside the specific truths or evidence. This includes, but is not limited to: the source characteristics of the message, such as [[Source credibility|credibility]]; [[Peer pressure|social pressures]]; the anticipated consequences of a modification; or the ability of the individual or group to act on the modification. Therefore, individuals seeking to achieve belief modification in themselves or others need to consider all possible forms of resistance to belief revision.

Glover maintains that any person can continue to hold any belief if they would really like to<ref name=BitesGlover/> (for example, with help from [[ad hoc hypotheses|''ad hoc'' hypotheses]]). One belief can be held fixed, and other beliefs will be altered around it. Glover warns that some beliefs may not be entirely [[Explicit memory|explicitly]] believed (for example, some people may not realize they have racist belief-systems adopted from their environment as a child). Glover believes that people tend to first realize that beliefs can change, and may be contingent on their upbringing, around age 12 or 15.<ref name=BitesGlover/>

[[File:Snipa.JPG|thumb|right|240px| Philosopher Jonathan Glover warns that belief systems are like whole boats in the water; it is extremely difficult to alter them all at once (for example, it may be too stressful, or people may maintain their biases without realizing it).<ref name=BitesGlover/>]] Glover emphasizes that beliefs are difficult to change. He says that one may try to rebuild one's beliefs on more secure foundations ([[axioms]]), like building a new house, but warns that this may not be possible. Glover offers the example of [[René Descartes]], saying: "[Descartes] starts off with the characteristic beliefs of a 17th-century Frenchman; he then junks the lot, he rebuilds the system, and somehow it looks a lot like the beliefs of a 17th-century Frenchman." To Glover, belief systems are not like houses but are instead like boats. As Glover puts it: "Maybe the whole thing needs rebuilding, but inevitably at any point you have to keep enough of it intact to keep floating."<ref name=BitesGlover/>

====Models of belief formation====
[[File:Ripples of influence.jpg|thumb|We are influenced by many factors that ripple through our minds as our beliefs form, evolve, and may eventually change.]]
Psychologists study belief formation and the relationship between beliefs and actions. Three types of ''models of belief formation'' and change have been proposed: conditional inference process models, linear models and information processing models.

'''Conditional inference process models''' emphasize the role of inference for belief formation. When asked to estimate the likelihood that a statement is true, people allegedly search their memory for information that has implications for the validity of this statement. Once this information has been identified, they estimate the likelihood that the statement would be true if the information were true, and the likelihood that the statement would be true if the information were false. If their estimates for these two [[Probability|probabilities]] differ, people average them, weighting each by the likelihood that the information is true and false. Thus, information bears directly on beliefs of another, related statement.<ref name="Wyer, R. S. 2005">Wyer, R.S., & Albarracin, D. (2005). "Belief formation, organization, and change: Cognitive and motivational influences". In D. Albarracin, B.T. Johnson, & M.P. Zanna, ''The Handbook of Attitudes'' (273–322). New York: Psychology Press.</ref>

Unlike the previous model, '''linear models''' take into consideration the possibility of multiple factors influencing belief formation. Using regression procedures, these models predict belief formation on the basis of several different pieces of information, with weights assigned to each piece on the basis of their relative importance.<ref name="Wyer, R. S. 2005" />

'''Information processing models''' address the fact that the responses people have to belief-relevant information is unlikely to be predicted from the objective basis of the information that they can recall at the time their beliefs are reported. Instead, these responses reflect the number and meaning of the thoughts that people have about the message at the time that they encounter it.<ref name="Wyer, R. S. 2005" />

Some influences on people's belief formation include:
* Internalization of beliefs during childhood, which can form and shape humans' beliefs in different domains. [[Albert Einstein]] is often quoted as having said that "Common sense is the collection of prejudices acquired by age eighteen." Political beliefs depend most strongly on the political beliefs most common in the community where one lives.<ref>{{cite book |author-link= Andrew Gelman |first1= Andrew |last1= Gelman |first2= David |last2= Park |first3= Boris |last3=Shor |first4= Joseph |last4= Bafumi |first5= Jeronimo |last5= Cortina |title=Red State, Blue State, Rich State, Poor State: Why Americans Vote the Way They Do |publisher=Princeton University Press |year=2008 |isbn=978-0691139272 |url= https://archive.org/details/redstatebluestat00gelm }}</ref> Most individuals believe the [[religion]] they were taught in childhood.<ref>{{cite book |first=Michael |last=Argyle |title=The Psychology of Religious Behaviour, Belief and Experience |location=London |publisher=Routledge |year=1997 |isbn=978-0415123303 |page=25 |quote=Religion, in most cultures, is ascribed, not chosen. }}</ref>
* [[Charismatic leader]]s can form or modify beliefs (even if those beliefs fly in the face of all previous beliefs).<ref>{{cite book |first=Eric |last=Hoffer |title=The True Believer |location=New York |publisher=Harper Perennial Modern Classics |year=2002 |isbn=978-0060505912 }}</ref> Rational individuals need to reconcile their direct reality with any said belief; therefore, if belief is not present or possible, it reflects the fact that contradictions were necessarily overcome using [[cognitive dissonance]].
* [[Advertising]] can form or change beliefs through repetition, shock, or association with images of sex, love, beauty, and other strong positive emotions.<ref>{{cite book |first1= Jane |last1= Kilbourne |first2= Mary |last2= Pipher |title= Can't Buy My Love: How Advertising Changes the Way We Think and Feel |publisher=Free Press |year=2000 |isbn=978-0684866000 |url= https://archive.org/details/cantbuymylovehow00kilb }}</ref> Contrary to [[intuition]], a delay, known as the [[sleeper effect]], instead of immediate succession may increase an advertisement's ability to persuade viewer's beliefs if a discounting cue is present.<ref>See Kumkale & Albarracin, 2004.</ref>
* Physical trauma, especially to the head, can radically alter a person's beliefs.<ref>{{cite book |first=Babette |last= Rothschild |title=The Body Remembers: The Psychophysiology of Trauma and Trauma Treatment |publisher=W.W. Norton & Company |location=New York |year=2000 |isbn=978-0393703276 }}</ref>

However, even educated people, well aware of the process by which beliefs form, still strongly cling to their beliefs, and act on those beliefs even against their own self-interest. In her book ''Leadership Therapy'', Anna Rowley states: "You want your beliefs to change. It's proof that you are keeping your eyes open, living fully, and welcoming everything that the world and people around you can teach you." This view implies that peoples' beliefs may evolve as they gain new experiences.<ref>{{cite book |last=Rowley |first=Anna |title=Leadership Therapy: Inside the Mind of Microsoft |location=Basingstoke |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan |year=2007 |page=[https://archive.org/details/leadershiptherap0000rowl/page/69 69] |isbn=978-1403984036 |url= https://archive.org/details/leadershiptherap0000rowl/page/69 }}</ref>

===Prediction===
Different psychological models have tried to predict people's beliefs and some of them try to estimate the exact probabilities of beliefs. For example, [[Robert S. Wyer|Robert Wyer]] developed a model of subjective probabilities.<ref name="Wyer, R. S. 1970">{{cite journal |last=Wyer |first=R.S. |year=1970 |title=Quantitative prediction of belief and opinion change: A further test of a subjective probability model |journal=Journal of Personality and Social Psychology |volume=16 |issue=4 |pages=559–570 |doi=10.1037/h0030064 }}</ref><ref name="WyerGoldberg">{{cite journal |last1=Wyer |first1=R.S. |last2=Goldberg |first2=L. |year=1970 |title=A probabilistic analysis of the relationships among beliefs and attitudes |journal=Psychological Review |volume=77 |issue=2 |pages=100–120 |doi=10.1037/h0028769 }}</ref> When people rate the likelihood of a certain statement (e.g., "It will rain tomorrow"), this rating can be seen as a subjective probability value. The subjective probability model posits that these subjective probabilities follow the same rules as objective probabilities. For example, the [[law of total probability]] might be applied to predict a subjective probability value. Wyer found that this model produces relatively accurate predictions for probabilities of single events and for changes in these probabilities, but that the probabilities of several beliefs linked by "and" or "or" do not follow the model as well.<ref name="Wyer, R. S. 1970" /><ref name="WyerGoldberg" />

===Delusion===
In the [[DSM-5]], delusions are defined as fixed false beliefs that are not changed even when confronted with conflicting evidence.

=== Belief studies ===

[[File:Socio-demographic correlates of witchcraft beliefs.png|thumb|Socio-demographic correlates of witchcraft beliefs<ref name="10.1371/journal.pone.0276872"/>]]
There is research investigating specific beliefs, types of beliefs and patterns of beliefs. For example, a study estimated contemporary prevalence and associations with belief in [[witchcraft]] around the world, which (in its data) varied between 9% and 90% between [[nation]]s and is still a widespread element in [[Reality#World views and theories|worldviews]] globally. It also shows associations such as with lower "innovative activity", higher levels of anxiety, lower [[life expectancy]], and higher [[religiosity]].<ref>{{cite news |title=Witchcraft beliefs are widespread, highly variable around the world |url=https://phys.org/news/2022-11-witchcraft-beliefs-widespread-highly-variable.html |access-date=17 December 2022 |work=Public Library of Science via phys.org |language=en}}</ref><ref name="10.1371/journal.pone.0276872">{{cite journal |last1=Gershman |first1=Boris |title=Witchcraft beliefs around the world: An exploratory analysis |journal=PLOS ONE |date=23 November 2022 |volume=17 |issue=11 |pages=e0276872 |doi=10.1371/journal.pone.0276872|pmid=36417350 |pmc=9683553 |bibcode=2022PLoSO..1776872G |doi-access=free}}</ref> Other research is investigating beliefs in misinformation and their resistance to correction, including with respect to [[Misinformation#Countermeasures|misinformation countermeasures]]. It describes cognitive, social and affective processes that leave people vulnerable to the formation of false beliefs.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Ecker |first1=Ullrich K. H. |last2=Lewandowsky |first2=Stephan |last3=Cook |first3=John |last4=Schmid |first4=Philipp |last5=Fazio |first5=Lisa K. |last6=Brashier |first6=Nadia |last7=Kendeou |first7=Panayiota |last8=Vraga |first8=Emily K. |last9=Amazeen |first9=Michelle A. |title=The psychological drivers of misinformation belief and its resistance to correction |journal=Nature Reviews Psychology |date=January 2022 |volume=1 |issue=1 |pages=13–29 |doi=10.1038/s44159-021-00006-y |s2cid=245916820 |language=en |issn=2731-0574|doi-access=free |hdl=1983/889ddb0f-0d44-44f4-a54f-57c260ae4917 |hdl-access=free }}</ref> A study introduced the concept of ''false social reality'' which refers to widespread perceptions of public opinion that are shown to be false, such as [[Public opinion on climate change|underestimated]] general [[Climate communication|public support]] in the U.S. for [[climate change mitigation]] [[policy|policies]].<ref>{{cite news |last1=Clifford |first1=Catherine |title=Americans don't think other Americans care about climate change as much as they do |url=https://www.cnbc.com/2022/08/24/americans-underestimate-how-much-their-peers-care-about-climate-change.html |access-date=15 September 2022 |work=CNBC |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Sparkman |first1=Gregg |last2=Geiger |first2=Nathan |last3=Weber |first3=Elke U. |title=Americans experience a false social reality by underestimating popular climate policy support by nearly half |journal=Nature Communications |date=23 August 2022 |volume=13 |issue=1 |pages=4779 |doi=10.1038/s41467-022-32412-y |pmid=35999211 |pmc=9399177 |bibcode=2022NatCo..13.4779S |language=en |issn=2041-1723|doi-access=free}}</ref> Studies also suggested some uses of [[psychedelic]]s can shift beliefs in some humans in certain ways, such as increasing attribution of consciousness to various entities (including plants and inanimate objects) and towards [[panpsychism]] and [[fatalism]].<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Nayak |first1=Sandeep M. |last2=Griffiths |first2=Roland R. |title=A Single Belief-Changing Psychedelic Experience Is Associated With Increased Attribution of Consciousness to Living and Non-living Entities |journal=Frontiers in Psychology |date=28 March 2022 |volume=13 |page=852248 |doi=10.3389/fpsyg.2022.852248 |pmid=35418909 |pmc=8995647 |language=English |issn=1664-1078|doi-access=free }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Timmermann |first1=Christopher |last2=Kettner |first2=Hannes |last3=Letheby |first3=Chris |last4=Roseman |first4=Leor |last5=Rosas |first5=Fernando E. |last6=Carhart-Harris |first6=Robin L. |author6-link=Robin Carhart-Harris|title=Psychedelics alter metaphysical beliefs |journal=Scientific Reports |date=23 November 2021 |volume=11 |issue=1 |pages=22166 |doi=10.1038/s41598-021-01209-2 |pmid=34815421 |pmc=8611059 |bibcode=2021NatSR..1122166T |language=en |issn=2045-2322}}</ref>

=== Emotion and beliefs ===
{{Expand section|date=January 2020}}
Research has indicated that [[emotion]] and cognition act in conjunction to produce beliefs, and more specifically emotion plays a vital role in the formation and maintenance of beliefs.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Emotions and Beliefs|last=Frijda|first=Nico H|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=2010|isbn=978-0511659904}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Mercer|first=Jonathan|date=January 2010|title=Emotional Beliefs|journal=International Organization|volume=65|pages=1–31|doi=10.1017/S0020818309990221|s2cid=232251086}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Harlé|first1=Katia M.|last2=Shenoy|first2=Pradeep|last3=Paulus|first3=Martin P.|date=2013-09-19|title=The influence of emotions on cognitive control: feelings and beliefs—where do they meet?|journal=Frontiers in Human Neuroscience|volume=7|pages=508|doi=10.3389/fnhum.2013.00508|issn=1662-5161|pmc=3776943|pmid=24065901|doi-access=free}}</ref>

==See also==
{{Portal|Philosophy|Psychology|Society}}
{{Columns-list|colwidth=15em|
* [[Alief (belief)|Alief]]
* [[Bayesian epistemology]]
* [[Culture-specific syndrome]]
* [[Doxastic attitudes]]
* [[Doxastic logic]]
* [[Doxastic voluntarism]]
* [[Expectation (epistemic)]]
* [[Idea]]
* [[Magical thinking]]
* [[Moore's paradox]]
* [[Observer-expectancy effect]]
* [[Opinion]]
* [[Propositional knowledge]]
* [[Self-deception]]
* [[Subject-expectancy effect]]
* [[Subjective validation]]
* [[Suggestibility]]
* [[Suggestion]]
* [[Theory of justification]]
* [[Thomas theorem]]
* [[Tinkerbell effect]]
* [[Trust (social sciences)|Trust]]
* [[Unintended consequence]]
* [[Validity (logic)|Validity]]
* [[Value (personal and cultural)]]
* [[World view]]
}}

==References==
{{Reflist}}

==Further reading==
* [[Robert Audi]] (Dec. 1994). [https://www.jstor.org/stable/2215473 "Dispositional Beliefs and Dispositions to Believe"], ''[[Noûs]]'', Vol. 28, No. 4, pp.&nbsp;419–434. {{OCLC|481484099}}.
* Coleman, T. III, Jong, J., & van Mulukom, V. (2018). [http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/journals/10.1163/18758185-01503001 Introduction to the Special Issue: What are Religious Beliefs?]. Contemporary Pragmatism, 15(3), 279–283. {{doi|10.1163/18758185-01503001}}
* Järnefelt, Elisa, ''Created by Some Being: Theoretical and Empirical Exploration of Adults' Automatic and Reflective Beliefs about the Origin of Natural Phenomena.'' Diss. University of Helsinki, 2013. {{ISBN|978-9521094163}}.
* Leicester, J. "What beliefs are made from". Sharjah, UAE: Bentham Science Publishers, 2016.

==External links==
{{Commons category|Belief}}
{{Wikiquote}}
{{Wikiversity|Knowing How You Know}}
{{Wikiversity|Seeking True Beliefs}}
{{Wiktionary|belief}}
{{Wiktionary|belief system}}
* {{cite SEP |url-id=belief |title=Belief |last=Schwitzgebel |first=Eric}}
* {{IEP|beli-aim|The Aim of Belief}}
* [[John Russell, Viscount Amberley|John Russell]] (1877), [https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/64748 An analysis of religious belief].
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[[Category:Belief| ]]
[[Category:Religious belief and doctrine| ]]
[[Category:Concepts in epistemology]]
[[Category:Propositional attitudes]]
[[Category:Psychological attitude]]
[[Category:Psychological concepts]]
[[Category:Truth]]